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RULE OF LAW PROGRAMME
 FOR SUB SAHARAN AFRICA
About the African Group of Experts on 
International Criminal Justice
About the group:
The African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice was formed in 
2010 under the auspices of the Multinational Development Policy Dialogue of the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS) based in Brussels, Belgium. In 2012, the group’s 
activities were transferred to the Rule of Law Programme for Sub Saharan Africa 
based in Nairobi, Kenya. The group meets annually to discuss matters related to 
international criminal justice on the African continent. The members of the group 
are drawn from various parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and consist of academics and 
legal	practitioners	holding	expertise	in	the	fi	eld	of	international	criminal	law.
Mission statement:
The group’s primary focus is to produce a regular edited publication to serve as 
an annual compendium of international criminal justice on the African continent. 
The publication is created by Africans for a global readership and aims to provide 
contemporaneous, diverse and critical perspectives from within Africa regarding 
important developments and issues relating to the prosecution of international and 
transnational	crimes	on	the	continent.	The	publication	aims	to	refl	ect	the	character	
of the modern, complementarity-centred international criminal justice system in 
that its focus falls not only on supranational (continental and regional) develop-
ments, but also on developments at state level within Sub-Saharan Africa. Fur-
thermore,	the	publication	aims	to	refl	ect	both	legal	and	extra-legal	developments	
in order to provide a holistic understanding of the project of international criminal 
justice	as	it	aff	ects	Africa	and	Africans	as	well	as	the	challenges	facing	this	project.
‘The views expressed in these articles are solely those of the authors and do not 
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HJ van der Merwe*
This book contains a collection of papers by members of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung’s African Group of Experts on International Criminal Justice. The book is the third of its kind1 and follows in the footsteps of its predecessors 
by drawing together a number of wide-ranging and contemporaneous perspectives 
relating to the prosecution of international crime on the African continent.2 This 
year’s publication contains seven contributions from new and old members of 
the	group.	Collectively,	they	offer	an	African	perspective	regarding	the	prospects	
and challenges facing the project of international criminal justice in Africa. The 
contributions cover situations and cases from across the continent as well as 
larger	 debates	 and	 contemporary	 issues	 affecting	 and	 shaping	 the	 application	of	
international criminal law in Africa. 
This year, as in previous years, the project of international criminal justice 
finds	itself	on	the	defensive	on	the	African	continent.	At	the	core	of	this	conflict	
lies the fractured relationship between the International Criminal Court (ICC or the 
Court) and the African Union (AU) (spearheaded by a number of African states, 
especially,	Sudan,	Kenya	and,	most	 recently,	South	Africa).	This	 state	of	 affairs	
would have been hard to predict in light of the amount of support for the ICC 
among African states when the Court was established in 2002. But we have learned 
*  BAcc LLB, LLM, LLD (Stellenbosch University). Lecturer at the University of the Western Cape and 
Coordinator/Lead Consultant of the Konrad Adenauer Stifting’s African Group of Experts on Interna-
tional Criminal Justice.
1 K Ambos and OA Maunganidze (eds) Power and prosecution: Challenges and opportunities for in-
ternational criminal justice in Sub-Saharan Africa (Universitätsverlag Göttingen 2012) and B van der 
Merwe (ed) International criminal justice in Africa: Challenges and opportunities (Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung 2014).
2	 The	contributions	in	this	boo�	generally	do	not	refl	ect	on	developments	relevant	to	international	crimi-
nal justice in Africa that occurred after 30 August 2015.
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that the legal-political landscape can change very quickly. In June 2015, Navi Pil-
lay commented that ‘[…] it is extremely unlikely that South Africa or any African 
country will withdraw from the ICC’ since ‘[a] majority of African countries played 
an enormous role in asking for this court.’3 Many, including myself, would not 
have hesitated to support this assertion. Yet, as of writing, the threat of withdrawal 
remains a very real one.
The African continent seems to have split into two opposing camps, namely, 
those criticising the way that international criminal law is enforced (especially en-
forcement of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute)) and those defending it. 
This	is,	off	course,	an	oversimplification	of	the	matter.	Nonetheless,	it	cannot	be	
denied that – as the calls of opponents and proponents alike become louder – the 
calls of those of observers with a more objective and reconciliatory point of view 
are drowned out. Crucially, what seems to be missing is a genuine, broad-ranging 
and constructive debate between the opposing camps. The absence of such a de-
bate	is	perhaps	best	exemplified	by	the	decision	of	the	African	National	Congress	
(ANC), the ruling political party in South Africa (traditionally a strong proponent 
of the ICC), to withdraw its support for the ICC – a decision that John Dugard has 
called ‘defeatist, naïve and reactionary.’4
In a speech to the Assembly of State Parties, South Africa’s International Re-
lations Minister, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, openly questioned the impartiality of 
the ICC:
We ask ourselves, as have many, why no investigations have been opened in Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Palestine after long periods of preliminary analysis, notwithstanding clear 
evidence of violations. Is it because those investigations have the potential to implicate 
the ‘great powers’?5
Hennie Strydom has argued that the ANC’s opposition to the ICC is disin-
genuous.6 In reality, this opposition is an expression of its dissatisfaction with the 
United	Nations	system,	particularly	the	power	of	veto	afforded	to	the	five	perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security Council. Strydom also points out that 
South Africa’s international legal obligations towards the prosecution of interna-
tional crime extend beyond the ICC. One is left with the impression that the South 
African Government is trying to make a political point with its reaction. If so, the 
3 F	Haffajee	‘Former	ICC	judge	spea�s	of	Omar	Al	Bashir	case’	News24 28 June 2015.
4 J	Dugard,	‘How	Africa	can	fix	the	International	Criminal	Court’	AllAfrica 28 October 2015.
5 J Evans, ‘SA questions impartiality of International Criminal Court’ News24 20 November 2015.
6 H Strydom, ‘Leaving the ICC won’t absolve South Africa of its legal obligations’ ENCA 13 November 
2015.
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only inference is that the making of political points is regarded as more important 
that the interests of victims in Africa.
The ANC’s decision, and the manner in which it was reached, provides clear 
evidence of the rift between opposing camps as well as the erosion of the common 
ground	between	African	states	and	the	ICC	that	had	seemed	so	firmly	established	
when the ICC came into being. A remarkable and saddening feature of the African 
critique of the ICC is that - while the debate revolves mainly around issues, such 
as, political bias, immunity for African heads of state, Western imperialism and 
African solidarity (not to mention the notable prevalence of political grandstand-
ing) – arguably the most important reasons for the establishment of an alternative 
and internationalised system of criminal accountability, namely, rights and interest 
of	victims,	has	somehow	flown	out	the	window.
The criticisms of the ICC from within Africa must not, however, be taken to 
represent a wholesale abandonment of the ideals of international criminal justice 
in	Africa.	The	true	state	of	affairs	is,	as	always,	much	more	nuanced	and	complex	
than it is often portrayed. Other developments from around the continent indicate 
support	for	efforts	to	ensure	accountability	in	respect	of	international	crimes.	In	this	
regard, the following developments deserve to be highlighted:7
•	 In	 January	 2015,	 Lord’s	 Resistance	Army	 leader	 Dominic	 Ongwen	 –	
wanted by the ICC since 2005 – was surrendered to the ICC. Interesting-
ly,	his	surrender	was	the	result	of	efforts	by	inter alia the United States 
and the AU, both of which are generally critical of the ICC.
•	 The	trial	of	Congolese	commander	Bosco	Ntaganda	opened	in	Septem-
ber 2015. Ntaganda has been charged with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, including, murder, rape and sexual slavery, committed in the 




with an international element. He faces charges of war crimes for alleg-
edly directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and histori-
cal monuments in Timbuktu, Mali.
7 See generally Human Rights Watch, ‘Memorandum to African state parties of the International Crimi-
nal Court for the Assembly of State Parties 14th Session’ <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/17/mem-
orandum-african-states-parties-international-criminal-court-assembly-states> accessed 19 November 
2015.
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•	 Another	 significant	 development	 from	 an	African	 perspective	 is	 that	
the	Office	of	the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	has	ta�en	positive	steps	toward	the	
investigation of international crimes committed outside of Africa. In 
October 2015, the OTP made an application to the Court for the opening 
of an investigation in relation to international crimes allegedly committed 
in	Georgia,	 raising	 the	 prospect	 of	 the	 first	 ICC	 investigation	 beyond	
Africa. The OTP has also continued its preliminary examinations in other 
situations (Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Palestine and Ukraine).
Once	 again,	African	 conflicts,	 situations	 and	 politics	 (many	 of	 which	 are	
discussed in this book) have served to highlight the limitations of international 
criminal	justice.	It	is	sometimes	too	easily	forgotten	that	the	field	of	international	
criminal law is, historically speaking, still very much in its infancy. From this per-
spective, it is understandable that rules and modes of enforcement of ICL are still 
in	somewhat	of	a	state	of	flux.	While	there	are,	and	will	be	disagreements	about	the	
‘means,’ the ultimate ‘end’ of international criminal law – the underlying ideal of 
putting an end to the culture of impunity for international crimes – should remain 
as	 strongly	 supported	 as	 ever.	Africa	 and	Africans	 in	 particular	 stand	 to	 benefit	
from	the	attainment	of	a	fair	and	efficient	system	of	international	criminal	law.	This	
should be regarded as the fundamental consideration in any debate on the scope and 
manner of application of international criminal law in Africa.
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PURSUING AL BASHIR IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
BETWEEN ‘APOLOGY AND UTOPIA’
JerusHa asin*
Abstract
Few things elicit a more vehement response from the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) than allegations that decisions made by 
the Office are subject to political considerations. The OTP publicly ascribes to the 
ideological conception of the Court as a manifestation of uncompromising legalism. 
Yet, the twin threads of legalism and realism were deliberately and closely woven 
together into the fabric of the Rome system of justice and have found expression 
in the continuing conundrum faced by the Court in securing state co-operation to 
facilitate its judicial mandate, especially in the execution of arrest warrants. The 
single most spectacular expression of the ‘reality deficit’ of international criminal 
law has been the staging of the ‘Great Escape’ by President Omar Al Bashir, the 
subject of ICC arrest warrants, from Johannesburg, South Africa, in June 2015, 
during an African Union Summit.
This paper considers that the inability of the ICC to persuade other state parties, third 
states, the Security Council and even high ranking officials of the United Nations 
to apply consistent, sustained international pressure to execute outstanding arrest 
warrants issued by the Court, even after referral by the Security Council points to 
a deeper malaise permeating the state cooperation regime under the Rome Statute 
of the ICC (Rome Statute). It is now apparent that the conflict between law and 
politics inherent in securing state cooperation with the Court cannot be mediated 
by appeal to strictly legalist arguments. Accordingly, this study joins the dialogue 
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on the ICC by considering whether the state cooperation regime under the Rome 
Statute enacts international politics within the classic Koskenniemian meaning.
Ultimately, the paper ponders whether the state cooperation regime under the 
Statute and the record of state practice in cooperating with the Court to date 
demands that the false necessities of uncompromising legalism be discarded in 
favour of strategic legalism within the statutory frame of the Prosecutor’s mandate 
to seek state cooperation with the Court.
1 Introduction
‘You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!’1 
In contemporary literature on international institutions,2 the tale of Franken-
stein stands as a cautionary tale of the manner in which the agent does not always 
heed the call of the principal and may eventually overreach the principal by means 
of deeds, which are inimical to the interests of the principal.3 Logically, the re-
ceived wisdom is that once international institutions are imbued with legal person-
ality, their interests and those of their creators (member states) diverge.
With reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court), no-
where has this divergence in interests been more apparent than in the continuing 
conundrum faced by the Court in securing state co-operation to facilitate its judicial 
mandate,4 especially in the execution of arrest warrants, the most prominent of 
which to date has been that of the serving head of state of the Republic of Sudan, 
President Hassan Al Bashir.5 The referral of the situation in Darfur in 2005 by the 
Security Council acting under the auspices of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter ostensibly created an agency relationship between the Security Council and 
the Court, in which international judicial intervention was deemed by the Council 
to be necessary in order to maintain international peace and security.6
1 MW Shelley, Frankenstein (1818) 205.
2 J Klabbers, An introduction to international institutional law (Cambridge University Press 2002) Pref-
ace.
3 Compare J Alvarez, International organizations as law-makers (Oxford University Press 2005) 585.
4 ICC-ASP, Report of the Court on cooperation (9 October 2013) ICC-ASP/12/35, paras 10-26.
5 Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Warrant of arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (4 March 2009) ICC-
02/05-01/09; Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Second warrant of arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (12 
July 2010) ICC-02/05-01/09.
6 UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593, para 1.
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However, the agency relationship between the Court and the Security Coun-
cil has soured incredibly in the period since the initial issuance of the warrant 
of the arrest for Omar Al Bashir and three others for crimes against humanity 
on 4 March 2009 and subsequently on 12 July 2010 for genocide. To date, the 
Prosecutor has issued a total of 21 reports to the Security Council on the situa-
tion in Darfur,7 with 10 of these communications trenchantly cataloguing various 
instances of non-cooperation by the Government of Sudan and other states party 
to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) and urging the Council to take the 
appropriate action against these states.8 Indeed, in December 2014, the Prosecutor 
mordantly observed that:
It	is	becoming	increasingly	difficult	for	me	to	appear	before	you	to	update	you	when	all	I	
am doing is repeating the same things I have said over and over again, most of which are 
well known to this Council… In the almost ten years that my Office has been reporting 
to this Council, there has never been a strategic recommendation provided to my Office, 
neither have there been any discussions resulting in concrete solutions for the problems 
we face in the Darfur situation. We find ourselves in a stalemate that can only embolden 
perpetrators to continue their brutality.9 [Emphasis added]
The Darfur referral, however, appears to have been overreached by other 
conflict	 resolution	 alternatives	 pursued	by	 the	Security	Council	 in	Sudan,	 all	 of	
which depend upon the continued cooperation of the Sudanese Government headed 
by President Al Bashir.10 The Security Council had proved either unwilling and/or 
unable, within the ordinary meaning of those terms, to buttress the Darfur referral 
by exacting state compliance in respect of the arrest and surrender of Al Bashir. The 
recalcitrance, both by the Council and by states, has manifested itself in various 
ways	 and	 has	 compelled	 even	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Prosecutor	 (OTP)	 to	 excoriate	
high	 level	United	Nations	 (UN)	officials	 for	 their	 ‘unnecessary	contact’	with	Al	
Bashir and members of his Government, even while they are subject to warrants 
of arrest.11 For their part, the judges of the Court have all but termed the Council’s 
referral of the Darfur situation as an exercise in futility because of the Council’s 
7 ICC-OTP, 21st Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council 
Pursuant to UNSCR 1593(2005) (29 June 2015).
8 Ibid.
9 ICC-OTP, Statement to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Darfur pursuant to 
UNSCR 1593(2005) 12 December 2014.
10 K Rodman, ‘Justice as a dialogue between law and politics: Embedding the International Criminal 
Court	within	conflict	management	and	peace	building’	 (2014)	12	Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 437, 447.
11 See ICC-OTP, 19th Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations 
Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2003) (23 June 2014), para 9.
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lackadaisical approach to enforcing the Court’s requests for cooperation that have 
gone unheeded.12
The above situation has been exacerbated by the current hostility between the 
Court and numerous member states of the African Union (AU), spurred by the infa-
mous resolution of July 2009 that blatantly urged its members to refuse to cooperate 
with the Court in respect of the arrest warrant issued against Omar Al Bashir.13 The 
said AU resolution has visibly impacted on the execution of requests for coopera-
tion with the Court in connection with Al Bashir.14 The most recent manifestation 
of this was the dramatic ‘Great Escape’ by Al Bashir from Johannesburg in South 
Africa during the 25th AU Summit held in June 2015 with the apparent complicity 
of the South African Government.15
This paper proceeds on the premise that the establishment of the Court as 
a legalist institution has not enabled it to transcend the biases, compromises and 
conflicts	inherent	in	the	politics	of	state	cooperation,16 where politics in that sense 
refers to decision-making on the basis of rational calculations of self-interest.17 
Further, the legalistic conception of the Court as an ‘empire of law’ secluded 
from historical and political realities18 has obscured critical acknowledgment and 
appraisal of its limitations19 and the contradictions that are built into its framework.20
For the sake of clarity, the term ‘legalist’ as used in this paper derives from 
the	 term	 legalism,	persuasively	defined	by	 the	political	 theorist	 Judith	Sh�lar	as	
‘the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule-following and 
moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules.’21 The core 
of legalism lies in the utter disavowal of any participation in political activity, such 
12 Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision on the non-compliance of the Republic of Chad with the cooperation 
requests issued by the Court regarding the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Al Bashir (20 March 
2013) ICC-02/05-01/09, para 22.
13 Decision on the meeting of African states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) of 1-3 July 2009, Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII).
14 ICC-ASP, Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation (7 November 2013) ICC-ASP/12/34, paras 22-
24 <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP12/ICC-ASP-12-34-ENG.pdf> accessed 1 January 
2014.
15 P Greef, ‘Anatomy of Al-Bashir’s great escape’ Daily Maverick 29 June 2015.
16 See B Leebaw, Judging state-sponsored violence, imagining political change (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 24.
17 J Maogoto, War crimes and Realpolitik: International justice from World War I to the 21st Century 
(Lynne Rienner Publishers 2004) 10-11.
18 J Shklar, Legalism: Law, morals and political trials (Harvard University Press 1986) 15.
19 Leebaw (n 16) 24-25.
20 B	Schiff,	Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press 2008) 8-9.
21 Shklar (n 18) 1.
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that legal institutions (as the epitome of the legalistic tradition) are deemed to be 
hermetically	sealed-off	from	political	society.22
The	main	object	of	this	study	is	not	only	to	illustrate	the	specific	interplay	of	
law and politics in connection to state cooperation, but also to contextualise the 
glaring disparity between norms of international law and actual state behaviour (or 
law’s	‘reality	deficit’).23
The	 paper	 is	 therefore	 structured	 as	 follows:	The	 first	 part	 is	 a	 conceptual	
framework that describes the political factors that shape international law and in-
teractions of states with international institutions in order to explain the reality 
deficit	facing	the	Court.24 The second part builds on the conceptual framework by 
outlining a theoretical framework whose primary postulate is that the state coopera-
tion regime under the Rome Statute enacts international politics within the classic 
Kos�enniemian	meaning.	The	third	and	final	part	advances	the	argument	for	politi-
cal intelligence in the pursuit of state cooperation with the Court by reference to the 
outstanding arrest warrants for Al Bashir and his dramatic exit from South Africa in 
June 2015. It is worth noting at this point that for present purposes, the term politi-
cal intelligence as used in this study is an expansion of the concept of political judg-
ment developed by the political theorist Hannah Arendt, which I have assimilated 
to advance my arguments and is not in any way synonymous with capitulation to 
power politics.25 In all arguments, recourse is had, not to a utopian model by which 
States freely and promptly cooperate with the Court, but to a model of state coop-
eration that does not render the Court nugatory and its Statute hollow.
2 Conceptual framework
There are four prominent theories in international relations, namely: the real-
ist, institutionalist, liberal and constructivist theories.26
States are the dominant actors in the realist narrative and constantly compete 
with each other in the absence of any central government. International law and, 
22 Ibid ix.
23 AM Slaughter et al., ‘International law and international relations theory and a new generation of inter-
disciplinary scholarship’ (1998) 92(3) American Journal of International Law 367, 371.
24 K Abbot, ‘International relations theory, international law and the regime governing atrocities in inter-
nal	conflict’	(1999)	93(2)	American Journal of International Law 361, 362.
25 Compare Prosecutor v Kenyatta, Partially dissenting opinion of Judge Ozaki (18 October 2013) ICC-
01/09-02/11, para 21. See also Leebaw (n 16).
26 Ibid 364-367.
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by extension, international cooperation are considered to be useful only when they 
advance state interests. Realists place heavy emphasis on the interests of power-
ful states and denigrate the ability of international rules and institutions to con-
strain state behaviour. Goldsmith and Posner stand out in international criminal law 
scholarship as realists for their assertion that the Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not exert any ‘gravitational 
pull’27	to	lure	defendants	such	as	former	President	Slobodan	Milošević	for	trial	be-
fore the ICTY.28 Because realists conceive of sovereignty as predating international 
law, international law cannot limit sovereignty.29
Institutionalists, on the other hand, acknowledge the competing interests in 
international life, but consider that because states create international institutions 
to impose order, institutions may modify state behaviour.30 Institutionalists identify 
‘islands of cooperation’31 in which states are willing to cooperate in order to legiti-
mise	different	forms	of	inter-state	action.32 An example may be the decision of the 
United States to abstain from voting on the Security Council resolution referring 
the situation in Darfur to the Court because ‘of the need for the international com-
munity to work together to end the climate of impunity in Sudan.’33
Liberal theorists for their part do not discount the importance of states in inter-
national politics, but consider that state interests are determined more by domestic 
politics than by considerations of relative power. In this conception, the fundamen-
tal actors in international politics are both individuals and private groups.34
Conversely, the constructivist theory holds that international actors socialise 
within a context of shared norms, which constitute their identities and determines 
appropriate forms of conduct.35 Therefore, fundamental concepts such as the state 
and sovereignty can only be determined by reference to the rights and duties held by 
27 J Goldsmith and E Posner, The limits of international law (Oxford University Press 2005) 116.
28 Ibid.
29 M Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia: The structure of international legal argument, Reissue with 
New Epilogue (Cambridge University Press 2005) 254. 
30 Alvarez (n 3) 25.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 UN, ‘Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of the International Criminal 
Court: Resolution 1593(2005) adopted by Vote of 11 in Favour and None Against’ (5158th Meeting) 
SC/8351 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sc8351.doc.htm> accessed 21 June 2014.
34 Abbot (n 24) 366. 
35 Ibid.
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a State.36 This theory emphasises normative commitments and the internalisation of 
these norms moving beyond the socialising institution in a ‘norm cascade.’37 Con-
structivists dispute the pre-dominance of states as analytical units in international 
law and advance the development of individuals, local organisations and states 
within	international	institutions	in	order	to	influence	these	institutions	beyond	the	
preferences of the powerful units within it.38 For instance, recall the role played by 
the sheer numbers of non-governmental organisations involved in lobbying for the 
Court during the Rome Conference39 and the subsequent statutory acknowledgment 
of their role in propagating these norms within the Rome system of justice.40
It is apparent that the establishment of the Court best accords to the construc-
tive model because the Court was established on the basis of normative and legal 
commitments by state parties to end impunity for the perpetration of atrocities41 
and drawing from the Nuremberg precedent whereby sovereignty was purportedly 
‘perforated.’42
In this regard, the contrasting perspectives on sovereignty under the realist 
and constructivist schools are especially noteworthy. While realists consider that 
neither international law nor international institutions can alter sovereignty, which 
is a structural concept incapable of delimitation,43	constructivists	fluidly	define	sov-
ereignty as being constituted by the international legal order in accordance with 
rights and duties held by the state.44
It	is	worth	noting	that	the	edifice	upon	which	the	entire	body	of	international	
criminal law is built is the active delimitation of state sovereignty.45 The paradox, 
36 Koskenniemi (n 29) 245-455.
37 See K Sikkink, The justice cascade: How human rights prosecutions are changing world politics (Nor-
ton & Co 2011) 5-28. See also José Alvarez (n 3) 44.
38 Ibid.
39 K Barrow, ‘The role of NGOs in the establishment of the International Criminal Court’ (2004) 2(1) 
Dialogue 11, 17.
40 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, (1998) 2187 UNTS 90 (hereinafter the �Rome Stat-
ute”), art. 15(2).
41 Rome Statute, preamble para 4.
42 G	Mettraux,	‘Judicial	inheritance:	The	value	and	significance	of	the	Nuremberg	Trial	to	contemporary	
war crimes tribunals’ in G Mettraux (ed) Perspectives on the Nuremberg trial (Oxford University Press 
2008) 604.
43 Alvarez (n 3) 29-30.
44 J Goldsmith, ‘Sovereignty, international relations theory and international law’ (2000) 52 Stanford Law 
Review 959, 960.
45 B Broomhall, International justice and the International Criminal Court: Between sovereignty and the 
rule of law (Oxford University Press 2003) 56-57.
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which is the scope of inquiry in this paper, is that sovereignty reappears in the form 
of states failing to cooperate with the Court and when the international community 
fails to exact compliance.46
3 Theoretical framework
Upon the conclusion of the constitutive treaty of the Rome Statute in 1998, 
Court	officials	and	the	Prosecutor	in	particular,47 gloried in proclaiming the Court’s 
apolitical nature, averring that it would subordinate politics to the law and speak 
‘law to power’48 by establishing legal realities that constrained, if not bound other 
entities.49
These	views	spea�	to	the	theory	of	legalism,	earlier	defined	as	a	rule-	centred	
approach that eschews the role of politics in any legal activity.50 In the present con-
text, legalism refers to a conception of global norms that seeks the separation of law 
from politics for the promotion of human rights.51
However, there appear to be two primary types of legalism, distinguished pri-
marily on the basis of their approach to the role of politics in international justice.52 
The	first	is	ideological	legalism,	which	rests	on	the	uncompromising	and	rigid	char-
acter of just action and disparages any other kind of social policy.53 In this concep-
tion, politics is a ‘dirty’54 word because it is the child of competing interests and 
ideologies and has a disreputable recourse to expediency that must by necessity 
be inferior to the law.55 By parity of reasoning, law is superior because it aims at 
justice, which is the sum of all legalistic aspirations56 and is therefore neutral and 
objective. Therefore, to maintain the distinction between legal order and political 
chaos, law is magically lifted and elevated beyond politics, which then becomes 
46 Ibid.
47 L Moreno-Ocampo, ‘Statement’ (ICC Review Conference, Kampala, 31 May 2010).
48 S Nouwen and W Werner, ‘Doing justice to the political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda 
and Sudan’ (2011) 21(4) European Journal of International Law 941, 965.
49 Ibid.
50 Shklar (n 18) 1.
51 Rodman (n 10) 439.
52 Leebaw (n 16) 36.
53 Shklar (n 18) 111-122.
54 Leebaw (n 16) 38.
55 Ibid 111.
56 Ibid 113.
13Pursuing Al Bashir in South Africa: Between ‘Apology and Utopia’
embattled with the law.57 For the law to subdue politics, it becomes necessary to 
insist on a policy of uncompromising rules and rule-following.58
This ideological conception of legalism, which presents the law as a com-
plete monolithic structure with no limitations is the one most commonly advocated 
in	connection	with	 the	 ICC.	 It	 is	difficult,	however,	 to	contest	 that	 the	 legalistic	
conception of justice as the impartial execution of existing laws59 that eschews 
arbitrariness,60 is the very essence of the law.
A	different	approach	advanced	by	critical	theorist,	Marti	Kos�enniemi,	argues	
that a rule-centred approach that maintains a strict distinction between law and 
politics does so because of the perceived normative strength of the law,61 which 
needs to be shown to bind states regardless of their behaviour or interests.62 Not-
withstanding that international law is the product of international politics and di-
plomacy, legalism assumes that the law mysteriously transcends these to bind states 
regardless of their interests or opinions when it is invoked against them. However, 
the dilemma in the ideological conception of legalism in completely severing law 
from politics, power and state interest is that it is tantamount to reverting to doc-
trines of natural and divine law, whereas international law positively derives from 
state behaviour (custom), will and interests.63 Certainly, the negotiated nature of 
the Rome Statute proves this point. All international criminal tribunals without ex-
ception owe their existence to the expressed will of states.64 Therefore, the legalist 
consequences of maintaining the rigid distinction between law and politics is that, 
when state behaviour fails to conform to legal rules because of an outright refusal 
to accept certain standards for any number of reasons, legalists ascribe this failure 
to politics. Koskenniemi describes this phenomenon as an apology for politics.65
In that event, the idiosyncrasy of the uncompromising approach to rule-fol-
lowing constrains legalists to emphasise that despite the changes in state behaviour 
and	interests	out	of	a	desire	to	escape	the	constraining	effect	of	international	law	in	
any particular situation,66 the legal rules are still binding on states. To the extent that 
57 Ibid 122.
58 Ibid.
59 Leebaw (n 16) 37.
60 Ibid 111.
61 Koskenniemi (n 29) 184.
62 Ibid 17-18.
63 Ibid.
64 See generally Maogoto (n 17).
65 Koskenniemi (n 29) 17-18.
66 Ibid 19-21.
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states decline to modify their behaviour to comply with the law, it becomes discon-
nected from state behaviour and connotes utopia.67
Indeed, it is possible to discern both the apology and utopia in a number of 
the Prosecutor’s statements to the UN Security Council in connection to the Darfur 
referral, in which she states that no meaningful steps have been taken to apprehend 
the Darfur suspects and bring them to justice (apology)68 and that arrests, which can 
only	be	effected	by	international	cooperation	to	enforce	the	arrest	warrants	(cur-
rently utopia), are needed to implement the Court’s processes.69
This paper therefore adopts the analytical lens of the second form of stra-
tegic or creative legalism that discards the myth that law can be magically and 
mysteriously separated from its political antecedents. Strategic legalism consid-
ers the political provenance of the law in propounding that law and politics are 
inextricably intertwined in one social continuum70 and that legalism can be modi-
fied	and	guided	by	political	judgment.71 However, Shklar’s conception of political 
judgment	differs	from	that	advanced	in	this	paper,	which	is	predicated	on	Hannah	
Arendt’s conception of political judgment and is of important utility in so far as 
it underscores the fact that, in analysing international institutions, the question is 
not whether the law is political, but rather to question the sort of interests that are 
supported by the law.72
The	ICC	is	reflective	of	creative	or	strategic	legalism	by	reference	to	the	nor-
mative and legal commitments lying side by side with the diplomatic bargains, 
political interests and compromises enacted into the provisions governing state co-
operation under the Rome Statute during the Rome Conference.73
This paper analyses state cooperation with the ICC within the prism of Ko-
skenniemi’s critical theory that the ‘politics of international law is what competent 
international lawyers do,’74 and avers that far from being the ‘unfolding of law’s 
master plan,’75 the state cooperation regime under the Rome Statute enacts interna-
67 Ibid.
68 F Bensouda, ‘Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations 
Security Council on the situation in Darfur pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) New York, 17 June 2014’ 
para 3.
69 Ibid.
70 Shklar (n 18) 169.
71 Leebaw (n 16) 40. 
72 Shklar (n 18) 144.
73 Schiff	(n	20)	3.
74 Koskenniemi (n 29) 571.
75 F Mégret, ‘The politics of international criminal justice’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International 
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tional politics and creates both a legal and political mandate for the Prosecutor to 
seek state cooperation.76
4 The state cooperation regime under the Rome Statute
The establishment of the Court on the basis of a multilateral treaty 
encompassing diplomatic bargains,77 political interests and ‘hard fought political 
compromises’78 in addition to legal commitments has inevitably coloured the 
state cooperation provisions under the Statute establishing the Court. The parallel 
veins of legalism and realism enacted into the Statute in the course of its drafting 
history have impacted on the content of the legal duty to cooperate with the Court. 
Because the Court’s focus was not bound to discrete situations like that of the ad 
hoc tribunals, the trigger mechanisms were a procedural safeguard to limit the 
reach	 of	 the	 Court’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 particular	 conflict	 situations	 to	 the	 three	
mechanisms under Article 13,79 namely; by state party referral,80 by referral of the 
Security Council under Chapter VII measures of the United Nations Charter81 and 
the initiation of an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu.82
The principle of complementarity where the Court functions as a court of last 
resort83	constitutes	the	most	significant	compromise	to	sovereignty	and	practically	
stays the exercise of jurisdiction if the case is being addressed within the domestic 
jurisdiction.84	The	effect	is	that,	contingent	on	the	trigger	mechanism;85 cooperation 
obligations are stayed or stopped altogether because of challenges to the admis-
Law 1261, 1269; T Hansen, ‘The International Criminal Court and the legitimacy of exercise’ in Ander-
sen et al. (eds) Law and legitimacy (DJOEF Publishers 2014); W Schabas, ‘The banality of international 
justice’ (2013) Journal of International Criminal Justice 1, 7; C Ryngaert, ‘Arrest and detention’ in L 
Reydams et al. (eds) International prosecutors (Oxford University Press 2012).
76 See GJ Knoops and R Amsterdam, ‘The duality of state cooperation within international and national 
criminal cases’ (2006) 30(2) Fordham International Law Journal 260, 272.
77 Schiff	(n	20)	3-4.
78 P Mochochoko, ‘International cooperation and judicial assistance’ in R Lee (ed) The International 
Criminal Court: The making of the Rome Statute - issues, negotiations, results (Kluwer 1999).
79 W Schabas, An introduction to the International Criminal Court (Cambridge University Press 2011) 
157.
80 Rome Statute, art. 13(a).
81 Rome Statute, art. 13(b).
82 Rome Statute, art. 13(c).
83 Rome Statute, preamble para 10, art. 1.
84 Schabas (n 79) 190.
85 Ibid 192.
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sibility of a case.86	The	practical	effect	of	challenges	 to	admissibility	means	 that	
urgent	requests	or	opportunities	to	effect	an	arrest	or	seize	an	available	window	of	
opportunity might be lost in addition to long periods of time spent making comple-
mentarity assessments of situations under the Statute.87
4.1	 Differentiated	cooperation	obligations	under	the	Statute
Third states that are not party to the Rome Statute are under no obligation to 
cooperate with the Court, save for voluntary ad hoc arrangements to do so,88 which 
apply mutatis mutandis to intergovernmental organisations.89 This means that the 
Court has a chequered jurisdiction over states, practically witnessed with regard to 
the outstanding arrest warrant for Al Bashir, which non-state parties like Ethiopia 
are not bound to execute beyond the Security Council’s ‘encouragement’ to do so 
in Resolution 1593 of 2005.90 Indeed, a statement issued by the Chinese Foreign 
Ministry on the invitation extended to Al Bashir to visit China in September 2015 
states that ‘as China is not a member of the ICC, relevant issues will be handled on 
the basis of the basic principles of international law.’91
4.2	 The	legal	bases	of	the	duty	to	cooperate	with	the	Court
The obligation to cooperate with the Court derives from the statutory provi-
sion to ‘fully cooperate with the Court.’92 The means by which the Court is seized of 
a situation determines the legal basis of the cooperation obligation, as in the case of 
the Security Council referral of Libya93 and Darfur94 to the Court. Neither of these 
states were party to the Statute hence their obligation to cooperate with the Court 
was grounded under the resolution and the duty to implement Council decisions 
under the Charter of the United Nations.95 A further basis for cooperation between 
86 Knoops and Amsterdam (n 76) 276.
87 B Swart, ‘General problems’ in A Cassese et al. (eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: A commentary (Oxford University Press 2002) 1596. 
88 Rome Statute, art. 87(5).
89 Rome Statute, art. 87(6). See also European Council, Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the European Union on cooperation and assistance (2006) OJ L115/50, art. 4.
90 See Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Prosecution’s	urgent	notification	of	travel	in	the	case	of	The	Prosecutor	v	
Omar Al Bashir (29 April 2014) ICC-02/05-01/09.
91 ‘China welcomes Sudan’s war-crime accused Leader as �old friend”’ Reuters 1 September 2015.
92 Rome Statute, art. 86.
93 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970. 
94 UNSC Res 1593 (31 March 2005) UN Doc S/RES/1593.
95 Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI, art. 25.
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the Court and the UN in the event of Council referral is the Relationship Agreement 
negotiated between these institutions.96
4.3	 Enforcement	of	the	duty	to	cooperate	with	the	Court
Similar to the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC does not have the residual power to 
take enforcement measures against states.97 The net sum of enforcement proce-
dures is contingent on the source of the legal duty to provide support.98 Where a 
state	party	refuses	to	comply	with	a	request	for	cooperation,	a	judicial	finding	of	
non-cooperation is made against the state party and referred to the Assembly of 
State Parties (ASP)99 or to the Security Council in the event of a Council referral.100 
Where the basis of cooperation was a voluntary ad hoc arrangement with non-state 
parties,	the	finding	of	non-compliance	is	referred	to	the	ASP.	The	ASP	Procedures	
Relating to Non-Cooperation101 states categorically that the remit of the ASP under 
the Statute is to undertake ‘political and diplomatic’	efforts	to	promote	cooperation	
in response to non-cooperation.
Therefore,	no	enforcement	mechanisms	beyond	the	judicial	findings	of	non-
compliance are provided for in the Statute. This is at once the Court’s Achilles’ heel 
and continuation of the now familiar pattern of re-enacting international politics in 
international law, reminiscent of the truth that ‘[i]nternational law is still limited 
by international politics and we must not pretend either can live and grow without 
the other.’102 Situating enforcement within the political and diplomatic realm of 
the ASP sends the clearest possible signal that the Rome Statute does not create an 
‘empire of law,’103 but is instead embedded in the very midst of the international 
political universe.104
96 ICC, Negotiated relationship agreement between the International Criminal Court and the United Na-
tions (2004) ICC-ASP/3/Res.1.
97 Prosecutor v Tihomir Blaškic, Judgment on the request of the Republic of Croatia for review of the 
decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997 (29 October 1997) IT-95-14-AR108bis, para 25.
98 G Sluiter, ‘Cooperation of states with international criminal tribunals’ in A Cassese (ed.) The Oxford 
companion to international criminal justice (Oxford University Press 2009) 198.
99 Rome Statute, art. 87(7).
100 Ibid.
101 ICC-ASP, Assembly procedures relating to non cooperation.
102 H Stimson, ‘The Nuremberg trial: Landmark in law’ in Mettraux (n 42) 617.
103 J Czarnetsky and R Rychlak, ‘An empire of law: Legalism and the International Criminal Court’ (2003) 
79 Notre Dame Law Review 55, 62.
104 Shklar (n 19) 123.
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5 Pursuing Al Bashir: ‘Between apology and utopia’ in South Africa
Because the ICC not only operates in a political context, but is itself predi-
cated on overtly political transformational goals,105 the formula adopted at Rome 
to	 predicate	 cooperation	 and	 effective	 compliance	of	 states	without	 the	 force	of	
sanction betrayed the legalistic ambitions underpinning the Statute to the political 
interests of those whose prerogative it is to assist the Court – a classic enactment 
of international politics in the Rome Statute within the Koskenniemian meaning.106 
This is because a target state’s compliance with the Court’s orders is very much 
a question of political expediency and necessity. As pertinently noted by David 
Bosco, the Court operates in a turbulent world where power matters.107
The presence of Al Bashir in South Africa in June 2015 for the AU Summit 
held	in	Johannesburg	has	greatly	exemplified	this	fact.	A	brief	summary	of	the	es-
sential	facts	will	suffice	for	present	purposes.	The	AU	extended	an	invitation	to	Al	
Bashir to attend the Summit that was scheduled from 7-15 June 2015. On 13 June 
2015, Al Bashir travelled to South Africa, despite the fact that on that same day, 
the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	of	the	ICC	issued	a	decision	to	the	effect	that	South	Africa	
was under an international obligation to immediately arrest and surrender Al Bashir 
and	called	on	South	Africa	‘to	spare	no	effort	in	ensuring	the	execution	of	the	ar-
rest warrants.’108 On 14 June 2015, a civil society group in South Africa urgently 
applied to the High Court in Gauteng seeking orders compelling South African 
authorities to arrest Al Bashir under the provisions of both the Rome Statute and 
those of domestic legislation in South Africa implementing the Rome Statute.109 
Even as the High Court ordered that Al Bashir be prohibited from leaving the coun-
try pending the determination of the application,110 on 15 June 2015, Al Bashir was 
whisked out of South Africa in circumstances heavily suggestive of complicity by 
the authorities in his escape. Certainly the President of South Africa dispelled any 
doubt of the role of his Government in the entire episode when he stated in later 
105 A Greenwalt, ‘�Justice without politics?” Prosecutorial discretion and the International Criminal Court’ 
(2007) 39 NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 583, 606.
106 See M Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations: The rise and fall of international law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge University Press 2001) 431.
107 D Bosco, Rough justice: The International Criminal Court in a world of power politics (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2014) 1.
108 ICC-OTP (n 7).
109 The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002, South 
Africa.
110 See South Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others, 
Case Number 27740/2015, 23 June 2015.
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proceedings in Parliament that the presence of Al Bashir to South Africa was ‘on 
the invitation of the AU.’111 The triumphant return of Al Bashir from South Africa 
to Sudan was heralded by calls in Sudanese media that the ICC was ‘dead’ after the 
exit by Al Bashir.112 Most recently, President Al Bashir visited China, a non-state 
party to the Rome Statute and was described by the President of that country as ‘an 
old friend of the Chinese people.’113
By all accounts, prior to the above debacle, South Africa was arguably a mod-
el	state	party	to	the	Rome	Statute.	In	fact,	soon	after	the	issuance	of	the	first	warrant	
of arrest by the Court in March 2009, it was widely reported that representations 
had been made to the Sudanese Government that if Al Bashir attended the inau-
guration of President Jacob Zuma, he would be arrested.114 Later, President Zuma 
himself	went	on	public	record	with	the	Cable	News	Networ�	(CNN)	affirming	that	
if Al Bashir was to even set foot inside South Africa, he would have him arrested.115 
However, in 2015, amidst the furore generated by the hasty departure of Al Bashir 
from	South	Africa	in	defiance	of	both	the	ICC	and	the	High	Court	of	South	Africa,	
the self-same President Zuma had a complete volte face and defended the decision 
to let Al Bashir evade the arrest warrant and leave Johannesburg on grounds that 
Al Bashir had immunity as a guest of the AU.116 This comes about in the context of 
consideration by the ruling political party, the African National Congress (ANC), 
to withdraw from the Rome Statute.117
Recall that in both oral118 and written policy statements,119	the	first	Prosecu-
tor of the Court refuted the importance of state cooperation to case selection and 
indicated	that	his	office	deliberately	uncoupled	considerations	of	state	cooperation	
from general discussion on situations and cases before the Court.120 The position 
articulated by the then Prosecutor was tantamount to an assertion that states are 
111 ‘South African President defends failure to arrest Sudan’s Bashir’ Reuters 6 August 2015.
112 ‘Media consider ICC �dead” after Bashir exit’ BBC News 16 June 2015.
113 ‘China welcomes Sudan’s war crime-accused leader as �old friend”’ Voice of America 1 September 
2015.
114 ‘Sudanese President to skip Zuma’s inauguration’ Sudan Tribune 9 May 2009.
115 ‘South Africa President warns Sudan’s Bashir of arrest’ Sudan Tribune 27 September 2009.
116 ‘South African President defends failure to arrest Sudan’s Bashir’ (n 111).
117 ‘ICC gives South Africa more time to explain failure to arrest Bashir’ Reuters 16 October 2015.
118 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Pursuing international justice: A conversation with Luis Moreno-Ocam-
po’ (5 February 2010) <http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/pursuing-international-justice-conversation-
luis-moreno-ocampo/p21418> accessed 1 September 2014. 




the ‘subjects of the law’s empire’121 as embodied in the Rome Statute, acting as 
lieges to its ‘methods and ideals’122 because they are bound to do so both in letter 
and spirit. This is a pervasive legalist utopia; that justice can be secured above the 
political world, and not within it.123
The	political	firestorm	generated	by	the	decision	to	apply	for	arrest	warrants	
for the serving President of Sudan in July 2008124 appears to me to be one of the 
most egregious errors in political judgment by the OTP in recent times. This is be-
cause this decision was predicated on the familiar legalist utopia of law as empire, 
hierarchically superior to politics,125 in which the former Prosecutor, in an exchange 
with a diplomat who openly advised against an arrest warrant for the President, 
characterised himself as a ‘train moving down the track’ in order to ‘follow the 
evidence.’126 When the diplomat indicated that the Prosecutor would hurt the very 
institution that he was trying to build, the two agreed to disagree.
All accounts indicate that in shifting to an adversarial strategy against Khar-
toum, the former Prosecutor failed to persuade the international community to ef-
fect a concomitant shift in the political agenda that was necessary for the extraor-
dinary international political commitment127 needed for the execution of the arrest 
warrants.128	In	effect,	the	Prosecutor	sought	to	compel	states,	as	purported	subjects	
of the legalist empire under the Rome Statute, to set in motion political events to 
adhere to the dictates of the Court, which possibly included sanctions, military es-
calation and regime change.129
In response, the international community has to date largely spurned the 
OTP’s attempts to shame it in the increasingly mordant OTP reports to the Security 
Council over the failure to execute the arrest warrants and has instead advanced 
its own agenda of mediation, peace-keeping and humanitarian relief in Darfur, all 
of which depend on the cooperation of Al Bashir.130 This episode, as most recently 
121 R Dworkin, Law’s empire (Hart 1998) vii.
122 Ibid.
123 Shklar (n 18) 123.
124 J Geis and A Mundt, ‘When to indict? The timing of international criminal indictments on peace pro-
cesses and humanitarian action’ (World Humanitarian Studies Conference, Groningen February 2009), 
14 <http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/04/peace-and-justice-geis> accessed 26 June 
2014.
125 See Czarnetzky and Rychlak (n 103) 62.
126 Bosco (n 107) 143.
127 Greenwalt (n 105) 606.
128 Rodman (n 10) 446.
129 Ibid 456.
130 Ibid. 
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highlighted	by	the	flight	of	Al	Bashir	from	South	Africa,	powerfully	underscores	
the true counterpoint to legalism in relation to politics that justice does not lead, but 
follows.131 The emperor in this narrative, the OTP, has been exposed, denuded of 
any real power or sanction to execute the arrest warrants.132
In the absence of independent enforcement capability, the Court depends on 
external actors, principally states, and organisations as ‘surrogate enforcers’133 to 
compel compliance with its orders.134 For their part, the commitment of these sur-
rogate enforcers is subject to varied geopolitical interests and is contextualised 
against the prevailing political conditions in the target state, or rather, the state that 
is the subject of focus by the Court.
In the case of South Africa, it is clear that in failing to arrest and surren-
der Al Bashir to the Court, it furthered the interests of the AU in non-cooperation 
with the ICC on allegations of the Court’s ‘imperialistic, colonialist and racist’ 
bias against African states.135 This is the clearest example to date that cooperation 
with	the	Court	does	not	flow	from	the	gravitational	pull	of	the	legal	obligation	to	
cooperate with the Court,136 notwithstanding that South Africa had the domestic 
constitutional obligation to arrest Al Bashir having implemented the Rome Statute 
in 2002. This denotes that the Court and its processes involve a perpetual political 
contest and that an ideological approach to legalism in seeking cooperation will 
falter between apology and utopia.137 What this implies is that, because the former 
Prosecutor	failed	to	build	the	necessary	level	of	official	international	support	for	
the arrest warrant against Al Bashir and because an extraordinary level of interna-
tional political commitment is required to pursue criminals beyond state borders,138 
cooperation with the request for execution of the Al Bashir arrest warrant will be 
extended on terms that target states and the wider international community dictate. 
The consequence is that, because the decision to issue the warrant was made in pur-
suance of the rigid distinction between law and politics, when behaviour of states 
131 J Snyder and L Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and errors: Principle and pragmatism in strategies of international 
justice’ (2003) 28 International Security 5, 6.
132 Ryngaert (n 75) 699.
133 Compare, V Peskin, International justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual trials and the struggle for 
state cooperation (Cambridge University Press 2008) 12.
134 C Lamont, International criminal justice and the politics of state compliance (Ashgate 2010) 164.
135 D Tladi, ‘The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The battle for the soul of interna-
tional law’ (2009) 34 South African Yearbook of International Law 57, 58.
136 Compare, Goldsmith and Posner (n 27) 116.
137 Nouwen and Wouter (n 48) 964.
138 Greenwalt (n 105) 660.
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such as South Africa fail to conform to legal rules because of outright refusal to 
accept certain standards for any number of reasons, then this failure is ascribed to 
politics, as an apology for politics.139 In that event, the uncompromising approach 
to rule-following inherent in legalism constrains legalists to emphasise that despite 
the changes in state behaviour and interests out of a desire to escape the constrain-
ing	effect	of	international	law	in	any	particular	situation,140 the legal rules are still 
binding on states. To the extent that the political party in the majority in South Af-
rica is seriously considering withdrawal from the Rome Statute, it is possible that 
this state and possibly others in the regional bloc, have declined to modify their 
behaviour to comply with the law of the Rome Statute, which then become discon-
nected from state behaviour and connotes utopia.141
The lesson for the Prosecutor with reference to Sudan, however, lies not in 
the failure to convince the target state to cooperate with the Court by arresting and 
surrendering Al Bashir, which is nakedly contrary to its own interests where the 
accused remains a serving head of state, but in the failure to engage other state 
parties,142 third states,143 the Security Council144 and even the United Nations145 to 
apply consistent, sustained international pressure to execute outstanding arrest war-
rants issued by the Court even after referral by the Security Council.146 Hence, the 
139 Koskenniemi (n 29) 17-18.
140 Ibid 19-21.
141 Ibid.
142 Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the failure by the 
Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the ar-
rest, ICC-02/05-01/09-139 (12 December 2011; Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision informing the United 
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al 
Bashir’s recent visit to the Republic of Chad (27 August 2010) ICC-02/05-01/09109; Prosecutor v Al 
Bashir, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties 
to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti, ICC-02/05-01/09-129 (12 May 
2011); Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision informing the United Nations Security Council and the As-
sembly of the States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s presence in the territory of the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-02/05-01/09-107 (27 August 2010).
143 Prosecutor v Al Bashir, Decision regarding Omar Al Bashir’s potential travel to the United States of 
America (18 September 2013) ICC-02/05-01/09. See also G Thompson, ‘White House’s new Sudan 
strategy	fits	envoys	pragmatic	style’	The New York Times 19 October 2009.




146 A De Waal, ‘Darfur, the Court and Khartoum: The politics of non-state cooperation’ in N Waddell and P 
Clark (eds) Courting conflict? Justice, peace and the ICC in Africa (Royal African Press 2008) 35. See 
also W Burke-White, ‘Bargaining for arrests at the International Criminal Court: A response to Roper 
and Barria’ (2008) 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 477, 481.
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outstanding arrest warrants in the Darfur referral is attributable not only to the am-
bivalence of the international community, but also to the failure of the exercise of 
political intelligence by the former Prosecutor.147 It is also worth noting that there 
are credible reports to lead to the conclusion that the ICC processes were adopted 
as one among many of a series of solutions and that consequently, the referral has 
been	overreached	by	other	conflict	resolution	alternatives.148 The practical implica-
tion of this is that until the Darfur process is resolved by political means, there will 
be little or no interest or incentives on the part of surrogate enforcers, particularly 
those	with	overarching	interests	in	conflict	with	those	of	the	Court,	to	ensure	the	
implementation of the arrest warrants.149 Note also that international pressure to 
cooperate with the Court, if at all, is not applied in a ‘domestic political vacuum,’150 
but interacts with conducive domestic political conditions in order to frame compli-
ance.151 The implications for the Prosecutor are that at least with regard to securing 
arrest and surrender, which is crucial to the Court’s existence and functioning,152 the 
Court is as much a political actor as a legal one.153
Conversely,	consider	how	different	the	situation	may	have	been	if	the	former	
Prosecutor had rather sought to obtain a critical mass in support of an indictment 
against Al Bashir by engaging in dialogue and persuasion with member states and 
leveraging the moral authority of the Security Council referral to prod state parties 
and the members of the Security Council for support. Pursuing dialogue with target 
states and actively persuading states and the wider international community to ex-
act compliance with the Court constitutes strategic legalism, which belies the need 
for the Prosecutor to exercise legal discretion but requires the Prosecutor to gauge 
political sensitivities before proceeding, which is illustrative of political intelli-
gence. This is necessary because the Rome Statute created a legal paradigm shift 
in respect of the old architecture of state sovereignty.154 The paradigm shift was 
intended to replace the sovereignty–centred rules by holding individuals, irrespec-
tive	of	office	or	station,	criminally	accountable.155 The apparent revolution at Rome 
147 Rodman (n 10) 445.
148 Ibid.
149 De Waal (n 146) 35.
150 J Subotic, ‘The paradox of international justice compliance’ (2009) 1 International Journal of Transi-
tional Justice 1, 4.
151 Ibid.
152 Rome Statute, art. 63.
153 Burke-White (n 146) 482.
154 Rodman (n 10) 440.
155 Ibid.
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was however incomplete, because state parties did not concomitantly transfer en-
forcement powers to the Court. As denoted by the enforcement problem in interna-
tional institutions, these enforcement powers are traditionally the jealous preserve 
of states. That is the sole reason why the Prosecutor exercises legal discretion but 
is still encumbered by the need to proceed on the basis of political sensitivities to 
ensure the broad, and sometimes extraordinary, level of international commitment 
and support necessary to discharge the OTP’s mandate.
6 Conclusion
The opening quote of this chapter used the tale of Frankenstein to capture 
the fraught agency relationship between the ICC and state parties that enacted its 
existence under the Rome Statute in addition to pertinent international political ac-
tors such as the Security Council and non-state parties. This is because the Court’s 
underpinnings	of	equal	 justice	and	ending	 impunity	and	 the	specific	 target	audi-
ence of top military and political leaders represent an unprecedented challenge to 
state	 sovereignty.	Recognising	 the	 sword	of	Damocles	 effectively	dangling	over	
them, states enacted self-preservation measures into the Statute, leading to struc-
tural compromises between legalism and realism, which in turn pervades the re-
gime governing how states and other actors cooperate with the Court. One of the 
structural compromises referred to above is the non-existent enforcement regime 
under the Rome Statute, which state cooperation provisions, although present, are 
rather feeble.
Frankenstein created a beast of whose potential he was oblivious, and thus 
could not contain. The ad hoc international criminal tribunals might have escaped 
their	 creators,	 but	 definitely	 did	 not	 escape	 their	 environment.156 The deliberate 
omission of the framers of the Rome Statute to include enforcement mechanisms 
to frame compliance with orders and judgments of the Court in the Rome Statute 
constitutes a realist betrayal of the legalist ambitions and aspirations within it, in 
themselves a considerable feat, but nevertheless subjected to the prerogatives of 
those ultimately called upon to support and implement the Court’s processes.
The lack of enforcement mechanisms directly speaks to the competing com-
pulsions by states to make normative commitments to international criminal jus-
tice, but to also contain the development and growth of these institutions. The ICC 
was not crafted to escape its creators and may not be doing so any time soon.
156 L Côté, ‘Independence and impartiality’ in Reydams et al. (n 75) 370.
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In the case of the arrest warrant issued against Al Bashir, the book Rough 
Justice details the exchange between the ICC Prosecutor and a diplomat in which 
the	diplomat	advised	the	Prosecutor	that	pursuing	the	head	of	state	at	first	instance	
would undercut all other options and would ultimately hurt the image of the very 
institution the Prosecution was intent on building. Judging by the blaring headlines 
whenever	both	member	and	non-member	states	defiantly	and	openly	flout	the	ICC	
arrest warrant by failing to arrest Al Bashir when it is within their power to do so, 
it would appear that the particular diplomat was right and that the damage wrought 
to the Court has been considerable.
It is important to note that political judgment or intelligence is not appease-
ment by another name. This paper does not presume that Al Bashir will not be ar-
rested in the fullness of time. Instead, it draws from the experience of the ICTY and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to conclude that all factors remain-
ing constant, in terms of the relations between the AU and the Court, the execution 
of the arrest warrant against Al Bashir by his arrest and surrender to the Court will 
happen when he loses all and any political capital that he presently holds.
Where the Court does not make intelligent interventions, state cooperation 
with the Court will vacillate between apology and utopia. Such is the nature of 
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As Kenya grapples with questions regarding its social, legal, economic and political 
transition, the issue of the local prosecution of alleged perpetrators of past crimes 
has taken centre stage. It is argued that for member states to the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), like Kenya, any transitional 
justice measures must address the issue of impunity for past atrocities through 
prosecution. Thus, while the International Criminal Court (ICC) is designed to 
exercise jurisdiction over those who bear the greatest responsibility, municipal 
courts are expected to hold to account mid- and lower level perpetrators or those 
who do not bear the most responsibility for the commission of international crimes. 
This contribution underscores the importance of accountability through prosecution 
as a cardinal component of transitional justice. It critically analyses the challenges 
facing effective prosecutions of international crimes in Kenyan courts. By doing 
so, this chapter seeks to answer the questions: how should local courts effectively 
prosecute perpetrators of international crimes who may not necessarily bear the 
greatest responsibility? In other words, how should local criminal law systems and 
legislations effectively respond to international crimes?
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1 Introduction and background
On 27 December 2007, Kenya held its ninth general election since independ-
ence.1 The outcome of the presidential elections was, however, contested on several 
fronts. Rigging allegations marred by scores of violence led to the commission of 
international and other serious crimes in several parts of the country.2 These events 
necessitated the establishment of mechanisms to help Kenya address its past and 
forge a way forward on a path of peace, justice and prosperity. The Kenya National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee (KNDRC) was established to spearhead 
the process.3 It is this committee that laid a foundation for the subsequent transi-
tional justice mechanisms. The committee agreed on several initiatives, including: 
the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission;4 the adoption 
of comprehensive constitutional, legal and institutional reform processes;5 and the 
establishment of a commission of inquiry to investigate the violence and make 
recommendations on any probable legal redress.6 Some scholars deemed this agree-
ment the most comprehensive way of addressing the salient objectives of the tran-
sitional justice process.7 Some of these initiatives are ongoing, while others have 
completed their work with varying degrees of success.8 Other initiatives came to a 
1 A general election combines the presidential, parliamentary and civic elections.
2 European Union Election Observation Mission, Final report on Kenya, General Elections 27 December 
2007 (3 April 2008) 36; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) ‘Speedy reforms needed to 
deal with past injustices and prevent future displacement’ (10 June 2010) <http://www.internal- dis-
placement.org/countries/Kenya> accessed 26 October 2011; Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Elec-
tion Violence (CIPEV) Final Report (15 October 2008) 472-475 <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/index.
php/reports/commission-reports.html> accessed 1 May 2012.
3 This was an ad hoc committee established during the post-election violence (PEV). It comprised of 
members drawn from the then ruling Party of National Unity, the then opposition party Orange Demo-
cratic Party and a panel of eminent African personalities: Benjamin Mkapa, Graca Machel and Jakaya 
Ki�wete.	The	former	United	Nations	Secretary	General,	Kofi	Anan,	chaired	the	committee.
4 Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Committee (KNDRC) Agreement on agenda item three: 
How to resolve the political crisis (14 February 2008) 3 <http://www.dialoguekenya.org/index.php/
agreements.html> accessed 1 May 2012.
5 Ibid. 
6 KNDRC Agreement: Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (2008).
7 TO Hansen, ‘Kenya’s power-sharing arrangement and its implications for transitional justice’ (2013) 17 
The International Journal of Human Rights 307. 
8 CIPEV	concluded	 its	mandate	 in	2008.	 Its	 investigations	 and	findings	have	been	hailed	 to	be	most	
comprehensive.	In	fact,	the	ICC	prosecution	has	often	times	relied	on	these	findings	in	the	ongoing	tri-
als. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) equally concluded its mandate in 2013 
and	its	final	report	handed	over	to	the	President	on	23	May	2013	for	implementation.	The	report	was	
subsequently tabled before Parliament on 24 July 2013 exceeding the deadline stipulated under Sec-
tion	48(4)	of	the	TJRC	Act,	which	requires	that	the	final	report	be	tabled	in	Parliament	within	21	days	
after its publication. Since then, nothing has been done towards implementation the TJRC’s report. On 
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pre-mature end having hardly achieved their objectives.9
Kenya therefore continues to grapple with questions regarding its social, le-
gal, economic and political transition. The understanding that prosecution is crit-
ical to the success of any transition resonates with legal-philosophical thinking 
that underlies transitional justice processes.10 Although this contribution acknowl-
edges that some scholars emphasize the prioritization of alternative accountabil-
ity mechanisms like truth-telling, healing and peace building during transition,11 it 
underscores the importance of accountability through prosecution for transitional 
societies.12 This contribution also takes note of an international duty to prosecute 
for countries, like Kenya, which are not only party to the Rome Statute of the 
ICC (Rome Statute),13 but also have a similar duty under other international instru-
ments14 and customary international law.15 It is argued that for states like Kenya, 
the other hand, local prosecution of international crimes have been overshadowed by the ongoing ICC 
trials. There is hardly any reporting on these cases. On constitutional reforms, a commendable job was 
done leading to the promulgation of a new constitution on 27 August 2010. This Constitution embod-
ies principles on numerous institutional reforms. Related institutional reforms include reforms of the 
electoral body, police reforms and judicial reforms that called upon the legislators to enact legislation 
providing	for	vetting	of	judicial	officers.	This	process	is	still	ongoing.
9 See	(n	8)	(with	a	specific	focus	on	local	prosecution	of	international	crimes).
10 R Teitel, Transitional justice (Oxford University Press 2000). Teitel acknowledges that trials are com-
monly thought to play the leading foundational role in the transition to a more liberal political order. 
Only trials are thought to draw a bright line demarcating the normative shift from illegitimate to legiti-
mate rule. See also D Orentlicher, ‘Settling accounts: The duty to prosecute human rights violations 
of a prior regime’ (1991) 100 The Yale Law Journal 25. See also M Osiel, Mass atrocity, collective 
memory and the law (Transaction Publishers 1999) 15-22 as cited by J Rowen, ‘Social realities and 
philosophical ideals in transitional justice’ (2008) 7 Cardozo Public Law Policy and Ethics Journal 98. 
L Huyse, ‘Justice after transition: On the choices successor elites make in dealing with the past’ (1995) 
20 Law and Social Inquiry 55. Huyse points out the importance of prosecutions for a young democracy 
in transition not only as a tool that legitimizes the new government, but also as a means to foster respect 
for new democratic institutions.
11 L Keller, ‘Achieving peace without justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan alternative 
justice mechanisms’ (2008) 23 Connecticut Journal of International Law 261.
12 Teitel (n 10); Orentlicher (n 10); Osiel (n 10).
13 Para 5 of the preamble to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court underscores that the 
philosophy underlying the Rome Statute is to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of crimes of 
concern to the international community thus contributing to their prevention. Article 5 of the Rome 
Statute further enlists these crimes to include genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. See K 
Obura, ‘Duty to prosecute international crimes under international law’ in C Murugu and J Biegon (eds) 
Prosecuting international crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press 2011) 11.
14 For example, Kenya has an express mandate under the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman	or	Degrading	Treatment	or	Punishment	(CAT).	CAT	was	ratified	by	Kenya	on	8	March	1996.	
Article 4 of the Convention calls upon member states to ensure that torture or attempt to commit torture 
are	offences	punishable	by	appropriate	penalties	under	criminal	law.
15 T Meron, Human rights and humanitarian norms as customary law (Clarendon Press 1989) 210. 
Though scholars have disagreed on the range of human rights protected by international customary law, 
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any transitional justice measures must address the issue of impunity for past atroci-
ties through prosecution. Indeed, there exists both local and international consensus 
on the importance of prosecuting international and other serious crimes in Kenya 
following their commission in the Post-Election Violence (PEV) of 2007. Further-
more, the Commission of Inquiry into the PEV16 (CIPEV) suggested the establish-
ment of a prosecution mechanism to eradicate impunity.17
While the International Criminal Court (ICC) is only exercising jurisdiction 
over those who bear the greatest responsibility for PEV,18 municipal courts were/are 
expected to hold to account mid and lower level perpetrators or those who do not 
bear the most responsibility for the commission of international crimes. This is be-
cause the ICC only complements the jurisdiction of local courts.19 In fact, the ICC 
only	exists	to	reinforce	efforts	of	national	systems	to	combat	impunity;	therefore	
relying principally on states to investigate and prosecute persons accused of ICC 
crimes.20 Thus, the ICC and state parties to the Statute have a mutual responsibility 
to bring to justice perpetrators of the worst crimes.
This	chapter	therefore	critically	analyses	the	challenges	facing	effective	pros-
ecutions	of	international	crimes	in	Kenyan	courts.	How	should	local	courts	effec-
tively prosecute perpetrators of international crimes who may not necessarily bear 
the greatest responsibility? In other words, how should local criminal law systems 
and	legislations	effectively	respond	to	international	crimes?	To	this	end,	this	chap-
ter seeks to inform better criminal law processes in respect of the prosecution of 
international crimes in national courts.
This chapter is divided into three main parts. Following a brief introduction, 
part	two	examines	the	�ey	challenges	facing	effective	local	prosecutions	as	well	as	
there is general agreement that customary law prohibits torture, genocide, extra judicial executions and 
disappearances.
16 KNDRC Agreement: Commission of Inquiry of Post-Election Violence (2008) 1.
17 CIPEV Report (n 2) 472.
18 Initially, ICC investigations were launched against six individuals: William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kip-
rono Kosgey, Joshua Arap Sang, Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Husein	Ali.	After	confirmation	hearings,	proceedings	were	confirmed	against	 three:	William	Samoei	
Ruto, Joshua Arap Sang and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta. While Ruto and Sang continue to face trial before 
the	ICC	today,	the	case	against	Uhuru	Kenyatta	was	withdrawn	due	to	insufficient	evidence.	ICC	Trial	
Chamber V(B), Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, 
Decision on withdrawal of charges against Kenyatta (13 March 2015) ICC-01/09-02/11.
19 Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(a).
20 H Steiner and P Alston, International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals (Oxford University 
Press 2007) 1299; EO Asaala, ‘The International Criminal Court factor on transitional justice in Kenya’ 
in K Ambos and O Maunganidze (eds) Power and prosecution: Challenges and opportunities for inter-
national criminal justice in Sub-Saharan Africa (Universitätsverlag Göttingen 2012) 124.
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the impact of these prosecutions on transitional justice in Kenya. The essence of 
this section is to discuss Kenya’s experience in prosecuting international crimes. 
Part two considers the jurisprudence put forth by the Kenyan courts regarding 
prosecution of PEV-related crimes. However, because of the limited scope of this 
contribution, only a selected number of the PEV-related cases are reviewed. The 
Kenyan	cases	 that	were	confirmed	by	the	ICC	and	the	geographical	coverage	of	
their charges are the criterion that this chapter has used in selecting the cases under 
discussion. A discussion of the challenges also adopts a thematic approach, which 
highlights the following aspects: jurisdiction, investigations, local ownership and 
legitimacy and political will. Finally, the chapter draws various conclusions and 
suggests the way forward.
2	 Challenges	to	effective	prosecution	of	international	crimes	in	
local courts
Local prosecutions of crimes against humanity in Kenya have faced a vast 
range of challenges. Key among them include the jurisdictional question, inad-
equate investigations by police (inadequate competencies and human and technical 




Kenya is a state party to the Rome Statute21 that has domesticated the Statute 
under	its	International	Crimes	Act	(ICA).	The	ICA	adopts	the	Rome	Statute	defini-
tion of crimes against humanity.22 This law however came into force on 1 January 
2009 after the alleged PEV crimes were committed. According to the principles 
of legality (nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege),23 this statute cannot apply ret-
rospectively. Similarly, although the Kenyan Constitution makes a mandatory re-
21 Kenya	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	on	15	March	2005.
22 ICA, art. 6(4).
23 This requires that all criminal behaviour is criminalized and all punishment established under the law 
before any prosecution. See Rome Statute, art. 22 (no person can be held criminally responsible unless 
such conduct constitutes a crime under the law). For further reading on this see, I Crisan, ‘The prin-
ciples of legality, “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege” and their role’ Effectius Newsletter (2010) 5 
<http://effectius.com/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/The_principles_of_legality_nullum_crimen_nul-
la_poena_sine_lege_and_their_role__Iulia_Crisan_Issue5.16811416.pdf> accessed 14 October 2015.
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quirement	of	general	rules	of	international	law	and	any	treaties	ratified	by	Kenya	
to form part of the laws of Kenya,24 it was promulgated on 27 August 2010. Un-
til the promulgation of the 2010 Constitution, Kenya traditionally ascribed to the 
dualist philosophy of applying international law in domestic courts.25 Prosecuting 
PEV related international crimes under Kenyan laws was therefore not possible, 
as it would have amounted to an infringement of the established international law 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege.	This	deficiency	in	the	legal	framewor�	then	
explains why local mechanisms chose to prosecute ordinary municipal crimes in-
stead of international crimes such as crimes against humanity for those not indicted 
by the ICC. Local prosecution of PEV related crimes therefore involved crimes 
ranging	from	petty	crimes	 to	capital	offences:	murder,26 handling stolen goods,27 
burglary,28	 rape	 and	 defilement,29	 which	 offences	 potentially	 comprise	 the	actus 
reus of crimes against humanity.30
Given this scenario, there has been no instance when local courts conceptu-
alized the notion of crimes against humanity. This option of prosecuting alleged 
perpetrators under ordinary crimes in domestic courts has meant that it is only those 
prosecuted at the ICC that faces the charges of international crimes. While Ken-
yan courts did not hear cases of crimes against humanity as such, the punishment 
for capital conduct nevertheless attracts a death sentence. However, the maximum 
punishment for crimes against humanity under international law is a life sentence.31 
24 Constitution of Kenya (2010), arts. 2(5) and (6).
25 JO Ambani, ‘Navigating past the �Dualist Doctrine”: The case for progressive jurisprudence on the 
application of international human rights norms in Kenya’ in M Killander (ed) International law and 
domestic human rights litigation in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press 2010) 25, 30. According to 
the	dualist	approach,	an	international	treaty	does	not	become	binding	at	the	domestic	level	upon	ratifica-
tion thereof, but only once the terms of the treaty have been transformed into domestic law.
26 R v Stephen Kiprotich Leting and others, Nakuru High Court Criminal Case No 34 of 2008 (in this case 
the accused were charged, jointly with others not before the court, with the murder of about 35 people 
who were burnt in a church at Kiambaa, Uasin Gishu District, Rift valley Province); see also R v John 
Kimita Mwaniki, Nakuru High Court Criminal Case No 116 of 2007; see also R v Eric Akeyo Otieno, 
Criminal Appeal No 10 of 2008; see also R v Peter Kipkemboi Rutto alias Saitoti, Nakuru High Court 
Criminal Case No 118 of 2008.
27 R v James Wafula Khamala, Bungoma High Court Criminal Appeal No 9 of 2010.
28 R v Paul Khamala, Kakamega High Court criminal Appeal No 115 of 2008.
29 R v Philemon Kipsang Kirui, Kericho High Court Criminal Appeal No 59 of 2009.
30 Rome	Statute,	art.	7(1).	Crimes	against	humanity	has	been	defined	as	acts	of	murder,	extermination,	
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, persecution on political, racial and religious 
grounds, enforced disappearance of persons, apartheid and other inhuman acts committed as part of a 
widespread or systematic attack directed against civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.
31 Rome Statute, art. 77; see also Penal Code of Kenya (Cap 63 Laws of Kenya), Sections 204 and 296(2), 
which stipulates that murder and robbery with violence respectively attract death sentences.
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This is despite the fact that the ICC requires a higher and stringent threshold in 
proving crimes against humanity. The end result is that those with highest respon-
sibility are treated more leniently by international law as opposed to those who did 
not bear the highest responsibility and facing prosecution before municipal courts. 
Although the doctrine of complementarity would dictate that those who do not bear 
the most responsibility are prosecuted for international crimes in municipal courts, 
the lack of a legal framework leading to prosecution of PEV crimes as ordinary 
crimes in Kenyan courts has so far not attracted any scholarly criticism.
The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber’s authorization of the Prosecutor to launch in-
vestigations into the Kenyan cases32 triggered a local case challenging the ICC’s 
involvement in Kenyan PEV-related cases. In the case of Joseph Kimani Gathungu 
v The Attorney General and Others,33 the applicant sought inter alia court orders 
declaring ICC’s involvement in Kenyan PEV cases unconstitutional and therefore 
invalid. It was the applicant’s further submission that the ICC was not provided 
for under the Constitution as an organ capable of investigating crimes committed 
in Kenya. The respondents, however, lodged a preliminary objection questioning, 
inter alia, whether the High Court of Kenya had jurisdiction in respect of the ju-
risdiction of the ICC and whether the ICC was amenable to judicial proceedings 
before the High Court of Kenya.
This application paved the way for Kenyan courts to canvass the salient issues 
on the role played by international criminal justice systems vis-à-vis municipal 
systems in the prosecution of international crimes. The fact that Kenya had not at 
that stage domesticated the ICC Statute as a dualist state then posed a real challenge 
necessitating the court’s intervention. In this case, the court observed that:
… international tribunal such as the ICC is well recognized to have compétence de la 
compétence – an initial capacity to determine whether or not it has the jurisdiction to hear 
and determine a case coming up before it… the ICC, acting within the terms of the Rome 
Statute, has already determined that it indeed has jurisdiction. The ICC has gone further 
to determine the second jurisdictional question: whether the special facts of post-election 
violence in Kenya (2007-2008) render the matter justiciable before that Court. The ICC 
has determined that, on the facts, it has jurisdiction to investigate, hear and determine the 
cases arising from the post-election violence.34
32 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the authorization of an 
investigation into the situation in the Republic of Kenya (31 March 2010) ICC-01/09.
33 Constitutional Reference Number 12 of 2010, High Court of Kenya at Mombasa, 23rd November 2010; 
(2010) eKLR <http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/72570/> accessed 15 May 2014.
34 Constitutional Reference Number 12 of 2010, para h.
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According to the Court, the ICC has inherent capacity emanating from the 
Rome Statute to determine whether or not it has got jurisdiction to hear and deter-
mine a matter. It is through the exercise of this power that the Court determined 
its jurisdiction over the Kenyan cases. More so, ‘Kenya was a member of the com-
munity of nations and subject to the governing law bearing upon states as members 
of that community.’35 Obligations arising from this governing law are embodied 
in treaties and conventions to which states were parties and the Rome Statute was 
one such convention. The act of ratifying international treaties by a state therefore 
allows limitations on its sovereignty regarding the stipulated legal obligations. It 
cannot therefore be argued that the ICC in any way infringes on Kenya’s constitu-
tional	sovereignty	when	Kenya	voluntarily	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	binding	itself	
to its provisions. The applicant’s reliance on Kenya’s new constitution as excluding 
the ICC’s operations in Kenya was therefore not convincing since:
… the Constitution of 2010 is not to be regarded as rejecting the role of international 
institutions such as the ICC. Indeed, from the express provisions of the Constitution, �the 
general rules of international law shall form part of the law of Kenya”; and Kenya remains 
party to a large number of multilateral international legal instruments: and so, by law, 
Kenya	has	obligations	to	give	effect	to	these.	One	of	such	Conventions	is	the	Rome	Statute	
which establishes the International Criminal Court.36
To this end, the Court dismissed the application on grounds that it neither had 
such jurisdiction nor were the orders being sought justiciable.
2.2	 Poor	investigations	and	laxity	by	police	officers
The quality of local investigations conducted in PEV-related cases has also 
raised concerns. Poor investigations have allowed many perpetrators of serious 
crimes to evade accountability37 resulting in very few prosecutions, and even fewer 
convictions.38 Regrettably, there has not been a continuous and up to date catalogu-
ing of the progress in all the PEV-related cases. According to a report by the Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions (DPP), a total of 6081 PEV-related cases were reported 
to the local authorities for investigations.39 Out of all these cases, only 366 had been 
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Human Rights Watch, Turning pebbles: Evading accountability for post-election violence in Kenya 
(2011) 4.
38 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 3.
39 The Multi-Agency Task Force on the 2007/2008 PEV, ‘Report on the 2007/2008 PEV Related cases’ 
(2012) 1.
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taken to Court by the year 2012. Of these, 23 cases were still pending in court, 78 
cases had resulted in acquittals, 77 cases had been withdrawn and only 138 convic-
tions achieved.40	A	study	by	Human	Rights	Watch	however	confirms	that	only	a	few	
of these convictions were for serious crimes directly related to the PEV.41 These 
included two murder cases, three cases of robbery with violence, one for common 
assault and another for assault causing grievous harm.42 In fact, the DPP’s report 
has been criticized for lacking precision. For example, four of the alleged 49 con-
victions in sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) were actually acquittals and 
two of these cases had nothing to do with PEV as they involved unnatural sexual of-
fences.43 Only one of all these cases was a clear SGBV case related to PEV and the 
same	had	resulted	in	an	acquittal	on	the	charges	of	sexual	offences,	but	a	conviction	
on robbery with violence.44
It is also alarming that some of the ‘hot spot’ areas with high casualties for 
PEV victims recorded no subsequent convictions. In Uasin Gishu, for example, 
there was no single conviction despite the killing of 230 people. Similarly, there 
were	 no	 convictions	 of	 police	 officers	 despite	 an	 estimated	 962	 cases	 of	 police	
shootings, which resulted in 405 deaths.45
The	laxity	displayed	by	police	officers	in	the	investigation	of	sexual	offences	
related to PEV has also been condemned.46 Despite recommending a list of 66 com-
plaints to the DPP for prosecution, the police subsequently endorsed a closure of 
almost all these cases due to lack of evidence.47 According to the DPP, the majority 
of	 these	files	 contained	nothing	more	 than	 complainants’	 statements.48 Although 
the	DPP	sent	the	files	bac�	for	further	investigations,	these	were	never	returned.49 
The dismal performance in prosecution can therefore be closely associated to poor 
investigations	by	the	police	officers.
40 The Multi-Agency Task Force on the 2007/2008 PEV (n 39) 2.




45 Ibid; CIPEV report (n 1).
46 CIPEV report (n 1) 399-404; Human Rights Watch (n 37) 20. This report condemns the failure of police 
to	investigate	sexual	offences	committed	during	the	post-election	violence.	Following	these	criticisms,	
the police established a Police Task Force to investigate rape cases during the post-election violence. 
This Task Force was however criticised by FIDA, one of the major stakeholders who later withdrew its 
membership citing lack of credibility on the part of the Task Force.
47 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 21.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
36 Evelyne Owiye Asaala
Having ascribed to the adversarial system of dispute resolution, it has become 
increasingly	difficult,	and	almost	impossible	for	Kenyan	courts	to	ma�e	any	mean-
ingful engagement with PEV cases where investigations are conducted dismally. 
For example, most of the occurrences upon which those facing trial before the 
ICC were charged for crimes against humanity attracted a charge of murder for 
the alleged actual perpetrators in the municipal courts.50 Yet, the outcome of local 
prosecutions remains questionable over allegations of poor investigations. A criti-
cal review of two of these cases is worth considering.
2.2.1 R v Stephen Kiprotich Leting and three others51
The facts of this case were as follows: On 30 December 2008, following erup-
tion of PEV, some Kikuyu families in Uasin Gishu District within Rift Valley Prov-
ince sought refuge at Kenya Assemblies of God Church, Kiambaa. The number of 
those seeking refuge at the church increased the following day by an additional 160 
people whose houses had been torched joining those already at the church. On the 
night of 1 January 2008, a gang of about 4000 people armed with bows and arrows 
attacked the church. While those seeking refuge scattered, some locked themselves 
inside the church. The gang then surrounded the church and set it ablaze, killing 
about 35 people.
Whereas the High Court in this case condemned the crimes committed, it un-
derlined the importance of the state proving PEV cases beyond a reasonable doubt 
in order to secure convictions. According to the Court, the state failed to prove three 
cardinal components essential to proving the crime of murder: (a) the death of the 
deceased and the cause of that death; (b) that the accused committed the unlawful 
act which caused the death of the deceased; and (c) that the accused had the malice 
aforethought. It was the Court’s observation that the prosecution failed to call some 
crucial witnesses and as a result failed to establish that some of the deceased per-
sons were actually dead or that it was the accused persons who actually murdered 
them.	The	first,	second	and	fourth	accused	persons	in	this	case	raised	the	defence	of	
alibi. In so far as the third accused person admitted being at the scene of crime, it 
50 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber 
II, ICC-01/09-01/11, 10–11; Prosecutor v Francis Karimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges pursuant to Article 61 (7) (a) and (b) of the Rome 
Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II, ICC-01/09-02/11, 11–13.
51 For the entire referencing below on the facts and court decision in this case, see High Court Crimi-
nal case no 34 of 2008 at Nakuru http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/55195> accessed 30 January 
2015.
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was his submission that he had only rushed there to rescue the victims. The police 
was unable to produce evidence to dismiss these claims beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court further observed that the prosecutor ought to have called into 
action the doctrine of ‘common intention’52 in order to secure the conviction of 
the accused persons. In the Court’s wisdom, the doctrine of common intention 
was deemed essential given the manner in which the attack was orchestrated. For 
instance, all the attackers had painted their faces; were chanting war dirges; were 
armed with crude weapons, including machetes, pangas, spears, clubs, arrows 
and bows; were systematic in the manner in which they launched their attacks 
against Kimuli, Rehema and Kiambaa farms; and were systematic in the manner 
they	followed	their	victims,	slashing	and	hac�ing	them	to	death	and	then	finally	
setting the church a blaze. This was adequate proof of common intention. Ac-
cording to the Court, the evidence narrows down to prove a preconceived plan 
to commit these atrocities. The court however decried the level of evidence pro-
duced by the police:
One would have expected the police to place before court evidence of the Accused having 
been	part	of	the	gang	that	pre-arranged	to	commit	this	offence.	That,	however,	was	not	the	
case. The evidence on record does not show, leave alone suggest, the involvement of the 
Accused in any pre-arranged plan to execute any or any unlawful act… I know that it is 
an	undoubtedly	difficult	thing	to	prove	even	the	intention	of	an	individual	and	therefore	
more	difficult	to	prove	the	common	intention	of	a	group	of	people.	But	however	difficult	
the task is, like any other element of crime, the prosecution must lead evidence of facts, 
circumstances and conduct of accused persons from which their common intention can be 
gathered. In this case there is absolutely no evidence of the raiders and/or any of the accused 
having met to arrange the execution of any or any unlawful purpose. There is absolutely 
no evidence to show that the Accused and/or others had a pre-arranged plan to attack 
Kimuli, Rehema and/or Kiambaa farms and kill their residents… In this case, without 
placing	any	evidence	on	record,	the	prosecution	wants	me	to	find	that	the	Accused	had	a	
common intent with the murderers of the deceased and were part of that joint enterprise. 
That cannot be… I have to point out the shoddy police investigations in this case so that 
blame is placed where it belongs… The judiciary is being accused of acquitting criminals 
and	unleashing	them	to	society...	I	do	not	want	to	dismiss	those	complaints	off	hand.	But	
what I know is that courts acquit accused persons if there is no evidence against them. In 
our criminal jurisprudence: out of 100 suspects, it is better to acquit 99 criminals than to 
52 This simply means a premeditated plan to act in concert. In order to secure a conviction under common 
intention, the prosecution must prove that the Accused had (a) a criminal intention to commit the of-
fence charged jointly with others, (b) the act committed by one or more of the perpetrators in respect of 
which it is sought to hold an accused guilty, even though it is outside the common design, was a natural 
and	foreseeable	consequence	of	effecting	that	common	purpose,	and	(c)	the	accused	was	aware	of	this	
when he or she agreed to participate in that joint criminal act.
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convict one innocent person. Because of that our law requires that for a conviction to result 
the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt the case against an accused person.53
Having expressed its frustration over the quality of investigations and pros-
ecutions in this case, the Court proceeded to acquit all the accused persons on the 
basis that the prosecution had failed to prove their case.
2.2.2 Republic v Edward Kirui54
This case portrays the direct role of the then Kenyan Government in 
the PEV of 2007. Aggrieved by the declaration of Mwai Kibaki as the elected 
president of the 2007 general elections, the Orange Democratic (Movement) 
Party (ODM) contested the elections and gave notice of their intention to hold 
peaceful demonstrations to express their displeasure. The police responded to 
this notice by declaring the planned demonstrations illegal. Consequently, the 
Government	intensified	police	presence	all	over	the	country,	especially	in	ODM’s	
strongholds. Despite declaring the meetings illegal, ODM demonstrations went 
ahead as planned. At Kondele, in Nyanza, displeased crowds continued with the 
demonstrations despite warnings to disperse. It was in this context that two persons 
were	shot	dead	by	the	accused	police	officer.	These	events	were	captured	on	video	
camera and displayed during trial.
While	 the	Court	 found	 that	 the	offence	of	murder	had	been	committed,	 the	
major issue for determination remained the question whether it was the accused 
person who had shot the deceased. One of the central issues in the case was the 
identification	of	the	accused	person.	This	was	shrouded	in	uncertainty	as	a	result	
of contradicting evidence from some of the witnesses. The Court did not, however, 
fault	 the	 police	 for	 failing	 to	 hold	 an	 identification	 parade	 since	 the	 identifying	
witnesses were well known to the accused person even before the incident. The 
other	�ey	 issue	 that	arose	was	whether	 it	 is	 the	accused	 that	fired	 the	shots	 that	
�illed	 the	deceased	persons.	The	sergeant	 in	charge	of	 the	armoury	 testified	 that	
on that material day he issued the accused with an AK47 serial number 23008378. 
The Firearms Examiner and the then Acting Senior Superintendent, however, testi-
fied	that	the	firearm	that	�illed	the	accused	bore	the	serial	number	3008378.	This	
cast	some	doubt	on	whether	the	accused’s	rifle	was	employed	to	�ill	the	deceased.	
53 See (n 51).
54 For the entire referencing below on the facts and court decision in this case see, Nairobi High Court 
Criminal Case No 9 of 2008; (2010) eKLR <http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/68555/> accessed 
15 May 2014. 
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According to the Court, the prosecution had not only failed to produce before the 
court	the	rifle	with	serial	number	3008378,	but	also	failed	to	ma�e	any	attempts	to	
lin�	the	firearm	to	the	accused.	As	a	result	the	accused	was	acquitted.	Certain	civil	
society actors have however argued that the police tampered with this evidence.55 A 
notable trend among these cases is mass acquittals as a result of the failure on the 
part of local prosecutors to prove their cases according to the required standard of 
proof. Thus, corruption within the police investigating agencies, incompetence and 
the	unwillingness	of	police	officers	to	hold	their	colleagues	accountable	are	some	
of the factors that largely contributed to massive premature dismissal of PEV cases.
Relatedly, a review by a Task Force56 revealed that some victims hardly knew 
their	perpetrators	and	only	identified	them	as	‘neighbours’	or	‘members	of	a	par-
ticular ethnic group.’57 This contributed to several acquittals especially in sexual 




Like any other transitional justice mechanism, local prosecutions must be rel-
evant to the local communities. As such, they must take into account the priorities 
of	the	local	communities	in	the	identification	and	prosecution	of	alleged	perpetra-




ers and the general public and, secondly, the distrust between the judicial arm of 
government and the general public.
55 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 33.
56 In 2012, through Gazette Notice No 5417 of 20 April 2012, the Director of Public Prosecutions estab-
lished a Multi-Agency Task Force to undertake a national review, re-evaluation, and re-examination of 
all cases arising out to the 2007-2008 PEV.
57 The Multi-Agency Task Force on the 2007/2008 PEV (n 39) 3. CIPEV report (n 2) 400.
58 Republic v Julius Cheruiyot Kogo, Republic v Erick Kibet Towett and Simion Kipyegon Chepkwony. In 
both these cases, although the victims could identify the perpetrators, they failed to identify their names. 
This	caused	the	court	to	doubt	the	accuracy	of	the	identification	process,	which	lead	to	acquittals.
59 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 38.
60 This is the position favoured by both scholars and human rights organisations. See, for example, Human 
Rights Watch (n 37) 4; E Lutz, ‘Transitional justice: Lessons learned and the road ahead’ in N Roht-
Arriaza and J Mariezcurrena (eds) Transitional justice in the twenty-first Century: Beyond truth versus 
justice (Cambridge University Press 2006) 325-342.
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One	major	reason	contributing	to	poor	investigations	by	the	police	officers	is	
their perceived lack of legitimacy by the locals who are a crucial component of the 
process.	The	Kenyan	public	lac�s	trust	of	police	officers.61 This was exacerbated 
by the tribal tension that prevailed in the country during and after the PEV period. 
For example, the public wanted nothing to do with the police in areas where they 
were perceived to be Government.62	A	police	officer	has	previously	observed	that	
‘in Western [province] and Nyanza [province], people don’t give information about 
crime. People are used to being in the opposition, and they receive Government 
officials	negatively.’63 In some exceptional cases, the police have been accused of 
being partial in their investigations especially where they had ethnic solidarity with 
accused persons.64 This was a particular challenge in the PEV investigations in Rift 
Valley,	where	 police	 officers	 have	 confessed	 that	 some	of	 their	 colleagues	were	
in synch with some suspected local perpetrators.65 Under these circumstances, it 
becomes	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	police	 to	 carry	out	 effective	 investigations	because	
those who possess such knowledge may not be willing to freely pass it on to the 
authorities.
A negative public perception of Kenya’s Judiciary further distances the local 
population from local prosecution of PEV related cases. Historically, the Judiciary 
has had a reputation of lacking independence,66 being too untrustworthy to dispense 
any form of justice67 and as extremely corrupt.68 It is this mistrust of the local judi-
cial system that informed the excitement among Kenyans upon learning of the pos-
sibility of alleged perpetrators being prosecuted at the ICC.69 Notably, however, the 





66 CIPEV report (n 2) 460.
67 Africa Policy Institute, Breaking Kenya’s impasse: chaos or courts? Africa policy brief, page 3 as cit-
ed in Ongaro and Ambani ‘Constitutionalism as a panacea to ethnic divisions in Kenya: a post 2007 
election crisis perspective’ in G Mukundi (ed) Ethnicity, human rights and constitutionalism in Africa 
(Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists 2008) 29. This prompted the then ODM 
presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, to publicly decline having the disputed elections of 2007 resolved 
by local courts.
68 Report of the Task Force on Judicial Reforms (2009) 74-77.
69 ‘It’s The Hague, Kenyans tell violence suspects’ Daily Nation (Nairobi, 19 July 2009) 8 and 9. See also 
‘Hopes for justice high among Kenyans as Ocampo arrives’ Daily Nation (6 November 2009) 4. See 
‘MPs vow to defy Kibaki and Raila’ The Standard (7 July 2009) <http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?inc
l=comments&id=1144018708&cid=&articleID=1144018708> accessed 3 July 2012, pursuant to which 
the	Members	of	Parliament	vowed	to	bloc�	the	Bill	see�ing	to	try	post-poll	offenders	locally	for	fear	of	
manipulation from the executive.
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Judiciary	has	undergone	some	fundamental	reforms.	Significant	in	this	regard,	was	
the	adoption	of	stringent	measures	of	appointing	judicial	officers	and	the	vetting	of	
current judges and magistrates.70 Unfortunately, despite these reforms, a similar at-
titude is slowly and steadily pervading the public perception regarding prosecution 
of the actual perpetrators of PEV. This attitude has been informed by what some 
commentators perceive to be erroneous jurisprudence on key judicial decisions re-
volving around the ‘real power wielders.’71 As a result, there has been less focus on 
those few cases that have been successfully prosecuted at the local level.
2.4	 Lack	of	political	will
Government political commitment to the entire process of transitional jus-
tice,	including	prosecution,	is	fundamental	to	it.	However,	domestic	efforts	towards	
holding alleged perpetrators of international crimes accountable for past atrocities 
in Kenya has been largely characterized by a lack of political will. A report by 
Human	Rights	Watch,	for	instance,	labels	domestic	prosecution	efforts	as	a	‘half-
hearted’	effort	at	accountability,	with	the	result	that	‘hundreds	of	[...]	perpetrators	of	
serious crimes continue to evade accountability.’72 According to Asaala and Dicker, 
this	deficiency	can	be	attributed	to	a	host	of	challenges,	including	a	distinct	lac�	
of political will at two levels.73	First,	at	the	local	level,	a	study	has	confirmed	that	
the police, the Attorney General and all state prosecutors succumbed to negative 
local political pressure against prosecution.74 In several instances, local politicians 
as	well	as	the	then	Police	Commissioner,	Mohammed	Ali,	telephoned	his	officers	
instructing them to release suspected perpetrators of PEV.75 Consequently, despite 
overwhelming evidence that the police may have gathered against suspected per-
petrators, they had no option but to discard it and release the suspects without fur-
70 Vetting of Judges and Magistrates Act of 2011.
71 See generally E Asaala and N Dicker, ‘Transitional justice in Kenya and the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Truth and Justice: Where to from here?’ (2013) 13 (2) Africa Human Rights Law Journal 351; see also 
International Centre for Policy and Conflict and 5 Others v the AG and 4 Others Constitutional and Hu-
man Rights Division Petition 552 of 2012 (2013) eKLR, <http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view_ pre-
view1.php?link=119030658917561929 34559> accessed 4 April 2014. See generally Supreme Court of 
Kenya Petitions 3, 4 and 5 of 2013; Reports on re-tally of 22 polling stations in Petition 5 of 2013 and 
Report of the scrutiny of 33 400 polling stations. These reports are as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
own suo moto motion. 
72 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 4.
73 Asaala and Dicker (n 71).
74 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 53.
75 Ibid 54.
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ther prosecution. Furthermore, despite the CIPEV report implicating several local 
leaders for having funded and facilitated the violence, the police never bothered 
to follow-up and investigate such claims.76 It is therefore not surprising that the 
Government	 has	 displayed	 a	 lot	 of	 laxity	 towards	 effective	 local	 prosecution	 of	
some of the crucial cases it dubbed ‘priority cases.’77 In most of these cases, the au-
thorities closed their investigations without any arrest, claiming that there were no 
identifiable	suspects.78 As a result, none of the cases that were prosecuted involved 
suspected local politicians despite allegations of their involvement in organizing, 
financing	and	directing	the	local	violence.79 Although this contribution is aware of 
the fact that prosecuting PEV under national laws would not cover all the elements 
of	crimes	against	humanity	(li�e	deportation),	acts	 li�e	organizing	and	financing	
would	sufficiently	be	covered	under	the	notion	of	‘accessories	before	the	fact’80 that 
essentially apportions criminal liability.
Secondly, at the international level, the Government has displayed general 
reluctance	to	effectively	cooperate	with	the	ICC	regarding	the	Kenyan	cases.81 For 
example, despite Government’s reluctance to establish a tribunal to prosecute those 
who bare the greatest responsibility for international crimes,82 Parliament has on 
76 CIPEV (n 1) 225. For example, the report implicates a member of Parliament from the Coast province 
in funding the youth to burn all businesses belonging to ODM supporters.
77 These included, for example, the burning of a house in Naivasha that killed 9 people.
78 Republic v Jackson Kibor, Nakuru Magistrate’s Court, CR 96/08. Mr Kibor, an ODM politician was 
arrested and charged with inciting violence. According to an interview with BBC on 31 January 2007, 




cause they are thieves. We will never let them come back [...]. We will divide Kenya.’ A Kalenjin youth 
interviewed in the same broadcast, who confessed to have participated in the Kiambaa church burning, 
told the journalist that perpetrators of violence were taking cues from the elders: ‘We as young men, our 
culture, we don’t go over what somebody [...] an elder tells us. If the elder say no, we step down, but if 
our elders say yes, we will proceed [...]. I do it because it is something that has been permitted from our 
elders.’ Human Rights Watch (n 37) 29 citing P Harter, ‘Assignment’ BBC World Service, January 31, 
2008. This prosecution never proceeded to the end as the then Attorney General withdrew the charges 
by entering a nolle prosequi.
79 Human Rights Watch (n 37) 29.
80 Under Kenyan practice, an accessory before the fact has been used interchangeably with aiders, abettors 
and procurers. This is covered under Section 20 of the Penal Code and includes aiders, abettors and 
those	who	counselled	or	procured	(assisted	or	encouraged)	the	principle	offender	into	this	category.	In	
terms of responsibility and punishment, aiders, abettors, counsellors or procurers are all held respon-
sible in the same manner as though they were the actual perpetrators.
81 Asaala and Dicker (n 71) 346.
82 CIPEV called upon Government to establish a special tribunal comprising both national and interna-
tional judges and prosecutors to prosecute international crimes committed during the PEV.
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several occasions unanimously resolved to have Kenya withdraw from the Rome 
Statute.83 Subsequently, in January 2011, the Government announced its intention 
to establish a special division within the High Court to deal with all PEV cases.84 
This was a laudable step, since such local initiatives have the potential to assuage 
related fears in future.85 While recommending the establishment of an International 
Crimes Division (ICD) modelled on the ICC within the High Court, a Task Force 
has highlighted that ICD should be conferred jurisdiction over PEV cases in order 
to try international crimes under the ICA.86
The timing of this announcement, however, raised questions about its real 
motive. This is especially so given that on 26 November 2009; the ICC had author-
ized	the	Office	of	 the	Prosecutor	(OTP)	to	investigate	the	Kenyan	situation.	The	
intention of establishing a special division within the High Court was therefore 
largely	misconstrued	by	Government	officials,	who	viewed	it	as	a	way	of	referring	
ICC cases back to local mechanisms and not as a means of complementing ICC 
processes.87	Thus,	it	is	feared	that	the	ultimate	objective	of	these	effort	may	have	
been to undermine the ICC process.88
Immediately after the said announcement, on 31 March 2011, the Government 
made an application to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC challenging the admissi-
bility of the six Kenyan cases on the basis that there were ongoing local investiga-
tions,	which	application	failed.	While	confirming	the	admissibility	of	the	Kenyan	
cases, the ICC dismissed claims by Kenya that there were ongoing investigations 
as being hypothetical promises and not investigations within the context of Article 
17(1)(a).89	According	to	the	Court,	‘the	failure	to	specifically	mention	the	suspects	
before the ICC as some of the people under the Government’s investigation, ren-
dered the information given by the Kenyan Government inadequate to sustain the 
83 Motion 144 in Kenya National Assembly, Motions 2010 (22 December 2010).
84 See generally ICTJ ‘Prosecuting international and other serious crimes in Kenya’ (2013) 2 <https://ictj.
org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Kenya-Prosecutions-2013.pdf>	accessed	6	March	2013.
85 Judicial Service Commission, Report of the Committee of the Judicial Service Commission on the 
Establishment of an International Crimes Division in the High Court of Kenya (Oct. 30, 2012).
86 The Multi-Agency Task Force on the 2007/2008 PEV (n 39) 4-5.
87 KPTJ and KHRC ‘Securing justice: establishing a domestic mechanism for the 2007/08 post-election 
violence in Kenya’ (2013).
88 KPTJ and KHRC ‘Securing justice (n 87) 14.
89 Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali, Decision 
on the application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to 
Article (19)(2)(b) of the Statute, Pre-Trial Chamber II (30 May 2011) ICC-01/09-02/11-96, 6. See also 
Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on the 
application by the Government of Kenya challenging the admissibility of the case pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute Pre-Trial Chamber II (30 May 2011) ICC-01/09-01/11-101, 19.
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application.’90 The Court was emphatic that an investigation within the meaning of 
Section 17(1) must encompass the same conduct in respect of the same persons as 
at the time of the proceedings concerning the admissibility challenge.91 It is indeed 
very doubtful as to whether any local prosecutions would seek to prosecute the 
same individuals before the ICC.
Kenyan’s	fight	against	the	admissibility	of	PEV-related	cases	before	the	ICC	
followed several failed attempts to establish a special tribunal, coupled with absurd 
requests by the East African Court of Justice and the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to undertake the prosecutions.92 The declaration by the Kenya’s 
Government that no further prosecutions of PEV-related cases was tenable due to a 
lac�	of	sufficient	evidence93 supplemented the numerous failed attempts to get rid 
of the ICC process. While Government’s declaration may be true, in fact, it illus-
trates Kenya’s discomfort regarding the ongoing ICC cases. It is submitted that the 
essence of this statement was to convey a message to the international community 
that there were no crimes against humanity committed in Kenya’s PEV after all. 
This	 view	 is	 informed,	 first,	 by	 the	 persistence	 of	 calls	 by	Kenya	 in	 collabora-
tion with regional and sub-regional institutions that the then ongoing ICC cases 
against Kenya’s President and Deputy President be withdrawn.94 Again, in a bid to 
undermine the ICC, Kenya refused to arrest Omar Al Bashir when he visited the 
country on 27 August 2010, despite a High Court decision calling upon it to do 
so.95	Secondly,	is	the	reluctance	by	the	DPP’s	office	to	initiate	investigations	and/or	
prosecutions of a total of 255 alleged perpetrators of PEV as recommended by the 
Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) of Kenya.96 Instead, Parlia-
ment has enacted legislation allowing it to make amendments to the TJRC report, 
which	would	effectively	amount	to	a	re-writing	of	the	report.97
90 Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta, Ali (n 89) 25. See also Prosecutor v Ruto, Kosgey, Sang (n 89). See 
a detailed discussion of this decision in EO Asaala, ‘The International Criminal Court factor on transi-
tional justice in Kenya’ in O Maunganidze and K Ambos (eds) Power and prosecutions: Challenges and 
opportunities for international criminal justice in sub-saharan Africa (2012) 133-134.
91 Prosecutor v Muthaura, Kenyatta, Hussein Ali (n 89) 21, 26.
92 On 12 February 2009, a ‘Constitution of Kenya (Amendment Bill) 2009’ allowing the creation of a local 
tribunal was shot down by the Kenyan Parliament. See also ICTJ, ‘Prosecuting international and other 
serious crimes in Kenya’ (2013) 2.
93 ‘CID report says no charge can hold for PEV perpetrators’ The Standard (15 February 2014).
94 Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union, Decision on Africa’s relationship with the 
International Criminal Court (12 October 2013) Ext/Assembly/AU/Dec 1, 2-3.
95 The Kenya Section of the International Commission of Jurists v the Attorney General, The Minister of 
State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security, Final Judgment, eKLR; 28 November 2011.
96 See generally chapter IV of Vol 4 of the TJRC Kenya Report.
97 Section 49 of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Act provided that upon the publication of the TJRC’s 
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The tension between Kenya and the ICC can thus be cited as a central reason 
for	the	lac�	of	political	will	towards	ensuring	effective	local	prosecution	of	perpe-
trators of PEV-related crimes in Kenya. This, coupled with the general elections of 
2013, shifted much of the focus away from local accountability measures through 
prosecution.
3 Conclusions and recommendations
This	chapter	set	out	to	discuss	the	real	challenges	facing	the	effective	prosecu-
tion	of	international	crime	in	Kenya’s	PEV-related	cases	and	how	these	have	influ-
enced the transitional justice process in Kenya. It has established that a majority 
of the cases reported to authorities during the PEV period were hardly investigated 
and/or prosecuted. For example, out of the 6081 cases that were reported, the police 
prosecuted only 366 cases. The majority of the few cases that were pursued ended 
up in acquittals, with only six successful convictions. Although the police blame 
this on resource constraints, the absence of a forensic laboratory with trained per-
sonnel and inadequate equipment, this contribution has established the following 
as the main contributing factors: poor investigations, corruption and incompetence 
within police, lack of legitimacy and local ownership and lack of political will.
As such, subsequent prosecution of PEV-related cases cannot be said to have 
contributed in a positive way towards Kenya’s transitional justice objectives. In 
fact, it cannot be said that local prosecution of PEV-related cases guarantee the 
prevention of similar crimes in the future. Related tribal clashes silently continue 
to ravage the country without any respect for human life.98 Yet, the perpetrators are 
hardly held to account. This continued impunity is evidence that the rule of law re-
mains elusive in Kenya. The general lack of political will coupled with the absence 
of local ownership and inept investigations have denied the local prosecution of 
international crimes in Kenya’s PEV the much-needed legitimacy, thus compromis-
ing	its	ability	to	influence	Kenya’s	transitional	justice	process	in	a	positive	manner.	
report,	 the	Minister	of	 Justice	and	Constitutional	Affairs	was	 required	 to	 ‘operationalise’	 the	 imple-
mentation mechanism as would have been proposed by the TJRC within six months. The Truth Justice 
and Reconciliation (Amendment) Act No 44 of 2013, Kenya Gazette Supplement No 178, however 
introduces an interesting twist. It provides that ‘The Minister shall, upon consideration of the report of 
the Commission by the National Assembly, set in motion a mechanism to monitor the implementation 
of the report in accordance with the recommendations of the National Assembly.’
98 D Miriri and H Malalo, ‘Second Kenyan minister charged with inciting violence’ Reuters (27 Sep-
tember 2012). See also J Gondi, ‘Bridging the impunity gap in Kenya requires a holistic approach to 
transitional justice’ International Centre for Transitional Justice (19 July 2012).
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Consequently,	effective	prosecutions	in	the	ongoing	transitional	process	in	Kenya	
remains a mirage. Regardless of the initial misunderstandings, this chapter calls 
upon the Judiciary to re-visit the discourse on establishing the International Crimes 
Division within the High Court as a specialised prosecutorial unit to deal with these 
kinds of crimes. This will not only enhance Kenyan cooperation with the ICC in 
future, but also guarantee special attention to international crimes on the domes-
tic level. Government should facilitate this initiative by providing the necessary 
financial	resources,	training	of	personnel	and	relevant	sta�eholders	(including	the	
police) and the establishment of a forensic laboratory with trained personnel and 
adequate equipment.
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Abstract
The need to reconstruct and rebuild post-conflict societies through transitional 
and long-term mechanisms complements traditional diplomacy, peacemaking 
and peacekeeping. At the same time, responding to human rights violations that 
occurred during the conflict demands the rule of law and justice. The promotion 
and sustenance of peace, together with the delivery of justice, are arguably mutually 
reinforcing. On a purely conceptual level, justice forms part of peacebuilding, with 
the latter being more of a long-term process than the former. Thus, justice may be 
viewed as an element of peacebuilding. It is unsurprising therefore that several 
commentators include justice as a core component of peacebuilding.
This chapter will demonstrate that the two emerging paradigms of “peacebuilding” 
and “international criminal justice,” while often treated as separate, are inextricably 
linked. An understanding of their interconnectedness can help inform ways of 
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engaging going forward. From the outset, it should be clarified that this chapter’s 
main concern is justice and how it can contribute and/or already contributes to 
peace. While it is appreciated that justice is not limited solely to international 
criminal justice, the discussion on justice will be limited to international criminal 
justice for the purposes of this paper.
Specifically, this chapter will examine the contribution of international criminal 
courts (in their various forms) to building sustainable peace in post-conflict 
societies that have experienced mass atrocities. In so doing, this chapter will posit 
that international criminal justice (as part of a set of justice processes) will serve 
to ensure long term peace in contexts where it is necessary and properly executed.
While necessary and important, a fuller discussion of national justice processes 
geared towards international criminal justice is beyond the scope of this chapter.
1 Introduction
Little progress can be made by merely attempting to repress what is evil; our 
great hope lies in developing what is good.1 
In the aftermath of the Cold War, two new paradigms emerged, both arguably 
informed	 by	 the	 emerging	 dynamics	 of	 intrastate	 conflict	 in	 place	 of	 interstate	
conflict.	 The	 first,	 immediately	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War,	 was	 the	 need	 to	
reconstruct	 and	 rebuild	 post-conflict	 societies	 through	 transitional	 and	 long-term	
mechanisms. This ‘peacebuilding’ served to complement traditional diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peacekeeping. The second, largely in response to the gross human 
rights	violations	committed	during	the	course	of	violent	conflicts	such	as	those	in	the	
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, was a legalistic response. This legalistic response 
centred on the rule of law and justice, and positioned itself at the convergence 
between international humanitarian law, international human rights law and criminal 
law.
This chapter will demonstrate that the two emerging paradigms of ‘peace-
building’ and ‘international criminal justice,’ while often treated as separate are 
inextricably linked. The chapter seeks to show that both are equally important. An 
understanding of their interconnectedness and relevance in promoting international 
peace can help inform ways of engaging going forward.
1  Calvin Coolidge
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From	the	outset,	it	should	be	clarified	that	this	chapter’s	main	concern	is	jus-
tice and how it can contribute and/or already contributes to peace. While it is ap-
preciated that justice is not limited solely to international criminal justice, for the 
purposes of this chapter, the discussion on justice will restrict itself to international 
criminal justice.
Specifically,	this	chapter	will	examine	the	role	of	international	criminal	tribu-
nals (in their various forms) in contributing to building sustainable peace in post-
conflict	 societies	 that	 experienced	mass	 atrocities.	 In	 so	doing,	 this	 chapter	will	
posit that peacebuilding is not in the shadow of international criminal justice, but 
rather that international criminal justice (as part of a set of justice processes) will 
serve to ensure long term peace in contexts where it is necessary and properly ex-
ecuted. While necessary and important, a fuller discussion of national justice pro-
cesses geared towards international criminal justice and peacebuilding is beyond 
the scope of this chapter.
2 Understanding peacebuilding and international criminal justice
Peacebuilding	has	a	variety	of	definitions,	all	of	which	commonly	regard	it	as	
a	range	of	measures	targeted	to	reduce	the	ris�	of	lapsing	or	relapsing	into	conflict	
through the strengthening of national capacities at all levels. These measures, serve 
not	only	 to	manage	conflict,	but	also	serve	 to	 lay	 the	 foundation	 for	 sustainable	
peace and development.2 The concept, developed in the years following the Cold 
War, was introduced in 1992 by then Secretary General of the UN, Boutros Boutros 
Ghali, in his Agenda for Peace report.3 In this report, the concept of ‘peacebuilding’ 
is	defined	as	a	multidimensional	political project involving many activities and ac-
tors.4	The	report	went	further	to	define	the	concept	as	a	set	of	tas�s	and	goals	facing	
UN agencies operating in post war contexts distinct from peacemaking and peace-
�eeping	that	occur	during	the	conflict	and	see�	a	cessation	of	hostilities.	Thus,	the	
aims of peacebuilding are broad and longer term. In the Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace,5 peacebuilding	was	thus	defined	as	aiming	to	‘create	structures	for	the	
institutionalisation of peace.’
2 United Nations Secretary General Policy Committee, 2007.
3 An agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping UN Doc A/47/277 - 
S/241111, 17 June 1992.
4 Own emphasis. It is interesting to note that, conceptually peacebuilding was initially regarded as a 
political process.
5 Supplement to An agenda for peace: Position paper of the Secretary-General on the occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 3 January 1995, UN A/50/60-S/1995/1.
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Today,	 the	UN	clusters	 these	measures	 into	five	 core	 categories.	These	 are	
economic revitalisation, inclusive politics, public administration or basic service, 
justice, and basic safety and security.6 The World Bank limits the measures to three: 
economic measures, security and justice.7 Peacebuilding has ‘short-term as well as 
long-term objectives aimed at ensuring sustainability in the security, political, eco-
nomic and justice spheres.’8	Specifically	on	its	long-term	goals,	Lambourne	defines	
peacebuilding as ‘strategies designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace 
in	which	the	basic	human	needs	of	the	population	are	met	and	violent	conflicts	do	
not recur.’9
International criminal law is the ‘body of laws, norms, and rules governing 
international	crimes	and	their	repression,	and	the	rules	addressing	conflict	and	co-
operation between national criminal law systems.’10 ‘International criminal justice’ 
is the result of the use of international criminal law to prosecute alleged perpetra-
tors	of	specific	human	rights	violations,	which	fall	into	the	broad	categories	of	war	
crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and the crime of aggression.11
According to Galbraith, international criminal justice aspires to achieve three 
idealistic goals.12 Firstly, international criminal justice aspires to bring perpetrators 
to justice and to provide retribution for victims.13 Secondly, international criminal 
6 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict, A/63/881–
S/2009/304.
7 World Bank, World Development Report 2011.
8 W Lambourne, ‘Transitional justice and peacebuilding after mass violence’ (2009) 3 International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 28-48.
9 W	 Lambourne,	 ‘Post-conflict	 peacebuilding:	 Meeting	 human	 needs	 for	 justice	 and	 reconciliation’	
(2004) 4 Peace, Conflict and Development 3.
10 WA Schabas, ‘International criminal law’ Encyclopaedia Britannica (2011).
11	 For	the	purposes	of	this	chapter,	these	crimes	shall	be	understood	as	they	are	defi	ned	in	existing	inter-
national humanitarian law treaties and conventions. Further, the crimes shall be understood as they are 
defined	in	the	founding	treaties	of	international	criminal	tribunals,	such	as	the	International	Criminal	
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
internationalised/hybrid courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and as contained in 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). See R Cryer, An introduction to interna-
tional criminal law and procedure (Cambridge University Press 2007) 18. It should be noted that at 
present, jurisdiction over the crime of aggression will only be activated after 1 January 2017 after 30 
states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court ratify amendments to the Statute 
that pave way for such prosecution. The crime of aggression was previously prosecuted at post-World 
War II International Military Tribunals as the crime against peace.
12 J Galbraith, ‘The pace of international criminal justice’ (2009) 31 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 79–155, 83.
13 Ibid. Included in the retributive function of international criminal justice is the aim to deter. See Cryer 
(n 11) 18.
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justice seeks to create an historical record of mass atrocities.14 Lastly, international 
criminal justice helps societies in transition to achieve peace and reconciliation.15 
It is within the scope of Galbraith’s third aim of international criminal justice that 
the link with peacebuilding is clearest. Indeed, international criminal justice can be 
viewed as a means to restore the rule of law and provide accountability and redress 
for the victims of international crimes. This can be done at the international level 
through the various international criminal tribunals. It can also be achieved at na-
tional level through domestic prosecutions or other accountability processes. How-
ever, especially for domestic prosecutions and other accountability process, this is 
not without its practical hurdles and political challenges. Thus, while the ideal is for 
international criminal justice to ensure accountability, this is not always realised.
A	 mix	 of	 solutions	 can	 be	 adopted	 to	 effectively	 ensure	 that	 international	
criminal justice contributes to the rule of law, and thus serves to promote long-term 
peace. In this respect, it is worth noting that instruments promoting international 
criminal justice, such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome 
Statute), contain clear statements on the role of judicial institutions in promoting 
‘peace and security.’ It would not be remiss therefore, on a purely conceptual level, 
to maintain that justice forms part of peacebuilding, with the latter being a longer-
term process than the former. It is unsurprising therefore that several commentators 
include ‘justice’ as a core component of peacebuilding.16
3 False dichotomy of ‘peace versus justice’ in international criminal 
justice
… [I]t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to 
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the 
rule of law…17
14 Galbraith (n 12) 83.
15 Ibid.
16 Lambourne (n 8); J Herman, O Martin-Ortega and CL Sriram, ‘Beyond justice versus peace: Tran-
sitional justice and peacebuilding strategies’ <http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6e3e3742-d3fb-
405e-aa53-56d810f1b4b2.pdf> accessed 19 August 2015; L Davis and T Unger, ‘Justice in Peacebuild-
ing: Towards a policy framework for the European Union’ (2008) ICTJ Discussion Paper; LJ Laplante, 
‘Transitional justice and peace building: Diagnosing and addressing the socioeconomic roots of vio-
lence through a human rights framework’ (2008) 2 (3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 
331-355. See too, United Nations Assistant Secretary General for Peacebuilding, Judy Cheng Hopkins’ 
definition	of	peacebuilding	in	which	she	includes	justice	under	“healing.”
 See generally the website of the Peacebuilding Commission at <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuild-
ing/> accessed 19 August 2015.
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights G.A. Res. 217A (III) U.N. Doc A/810 Preamble, (1948).
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Increasingly, in conversations about international criminal justice, and also in 
those about global peace and security, peace and justice are discussed as if they are 
mutually exclusive, sometimes as competing, concepts.18 In the same vein there are 
differing	views	on	the	importance	of	peace	and	justice	in	conflict	and	post-conflict	
societies.19 On the one hand, there are those who believe justice should not be fore-
gone for peace. On the other, there are those who contend that justice can and does 
undermine peace. In both these camps, peace is seemingly understood in the short 
term and as that simply attained by the cessation of hostilities. Thus, peace is argu-
ably	not	understood	as	it	is	broadly	defined	in	long-term	peacebuilding.	In	under-
standing peace as ‘sustainable peace’ and thus long-term, justice (which includes 
international criminal justice) and reconciliation should be seen as preconditions. 
This viewpoint regards peace and justice as two sides of the same coin.
In	his	report	on	the	rule	of	law	in	post-conflict	societies,	then	UN	Secretary-
General	Kofi	Annan	stated,	‘justice,	peace	and	democracy	are	not	mutually	exclu-
sive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives.’20 This is an important 
point of departure and is a view that the UN maintains.21 Indeed, since 2004, the 
UN has developed and continues to develop policy guidelines22 and toolkits dealing 
with	different	transitional	justice	approaches	and	justice-related	issues	that	appre-
ciate these linkages. Similarly, campaigns such as ‘no peace without justice’23 are 
rooted in the belief that peace and justice should not be seen in isolation from or 
in competition with each other. These campaigns move from the point of departure 
that	these	processes	are	mutually	reinforcing	and	much	more	effective	together	than	
apart.
18 See generally Human Rights Watch, Seductions of “sequencing”: The risks of putting justice aside for 
peace, (2010).
19 CL Sriram, Confronting past human rights violations: Justice vs. peace in times of transitions (Frank 
Cass 2004); MJ Aukerman, ‘Extraordinary evil, ordinary crime: A framework for understanding tran-
sitional justice’ (2002) 15 Harvard Human Rights Journal 39-97. On the role of the ICC in light of the 
peace vs. justice debate, see L Davis, ‘The ICC: a straw man in the peace-versus-justice debate?’ (2013) 
<https://www.osloforum.org/sites/default/files/Africa-Mediators-retreat-BP-ICC.pdf>	accessed	19	Au-
gust 2015.
20 UN Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
Report of the Secretary-General, S/2004/616 (23 August 2004).
21 UN Security Council, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, 
Report of the Secretary-General, S/2011/634 (11 October 2011).
22 See, for example, United Nations, ‘Guidance note of the Secretary-General: United Nations approach 
to transitional justice’ (2010) and OHCHR, Analytical study on human rights and transitional justice 
(United Nations) 2009.
23 No Peace without Justice website, <http://www.npwj.org/About-NPWJ/Overview.html> accessed 19 
August 2015.
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Within the African Union (AU) context, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive 
Act	is	often	cited	as	reflective	of	a	commitment	by	Africa	to	end	impunity	and	thus	
promoting	 peace	 through	 responding	 effectively	 to	 international	 crimes.	Article	
4(h) provides for African states to intervene in respect of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide. Article 4(h) can also be interpreted as showing that the pro-
tection of human rights is central to the AU.24 While the intervention contemplated 
in Article 4(h) is arguably a political or military one, it is worth stating that both 
justice and peacebuilding could be mechanisms of dealing with these crimes after 




edged the link between accountability and lasting peace.26 In addition, in 2013 the 
AU Panel of the Wise argued for an integrated approach to peace and justice that is 
rooted in transitional justice.27 In this regard, the Panel recommended that the AU 
develops a Transitional Justice Policy Framework and strengthen instruments for 
justice and reconciliation.28 At the time of writing, development of the policy was 
at an advanced stage, with the AU having already hosted a validation workshop in 
August 2014.29
Thus, at least in theory and rhetoric, policymakers and their advisors see peace 
and justice as processes that are mutually reinforcing – particularly for societies 
in	transition	–	and	much	more	effective	together	than	apart.	The	problem	arises	in	
24 D Kuwali, ‘The conundrum of conditions for intervention under article 4(h) of the African Union Act’ 
(2008) 17(4) African Security Review 92. For a discussion of Article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act in 
general, see T Murithi, ‘The responsibility to protect as enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of 
the African Union’ (2007) 16(3) African Security Review 14–24.
25 Principle 8 and 27; Centre for Human Rights, Pretoria Principles on ending mass atrocities pursuant to 
Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
26 AU Statement by Ben Kioko, Legal Counsel of the African Union Commission on behalf of the AU 
Commission at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kam-
pala, Uganda, 31 May to 11 June 2010.




Report of the African Union Panel on Darfur, ‘Darfur: The quest for peace, justice and reconciliation.’
29 Validation Workshop on the Draft African Transitional Justice Policy Framework (ATJPF), Johannes-
burg, South Africa <http://pa.au.int/en/content/validation-workshop-draft-african-transitional-justice-
policy-framework-atjpf-johannesburg-s> accessed 15 August 2015.
 For comment, see J Brankovic and N Roht-Arriaza, ‘African Union Transitional Justice Policy Frame-
work in practice’, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (2014).
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practically implementing both peace and justice, none at the expense of the other. 
It is essential therefore to examine ways in which international criminal justice can 
help contribute to peacebuilding.
4 International criminal tribunals: Promoting peace through meting 
out justice?
To assess the role of international criminal justice in peacebuilding, it is es-
sential to examine the work of international criminal tribunals that are synonymous 
with	international	criminal	justice.	The	primary	focus	of	the	reflections	in	this	chap-
ter is on the present and future role of the International Criminal Court (ICC or the 
Court). However, given that the Court remains a young judicial institution (the ICC 
began	its	wor�	in	2003,	but	its	first	prosecution	was	not	until	2009),	a	brief	discus-
sion of the role of other international criminal tribunals in peacebuilding is neces-
sary. This is also important because past tribunals have operated largely during the 
post-conflict	phase.	In	this	regard,	the	International	Criminal	Tribunal	for	former	
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 
will be covered.30 The potential role of the ICC in this regard will then ensue.
4.1	 The	ICTY	and	the	ICTR
The ICTY and the ICTR were established as judicial institutions founded on 
the need to promote and ensure ‘international peace and security.’ Thus these tri-
bunals can be seen to contribute to peace, but not necessarily as having a primary 
responsibility of peacemaking, peacekeeping and/or building peace. The ICTY, for 
example, has a fourfold mandate.31 First, the ICTY aims to bring to justice persons 
allegedly responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law. Sec-
ond, the ICTY aims to render justice to the victims. Third, the ICTY aims to deter 
further crimes. Last, but certainly not least, the ICTY aims to contribute to the 
restoration of peace by holding persons responsible for serious violations of inter-
national humanitarian law accountable.
30 The	SCSL	similarly	was	a	post-conflict	internationalised	tribunal	that	prosecuted	those	it	regarded	as	
most	responsible	for	crimes	committed	during	the	conflict.	Though	primarily	a	judicial	body,	the	SCSL	
can also be regarded as an integral element of the peacebuilding process during the country’s transition.
31 G Boas and WA Schabas (eds), International criminal law developments in the case law of the ICTY 
(Martinus	Nijhoff	2003).	See	also	ICTY	Website,	‘ICTY	at	a	glance’	<http://www.un.org/icty/glance-e/
index.htm> accessed 15 August 2015; see also ‘The Tribunal’s accomplishments in justice and law’ 
<http://icty.org/view_from_hague/jit_accomplishments_en.pdf> accessed 15 August 2015.
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That the tribunals were established by the UN Security Council ‘externally’ 
(as	 it	were)	 to	deal	with	grave	crimes	committed	during	 the	 internal	conflicts	 in	
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, makes them arguably a form of humanitarian 
intervention, albeit a justice-driven one. During the war in Bosnia, the ICTY had 
a working relationship with peacekeeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which 
illustrates a critical link between those seeking justice and the peacemakers.32 How-
ever, the fact that international crimes were still being committed in the former 
Yugoslavia even after the establishment of the ICTY suggests that while idealistic, 
this	remains	as	difficult	tas�.	The	extent	of	the	tribunal’s	contribution	to	the	peace-
building process should thus not be overstated.
With regards to the ICTR, one of its stated additional objectives is national 
reconciliation. This national reconciliation, if achieved, as with justice, can serve 
as an important precondition to lasting peace. Indeed, according to Bangamwambo, 
at the time the ICTR was established, the international community hoped that the 
ICTR would contribute, not only to national reconciliation in Rwanda, but also to 




gacaca processes and domestic processes) were characteristically judicial mecha-
nisms.
It	can	be	argued	that	by	brea�ing	down	conflicts	into	individual	crimes,	ju-
dicial intervention by international criminal tribunals can contribute to peace.34 
Judicial intervention would thus be seen as aiming for peace by not focusing on 
conflicts	between	groups,	but	rather	on	individual	criminal	responsibility.	This	was	
the	case	when	the	ICTY	indicted	Slobodan	Milošević	and	Radovan	Karadžić.	Simi-
larly, the SCSL was lauded for its indictment and later conviction, amongst others, 
32 H Shinoda, ‘Peace-building by the rule of law: An examination of intervention in the form of interna-
tional tribunals’ (2001) Paper presented at the 2001 Annual Convention of International Studies Asso-
ciation, Chicago, and at the Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, UK <http://www.
gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol7_1/Shinoda.htm> accessed 15 August 2015.
33 F Bangamwambo, ‘International criminal justice and the protection of human rights in Africa’ in A Bosl 
and J Diescho (eds) Human rights in Africa: Legal perspectives on their protection and promotion (Mc-
Millan Education Namibia 2009) 107. It should be noted that prior to and during the mass massacres, 




ICC.pdf> accessed 9 November 2015.
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of former Liberian President Charles Taylor who had played a central role in the 
Sierra	Leonean	conflict.
However, this detachment of individuals can also be a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand, it ensures that the society does not view the crimes committed as a 
societal malaise, but rather as acts committed by individuals seeking to undermine 
societal peace and stability. Thus, judicial intervention is seen as the eradication of 
evil elements within a society by arresting suspected criminals and bringing them 
to	justice	in	a	way	that	would	contribute	to	future	peace.	On	the	flipside,	where	an	
indicted	individual	exerts	influence	on	the	ground	or	was	(or	is)	regarded	as	‘cen-
tral’ to establishing peace, processes against such a person can be regarded as un-
dermining peace. This has been the argument often raised in respect of indictments 
of senior politicians, particularly heads of state. The debate on this is ongoing.
4.2	 The	ICC
The	 issue	 of	 prosecuting	 senior	 government	 officials,	 particularly	 heads	 of	
state, is one that the ICC has had to contend with in several of the situations cur-
rently before it.35 Given that the ICC is tasked with addressing crimes by those al-
legedly	‘most	responsible’	and	that	oftentimes	in	a	time	of	conflict,	these	individu-
als can be quite senior in government, this was anticipated. Indeed, in negotiating 
the	Rome	Statute,	the	issue	of	immunity	came	up.	The	final	Statute,	in	Article	27,	
does	away	with	immunity	from	prosecution	on	the	basis	of	official	capacity.	How-
ever, this Article should be read with Article 98, which creates an opt-out clause for 
countries that have made bilateral agreements to the contrary. 
The	 ICC’s	 role,	 while	 significantly	 similar	 to	 that	 of	 ad hoc international 
criminal	 tribunals,	 is	 somewhat	and	understandably	different.	Unli�e	 the	ad hoc 
tribunals that were created for particular situations and established during the post-
conflict	phase	or	transition	from	conflict,	the	ICC’s	jurisdiction	is	permanent	and	
current.36 What this means is that the ICC will often have to deal with cases arising 
from	ongoing	conflicts,	even	before	efforts	towards	peace�eeping	or	peace-ma�ing	
have commenced. Thus, justice would inevitably precede cessation of hostilities 
and could potentially serve as a forerunner to peacebuilding.
35 Prosecutor v Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta ICC-01/09-02/11 and Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09.
36 F Lafontaine and A Tachou Sipowo, ‘The contribution of international criminal justice to sustainable 
peace and development’ in S Jodoin and MC Segger (eds) Sustainable development, international crim-
inal justice, and treaty implementation (Cambridge University Press 2013).
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In Uganda, the Government referred the situation in the North of the country 
to the ICC at a time when the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was still active in that 
region.37 The situation related to the LRA’s criminal activities and the inability of 
the Government to quell the rebellion. The Government had been negotiating peace 
with	the	LRA	in	vain.	The	threat	of	prosecution	arguably	forced	the	LRA	to	flee	
Uganda paving way for peace in the country. Of course, the LRA is now a threat to 
stability in neighbouring countries such as South Sudan38 and the Central African 
Republic.39 Despite arrest warrants, only one of the individuals indicted by the ICC 
in this situation has been arrested and surrendered to the ICC. However, at the time 
of writing, the case against Dominic Ongwen, whose surrender was in early 2015, 
was slated to commence in January 2016.40 In the absence of actual proceedings 
against the LRA, one can only hypothesise that if the LRA commanders indicted by 
the ICC had been captured and prosecuted, arguably the LRA would not be a threat 
to regional peace today.
Interestingly, at a domestic level, Uganda continues to recognise the impor-
tance of justice in security and stability (and thus in long term peace). To this end, 
in 2008, further to the Juba Agreement between the Government of Uganda and the 
LRA, the Government established a War Crimes Division (now the International 
Crimes Division (ICD)) of the High Court.41 The establishment of this division was 
necessitated by provisions in an Annex to the Juba Agreement, which expanded on 
the framework for accountability described in the Juba Agreement and provided 
that a special division of the High Court of Uganda would be established to try 
individuals	‘alleged	to	have	committed	serious	crimes	during	the	conflict.’42 Pros-
37 ICC Press Release, ‘President of Uganda refers situation concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) 
to the ICC’ ICC-20040129-44; ICC Press Release, ‘Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
opens an investigation into Northern Uganda’ ICC-OTP-20040729-65; Prosecutor v Joseph Kony, Vin-
cent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen ICC-02/04-01/05.
38  Enough,	 ‘The	LRA	in	Congo,	CAR,	and	South	Sudan’	<http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/lra/
congo-car-south-sudan> accessed 19 August 2015]; UN OCHA, ‘LRA Regional Update: Central Afri-
can Republic, DR Congo and South Sudan’ (July-September 2014).
39 UNSC Press Release, ‘Security Council concerned by grave security, humanitarian situation in Central 
Africa,	encourages	greater	support	 from	United	Nations	Regional	Office’	SC/11925	(11	June	2015);	
See also Small Arms Survey, ‘Lord’s Resistance Army Update’ <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.
org/facts-figures/south-sudan/lra.html>	accessed	19	August	2015.
40 Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen, Decision postponing the date of the confirmation of charges hearing 
ICC-02/04-01/15.
41 First established as the WCD, this special division of the High Court of Uganda was renamed the Inter-
national Crimes Division (ICD) on June 8 2011, further to High Court (International Crimes Division) 
Practice Directions, Legal Notice No. 10 of 2011, Legal Notice Supplements, Uganda Gazette 38 (CIV) 
31 May 2011, para 6.
42 M	du	Plessis,	A	Louw	and	OA	Maunganidze,	‘African	efforts	to	close	the	impunity	gap:	Lessons	for	
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ecutions by the specialised court would focus on those ‘alleged to have planned or 
carried out widespread, systematic, or serious attacks directed against civilians or 
who are alleged to have committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.’43 
The Annexure also makes provision for the establishment of a special unit in the 
office	of	the	Director	of	Public	Prosecutions	(DPP)	for	the	purposes	of	carrying	out	
investigations and supporting prosecution of crimes as agreed.44 Today the ICD 
has jurisdiction over war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. It also has 
jurisdiction over other serious international and transnational crimes, including, 
terrorism,	human	traffic�ing	and	piracy.45
In Sudan, in respect of the situation in Darfur, peace was also initially pre-
ferred	over	international	justice.	However,	in	the	absence	of	noted	efforts	to	end	the	
crisis and re-establish peace, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred 
the situation to the ICC for justice to be served.46 In 2009, the AU High-level Panel 
on Darfur included in its recommendations the importance of justice in the peace 
process.47 To this end, the Panel made several recommendations including that the 
role of the ICC as a court of last resort be recognized. Further the Panel recom-
mended that there be national justice processes, in the form of a hybrid Special 
Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur.48	Efforts	to	establish	peace	in	the	country	
continue,	as	do	efforts	to	bring	to	justice	those	considered	most	responsible.49 To 
date	neither	has	been	achieved,	notwithstanding	international	and	regional	efforts.
Important questions arise from these two examples. First, whether peacemak-
ing hinged on certain people – those regarded as politically necessary to negotiate 
complementarity from national and regional actions’ (2012) ISS Paper 241.
43 Agreement on accountability and reconciliation (between the Government of the Republic of Uganda 
and the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement), para 7 <http://www.amicc.org/docs/Agreement_on_Ac-
countability_and_Reconciliation.pdf> accessed 11 November 2015.
44 Ibid para 10.
45 Section 6 of The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions, Legal Notice No. 10 
of 2011, without prejudice to Article 139 of the Constitution.
46 United Nations Security Council, UN Doc S/RES/1593 (2005). See generally MT Reynolds, ‘Legiti-
mizing the ICC: Supporting the Court’s prosecution of those responsible in Darfur’ 2010 (30) Boston 
College Third World Law Journal 179. See also P Kastner, ‘The ICC in Darfur: Savior or spoiler?’ 
(2007) 14 ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 146.
47 ‘Darfur: The quest for peace, justice and reconciliation’ Report of the African Union
 High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), PSC/AHG/2(CCVII) (October 2009).
48 This special court was never established, owing in large part to a lack of political will on the part of the 
Sudanese Government.
49 It should be noted that one of the indictees is Sudanese President Omar Hassan Al Bashir who has 
vowed to cling to power and has received some support from fellow African leaders who believe that 
as president he should be immune from prosecution. Issues of immunity are beyond the scope of this 
paper.
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peace accords – does not in itself compromise peace and justice. Further, whether in 
pursuing justice, to what extent such political considerations should be made. The 
second relates to the scope of responsibility of international justice institutions like 
the ICC in peacebuilding. In essence, should justice, as a precondition to peace, be 
the sole responsibility of the ICC? The Rome Statute is clear on both these issues. 
First, the Rome Statute recognises that grave crimes threaten peace and security,50 
ergo that addressing these crimes will serve to promote peace and security. Second, 
the Rome Statute provides wide prosecutorial discretion.51 The Prosecutor, while 
having taken into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, can 
refuse to investigate or prosecute where s/he has substantial reasons to believe that 
proceeding would not serve the interests of justice. The Prosecutor may make sev-
eral considerations in this regard. Third, the Rome Statute allows for cases to be de-
ferred by the UNSC if the interests of international peace and security so demand.52 
Any such deferral will be for an initial period of 12 months and must be because 
proceeding with the investigation or prosecution would undermine international 
peace. To date, no request for deferral has been granted.53 Last, and certainly not 
least, the Rome Statute makes the ICC a court of last resort that may only intervene 
(or be called on to intervene) to bridge a gap where national courts are either unable 
or unwilling to do so.54 The challenge, as anticipated, is in implementation.
Rodman suggests a way forward – at least for the ICC.55 In his view, the ICC 
cannot and should not be independent of politics. He suggests that the Court needs 
to	operate	within,	rather	than	above,	international	strategies	of	conflict	resolution.	
He contends that in most, if not all of its cases, the ICC will inevitably confront a 
‘peace versus justice’ dilemma in which ‘insistence on prosecution could criminal-
ise those whose cooperation is necessary for a political solution.’ Thus, in his view, 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion should be central to the ICC’s engagement 
with	sta�eholders	involved	in	conflict	management	and	peacebuilding.	In	essence,	
he argues that having these discussions early on will help maximise the prospects 
for accountability while at the same time minimise the risks to peace and human 
security. Rodman’s arguments notwithstanding, if followed, this could exacerbate 
50 Rome Statute, preamble.
51 Rome Statute, art. 53.
52 Rome Statute, art. 16.
53 Requests have been made in respect of the situation in Darfur, Sudan and that in Kenya.
54 Rome Statute, art. 17.
55 KA Rodman, ‘Justice as a dialogue between law and politics: Embedding the International Criminal 
Court	within	 conflict	management	 and	 peacebuilding’	 (2014)	 12	 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 437.
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the pre-existing challenge of allegations of selective prosecution that the ICC’s has 
been accused of. Particularly, as a judicial body, it could be argued that such pro-
cess could serve to undermine the Court’s legitimacy as an independent court that 
operates within the parameters set out in the Rome Statute.
This latter proposal suggests that bridging the gap between rhetoric and reality 
requires that those promoting international criminal justice (not limited to the ICC) 
and	 sta�eholders	 involved	 in	 conflict	management	 and	peacebuilding	must	 con-
structively engage. Doing so may well aid in ensuring that international criminal 
justice plays its important role as a measure contributing to peacebuilding.
The creation of the ICC raised high expectations that justice would be done 
for gross human rights violations and that, as a result of this justice, there would be 
an end to impunity.56 However, the ICC cannot reach these goals by itself. Mind-
ful of the complementarity envisaged in the Rome Statute, domestic jurisdictions 
must also have this underlying aim to ensure justice and, as a result, promote peace. 
However, while ability and willingness to prosecute crimes can be assumed of 
functioning	criminal	justice	systems,	the	same	cannot	be	done	in	respect	of	conflict-
stric�en	and	post-conflict	societies.	When	it	comes	to	issues	of	building	sustainable	
peace, it is this latter category of countries that is in question. Davis and Unger note 
that	post-conflict	societies	are	mar�ed	by	a	plethora	of	victims	of	serious	crimes	
and many perpetrators.57	Addressing	these	crimes	is	crucial;	however,	post-conflict	
societies often have extremely weak and compromised judicial systems that are not 
well equipped and/or capable of delivering the required justice.58 Davis and Unger 
add that an (often unintended) impunity gap results.59
The	No	Peace	without	Justice	(NPWJ)	campaign	proposes	that	efforts	at	na-
tional level be geared towards meeting four key objectives.60	 First,	 efforts	must	
contribute to broad support for accountability as a systematic response to massive 
violations of human rights and international criminal law. Second, there should be a 
reduction of the expectation of impunity and a removal of the perception of rewards 
for	violence	on	the	part	of	parties	to	the	conflict,	potential	perpetrators,	victims	and	
affected	populations.	Third,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 increase	 the	 impact,	 effectiveness,	
56 L Davis and T Unger, ‘Justice in peacebuilding: Towards a policy framework for the European Union’ 




60 No Peace without Justice, ‘Strategy on international criminal justice’ <http://www.npwj.org/ICC/
NPWJ-strategy-international-criminal-justice.html> accessed 19 August 2015.
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transparency and accountability of mechanisms to stakeholders. Last, the univer-
sality	of	the	Rome	Statute	should	be	promoted	through	encouraging	its	ratification	
and	effective	implementing	legislation.
The reason why it is important to contribute to broad support for account-
ability is because, it can be argued that, countries that have implemented account-
ability processes after periods when human rights were grossly violated are more 
likely to achieve sustainable peace and development. To achieve this, there must 
be	buy-in	from	�ey	sta�eholders,	including	policyma�ers,	civil	society	and	affected	
communities.	Significantly,	there	needs	to	be	an	institutionalisation	of	accountabil-
ity. In respect of international crimes, this would be through the criminal justice 
system – domestically and, where possible, regionally and internationally. This ties 
in closely with the need to reduce the perception that crimes will go unpunished and 
that impunity will prevail. 
If the expectation of impunity was reduced, this could potentially discourage 
or deter would be perpetrators, while reinforcing support in the system from vic-
tims and others in society. However, it remains imperative to manage expectations 
on the scope and ability of international criminal trials to deter the commission of 
mass atrocities.61 Indeed, Cronin-Furman argues that while part of the intentions of 
the ICC, the current prosecutorial policy is not well targeted at producing a deter-
rent	effect.62
This will be best achieved if the accountability mechanisms are seen also as 
effective,	transparent	and	accountable.	In	this	regard,	it	is	imperative	that	institu-
tions be held to a high standard and called to account as and if they falter. Last, be-
yond	promoting	ratification	of	the	ICC	so	as	to	ensure	universality	of	international	
criminal justice, countries must be encouraged to actively pursue domestic justice 
processes. All four of these can contribute to the process of long-term peacebuild-
ing. Indeed, as Lambourne notes, justice as part of peacebuilding is more than just 
transitional; ‘justice’ must set up structures, institutions and relationships to pro-
mote sustainability.63 
61 K Cronin-Furman, ‘Managing expectations: International criminal trials and the prospects for deter-
rence of mass atrocity’ (2013) 7(3) International Journal of Transitional Justice 434-454.
62 Ibid.
63 Lambourne (n 8) 28-48. Own addition and emphasis.
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5 Conclusion: Towards inclusive justice and sustainable peace
With the aforementioned in mind, justice should thus be understood as go-
ing	beyond	a	narrow	definition	of	criminal	justice,	which	see�s	only	to	punish	the	
perpetrators of crime.64 Justice should be seen also as strengthening the rule of law 
and accountability more generally. Further, justice should be seen to also seek to ac-
knowledge the impact of the crimes on the victims and their wrongfulness and thus 
begin a process of reconciliation. In this regard, justice should be seen as aiming to 
restore the dignity of victims and to pave a way for long term healing. It has been 
argued that these processes will help build ties between population groups and po-
tentially	ensure	that	societies	are	more	conflict-resilient	as	a	result.65 This inclusive 
justice	is	clearly	important	in	efforts	to	build	sustainable	peace.66
It	should	also	be	understood	that	not	all	post-conflict	contexts	going	through	
a process of peacebuilding would call for prosecutions of international crimes. In 
those contexts where it is necessary to do so, international criminal justice, together 
with other measures, can serve to ensure long-term peace. It is worth reemphasising 
that international criminal justice is only one of several processes that should form 
part of peacebuilding.
Indeed, ‘peacebuilding’ and ‘international criminal justice’ are mutually rein-
forcing	and,	if	carried	out,	properly,	are	beneficial	in	ensuring	accountability	and	
sustainable peace. However, these two are not only intricately connected, but are 
also equally important in promoting and sustaining peace. Justice – in its various 
forms – is increasingly recognised as a necessary element in contributing to peace. 
In this regard, it should be underscored that other forms of justice not explored 
in this chapter are also invaluable and should complement international criminal 
justice	efforts.	Lessons	in	this	regard	can	be	drawn	from	experiences	in	Rwanda,	
Uganda	and	Sierra	Leone.	Further	afield,	the	experiences	of	dealing	with	peace	and	
justice	 issues	 arising	 from	 the	 conflict	 in	 the	 former	Yugoslavia	 are	 particularly	
useful and relevant.
64 Davis and Unger (n 56).
65 Ibid.
66 Beyond prosecutions, this broader understanding of justice could potentially ensure that hostilities do 
not resume.
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FOREIGN AID TOWARD EXTRAORDINARY 
RENDITION: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract
After September 11, 2001 it was uncovered that states, especially the US, used 
illegal methods to bring suspected terrorists within the jurisdiction of certain 
countries as part of the Global War on Terror. Although the US seemed to be the 
biggest culprit, other governments assisted in the capture, detention, interrogation 
and torture of these suspected terrorists, to which end secret facilities known as 
“black sites” were used. Among the participating governments are various African 
states. This chapter aims to shed light on the principles of extraordinary rendition, 
the international law issues created by it and, specifically, African participation 
in this practice and the difficulties in attributing accountability to the various role 
players under international law.
1 Introduction
A	connecting	flight	 lands	 and	a	passenger	disembar�s	 the	plane	and	enters	 the	 airport.	
He is halted by security and taken to an interrogation room. His whole world is about 
to change. He is escorted to a dark room where he is interrogated about every aspect of 
his life. His numerous requests for legal representation are denied. He’s injected with 
an unknown substance that will render him immobile and incoherent. Blindfolded, he is 
escorted to a desolate airport with a single jet engine that will deliver him to an unknown 
country and foreign legal system, where torture is the order of the day. No press, no legal 
representation,	no	 judicial	procedure	―	and	no	mercy.	An	 innocent	man	has	 just	been	
extraordinarily rendered to torture.
*  LLB LLM (UP); Admitted Attorney; Legal Project Facilitator and Researcher, CALIBRICS.
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Post September 11, 2001, and under the George W. Bush Administration, ex-
traordinary rendition truly gained momentum and the execution of renditions esca-
lated to what we know today as extraordinary renditions.1 President Bush signed di-
rectives authorising extraordinary rendition without the prior approval of the White 
House or the Departments of State and Justice.2 Condoleeza Rice3 vehemently de-
fended these renditions, contending that they served a crucial purpose in curbing 
terrorism.4	However,	she	failed	to	mention	the	significant	expansion	of	these	rendi-
tions and that captured suspects were being rendered to foreign governments.5
Although the United States of America (US) may be the main perpetrator in 
extraordinary renditions, they are largely reliant on the participation of foreign gov-
ernments to ensure successful execution of this phenomemon. These participating 
governments include various governments from the African continent, such as, Al-
geria, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Republic of Gambia, Malawi, Somalia, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe.6
This chapter is based on a doctoral thesis which focused on the US practice of 
extraordinary rendition. However, for purposes of this chapter the focus will shift 
to the participation of foreign governments in extraordinary rendition and attribut-
ing	accountability	to	the	aiders	and	abetters,	with	specific	focus	on	Africa.	In	order	
to achieve this, a basic introduction to the US practice of extraorindary redition is 
required. However, due to editorial constraints, an in-depth discussion on the entire 
practice of extraordinary rendition and all it entails will not be possible for purposes 
of this chapter.
1 LN Sadat, ‘Extraordinary rendition, torture, and other nightmares from the war on terror’ (2007) 75 
George Washington Law Review 1200, 1215.
2 D Jehl and D Johnston, ‘Rule change lets CIA freely send suspects abroad to jails’ (6 March 2005) The 
New York Times Online. Compare S Grey, Ghost plane: The true story of the CIA rendition and torture 
program (1st	edn,	Saint	Martin’s	Griffin	2007)	149;	A	Singh,	‘Globalizing	torture:	CIA	secret	detention	
and extraordinary rendition’ (2013) Open Society for Justice Initiative 15.
3 Condoleeza Rice was the U.S. National Security Advisor from 2001-2005 under the George W. Bush 
administration, and the U.S. Secretary of State from 2005-2009 under the same administration.
4 After the media published the article accusing the U.S. Government of maintaining secret detention fa-
cilities she held a press conference to mount a public defence against the accusations. She addressed the 
matter as follows: ‘For decades, the United States and other countries have used ‘renditions’ to transport 
terrorist suspects from the country where they are captured to their home country or to other countries 
where they can be questioned, held or brought to justice… In conducting such renditions, it is the policy 
of the United States, and I presume of any other democracies that use this procedure, to comply with its 
laws and comply with its treaty obligations.’ See C Rice, No higher honour: A memoir of my years in 
Washington (Crown Publishing 2011) 499-500.
5 Singh (n 2) 15.
6 Ibid 6.
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The chapter will therefore focus on the basic explanation of extraordinary 
rendition,	the	problems	created	by	it	and	the	effect	of	participation	by	foreign	gov-
ernments. Special attention will be given to African countries and the aid they have 
given to the US Government in the extraordinary rendition of various individuals.
2 Extraordinary rendition explained
Since the charge of resorting to extraordinary rendition as an anti-terror meas-
ure after the 9/11 attacks was mainly levelled at the Bush Administration, a fa-
mous Donald Rumsfeld remark – which can shed some light on the phenomenon 
of extraordinary rendition discussed below – is truly ironic, coming from the US 
Defence Secretary during the Ford and George W. Bush administrations.7
There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known 
unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are 
also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know.8
Rumsfeld explains that there are certain things in this world that are clearly 
evident to us as incontrovertible fact, things we absolutely know to be true9 (for ex-
ample: the sky is blue, the sun rises in the East and sets in the West). Then there are 
things of which we have conscious knowledge and things of which we consciously 
lack knowledge, and yet other things whose existence we are not aware of and are 
not aware of our ignorance about them.10 Until recently extraordinary rendition fell 
into this last category, being an unknown unknown, which is to say that the world 
at large was unaware of its existence and had no inkling that such a phenomenon 
might even exist, let alone what its consequences might be.
Growing public awareness of extraordinary rendition has changed its status 
from third category – that of an unknown unknown - to the second category – that 
of a known unknown. The existence of the practice and its use for the illegal cap-
ture, detention and torture of suspected terrorists is common cause at this juncture.11 
7 Donald Rumsfeld served as the 13th and the 21st U.S. Secretary of Defence. During the Ford Administra-
tion he served as the U.S. Secretary of Defence from 1975 – 1977.
8 D Rumsfeld, Known and unknown: A memoir (Penguin Group 2011) 12-14.
9 He states that these are known knowns such as laws, rules and the fact that we all know gravity will 
surely cause something to fall to the ground, see Rumsfeld (n 8) 12.
10 He	explains	that	this	is	the	most	difficult	category	since	there	are	gaps	in	our	�nowledge	but	we	don’t	
know that these gaps exist, see Rumsfeld (n 8) 12.
11 D Weissbrodt and A Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary rendition: A human rights analysis’ (2006) 19 Harvard 
Human Rights Journal 123; ICRC report on the treatment of fourteen ‘high value detainees’ in CIA 
custody (200) International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation for United States and 
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However, since the practice is largely shrouded in secrecy,12 given its known pur-
pose to huddle captives away from public scrutiny and the oversight of the law, 
little is known and understood about it, with the result that a severe paucity of 
conclusive evidence about the phenomenon further aggravates the conditions under 
which the struggle against it has to be waged.13
Exploratory reading shows that academics, writers and legislatures are not 
handling extraordinary rendition appropriately.14 There is a general tendency to try 
and	fit	 its	 characteristics	 into	 the	definitions	of	other	 forms	of	 illegal	expulsion,	
such as disguised extradition, abduction and other forms of irregular rendition. The 
reason for this misrepresentation is that the nature of the phenomenon and its impli-
cations	are	not	understood,	not	least	because	no	formal	definition	has	been	gener-
ated in law to shape and authenticate its meaning. Various writers have attempted to 
describe	or	define	extraordinary	rendition	for	purposes	of	their	own	wor�,	but	they	
never	fail	to	stress	that	there	is	no	formal	definition.15
Canada; Sadat (n 1) 1200; LN Sadat, ‘Ghost prisoners and black sites: Extraordinary rendition under 
international law’ (2006) 37 Case Western Journal of International Law 309; D Weissbrodt and A 
Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary rendition and the humanitarian law of war and occupation’ (2007) 47 Vir-
ginia Journal of International Law 295; D Weissbrodt and A Bergquist, ‘Extraordinary Rendition and 
the Torture Convention’ (2006) 46 Virginia Journal of International Law 585, 586; M Satterthwaite, 
‘Rendered meaningless: Extraordinary rendition and the rule of law’ (2007) 75 The George Washington 
Law Review 1333.
12 M Satterthwaite and J Huckerby, ‘Torture by proxy: International and domestic law applicable to 
�extraordinary renditions”’ (2004) Center for Human Rights and Global Justice New York University 
School of Law 15.
13 The entire purpose of extraordinary rendition is to place the suspected terrorists outside the legal frame-
work. This ensures that the perpetrators can avoid accountability and any other legal repercussions, but 
lack of accountability and transparency complicates investigations into extraordinary rendition which 
leads to a severe lack of evidence.
14 Instead of speaking directly of extraordinary rendition academics seem to ‘talk around the subject’ by 
referring to irregular rendition, disguised extradition, kidnapping or abduction. Dugard discusses the 
return of fugitives by means other than extradition, including deportation and disguised extradition (as 
a	 singular	and	 interchangeable	 term	which	could	 lead	 to	confusion	 regarding	 the	distinct	difference	
between disguised extradition and deportation) as well as abduction. Certain possible phases of extraor-
dinary	rendition	are	identifiable	in	abduction	or	even	perhaps	disguised	extradition,	but	extraordinary	
rendition cannot be placed in the same category as either of these. Furthermore, Dugard describes the 
alternatives to extradition as ‘the return of fugitives by means other than an extradition treaty to their 
country of origin.’ Compare J Dugard, International law: A South African perspective (Juta 2011) 231-
237.	Extraordinary	 rendition	 is	 not	 concerned	with	 fugitives	 that	need	 to	be	 returned	 to	 a	 specified	
state. The individuals captured and illegally rendered are only suspected terrorists in the eyes of their 
captors since no appropriate evidence regarding the captive individual’s connection to terrorism can be 
gathered, which is why such individuals are not arraigned before a court. The UN General Assembly 
also enacted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances Resolu-
tion 47/133 of 1992 (hereafter referred to as �the Declaration on Enforced Disappearances”), but this 
declaration is not comprehensive enough to include all the intricacies of extraordinary rendition.
15 Sadat	stresses	that	the	definition	of	extraordinary	rendition	seems	to	change	depending	on	the	source	
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Extraordinary rendition is a breed apart from all other illegal expulsion and/
or rendition methods and is informed by a hybrid theory,16 which needs to be thor-
oughly	perused	and	 ta�en	 into	account	 in	 formulating	a	cogent	definition	of	 the	
phenomenon. In light of the unconscionable range of consequences arising from 
extraordinary rendition, it is submitted that this practice needs to be criminalised 
under	international	law.	However,	in	the	absence	of	a	formal	definition	of	the	prac-
tice that will stand up in court, the criminalising process would have no leg to stand 
on,	so	 to	spea�.	The	first	 step	 towards	understanding	and	defining	extraordinary	
rendition would be to elaborate a detailed description of the phenomenon with all 
its	ramifications.
Extraordinary rendition17 entails willfully taking suspected terrorists into cus-
tody through illegal means such as abduction, followed by forcible detention and 
transportation	under	the	induced	influence	of	drugs18 to facilities that are well-nigh 
untraceable at undisclosed destinations19 where torture will be used as an interro-
gation technique20 and where public scrutiny and the oversight of the law cannot 







terthwaite (n 11) 1336). In Satterthwaite and Huckerby (n 12) 13, the authors aver that ‘extraordinary 
rendition appears to be an unauthorised version of rendition.’ The use of the word �appears” again 
underscores	the	lac�	of	a	definitive	description.
16 Weissbrodt and Bergquist (n 11) 127; P Johnston, ‘Leaving the invisible universe: Why all victims of 
extraordinary rendition need a cause of action against the United States’ (2007) 16 Journal of Law and 
Policy 381.
17 This is my detailed description of extraordinary rendition for the purposes of this chapter and the ar-
guments	and	statements	it	contains.	I	ac�nowledge	that	there	are	various	descriptions,	definitions	and	
interpretations of it, as pointed out in footnote 15 above.
18 The	word	“suspected”	 is	definitely	apposite	here,	given	 the	 scant	evidence	 that	would	certainly	not	
persuade a court to prosecute. Many suspects have such tenuous links to terrorism that legal process 
could not provide grounds for arrest, let alone detention, which is why torture is used as an aid to inter-
rogation.
19 Numerous articles refer to the existence of �black sites,” which are secret facilities maintained for the 
purposes of torture, illegal detention and the like. The existence of these facilities and the disappearance 
of detainees from them have led to the detainees being dubbed �ghost prisoners.” See E Sepper, ‘The 
ties that bind: How the Constitution limits the CIA’s actions in the war on terror’ (2006) 81 New York 
University Law Review 1807; Sadat (n 1) 1215; Weissbrodt and Bergquist (n 11) 588; Sadat (n 11) 315.
20 Extraordinary rendition is also referred to as �torture by proxy” because torture seems to go hand-in-
hand with extraordinary rendition. See in general Satterthwaite and Huckerby (n 12); A Hasbargen, 
‘Appropriately rendering disappearances: The despair between extraordinary renditions and forced dis-
appearances’ (2012) 34 Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 71, 89-90.
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reach them, with no assurances required from the receiving state.21 The suspected 
terrorists are captured by state agents, or agents acting under the guise of pseudo-
legality (i.e. purporting to act under the aegis of the US, but hailing from a variety 
of countries whose governments have invested them with powers of dubious legal-
ity to capture, detain, hold for questioning,22 transfer and/or torture the suspects 
thus detained)23 without following due legal process (e.g. allowing suspects to ac-
cess legal counsel).24
After	 transfer	 the	 suspects	 are	detained	 indefinitely	without	 trial,	while	 the	
governments involved deny their involvement and any knowledge of the state of 
well-being of the detainees.25 No access to humanitarian aid groups or legal rep-
resentation is allowed throughout and after such detention.26 The last phase of ex-
traordinary rendition is the lack of justice for released victims as states that are sued 
take refuge behind the defense of state secrecy.27
21 D Marty, ‘Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees involving Council of Europe member 
states: Second report’ (2007) Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights.
22 Ibid 49. This is a twenty-minute period commonly referred to as the �twenty minute take-out” or the 
CIA �security check.” A detainee can be fully prepared for transportation within these twenty minutes 
by rendering him immobile and incoherent. The detainee is blindfolded, brutalised and shackled by 
highly trained operatives wearing masks. His clothes are taken and he is photographed naked. Tran-
quilisers are inserted in his anus and he is strapped with a diaper. Finally he is blindfolded with a hood 
that provides nearly no holes for breathing, and transferred to a plane where he is strapped to a stretcher 
or	bound	in	a	very	uncomfortable	position	for	the	entire	course	of	the	flight	(which	can	be	up	to	a	full	
day). Again, this entire process takes twenty minutes; see Johnston (n 16) 357-360.
23 Johnston (n 16) 357-359; Singh (n 2) 6.
24 S Wolf, ‘An emerging paradigm for the enforcement of human rights: How the courts’ recent refusal to 
prosecute U.S. agents for extraordinary rendition may create a new reinforcement model’ (2007) 59 The 
State University of New Jersey Rutgers Law Review 917.
25 These detainees are naked when they are placed in cells that are temperature controlled to produce 
temperature extremes from freezing to extreme humidity and heat. They will also likely go through a 
�four month isolation regime” during which they are denied contact with human beings and their cells 
are under constant surveillance; see Johnston (n 16) 358-362; JR James, ‘Black letter abuse: the U.S. 
legal response to torture since 9/11’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 562.
26 M Satterthwaite, ‘Extraordinary rendition and disappearances in �the war on terror”’ (2006-2007) 10 
Gonzaga Journal of International Law 72.
27 A good example is the case of Khaled El-Masri. It was proved that the CIA participated in the abduction 
and transfer of El-Masri from Skopje to a secret detention facility in Kabul Afghanistan. He was held 
for a period of four months before the CIA realised they could not bring any charges against him. He 
was	subjected	to	solitary	confinement	for	several	wee�s.	He	was	eventually	blindfolded	and	flown	to	
Europe, where the captors drove around with him for several hours in order to confuse his sense of loca-
tion. They eventually stopped and instructed him to get out of the vehicle and walk down an unpaved 
road in the dark in mountainous terrain. He was also instructed not to look back. He feared for his life 
and	thought	he	would	be	shot	in	the	bac�,	but	the	captors	merely	drove	off	and	left	him	there.	Three	
years after his ordeal his case was still being investigated extensively (see Marty (n 21) 51). El-Masri’s 
civil suit against the U.S. was eventually rejected on grounds of state secrecy, with the result that he 
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In light of the above, extraordinary rendition is clearly not just a singular term 
to	define	one	illegal	act,	but	rather	an	entire	process	comprising	a	concatenation	of	
interlocking phases that individually and collectively contribute to the illegal na-
ture of extraordinary rendition as a whole, that is to say, each phase is fraught with 
illegality	in	its	own	right	and	confirms	and	compounds	the	illegality	of	the	whole.	
It cannot be reduced to a single act, but is a process comprising of a complex series 
of illegal acts.
The	difference	between	traditional	expulsion	(e.g.	deportation)	and	rendition	
is that the latter is entirely beyond the pale in a dark underworld where the protec-
tive framework of the rule of law, international or domestic, and respect for human 
rights in the international sphere does not apply. This is in contrast to traditional 
methods,	which	are	clearly	defined	and	subject	to	legal	process.
3 General issues created by extraordinary rendition
3.1	 Accountability	and	transparency
In their actions as part of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) the US aimed to 
manipulate the legal system in order to create a law-free zone where no perpetrator 
can be held accountable for its actions.28 The US has captured, detained and subjected 
persons to torture on vapid to non-existent evidence beyond bland claims that they 
were suspected of terrorist activity and had been detained as part of the GWOT.29
Purported diplomatic assurances are without legal substance because the ne-
farious actions of extraordinary rendition are conducted in secrecy.30 The individ-
ual’s interests are disregarded because the sending and receiving states both have 
a vested interest in keeping the rendition secret.31 The US wants to keep its illegal 
activities vis-a vis putative suspected terrorists secret while the receiving state does 
not want its collusion with the US and its violation of its non-refoulement obliga-
tions to become public knowledge.32
cannot	hold	anyone	accountable	for	 the	ordeal	he	suffered	(see	further	Marty	(n	21)	54).	The	writer	
agrees with Rapporteur Marty’s statement that to continue to invoke state secrecy doctrine years after 
the event is unacceptable in a democratic society (implies an adversarial relationship between the state 
and its subjects). He also argues that state secrecy cannot conceal criminal acts or acts of gross human 
rights violations (see further Marty (n 21) 55).
28 Sadat (n 1) 1226. 
29 Ibid 1211.





After 9/11, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was given the authority 
to transport individuals suspected of being terrorists to foreign governments for 
interrogation without the prior approval of the US Department of Justice.33 Since 
2006, reports have circulated that detainees captured in the GWOT were being 
held at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, Bagram Air Force base in Af-
ghanistan and that some were even being held at sea.34 It has also been reported that 
70%-90% of the detainees at the Abu Ghraib facility in Iraq were arrested in error.35
3.3	 Disrespect	for	the	rule	of	law
The purpose of the rule of law is to ensure that no individual or entity, public or 
private (including a state) is above the laws publicly promulgated and enforced, and 
these laws are consistent with international human rights.36 Extraordinary rendition 
violates international laws and international human rights by creating an extra-legal 
means of capturing, detaining and subjecting suspected terrorists to torture.37 It is 
clearly unlawful, but manages to escape active sanction by exploiting legislative 
lacunae and taking action that circumvents and prevents the administration of 
justice as would happen in the normal course.38 Various international instruments 
exist that enunciate the rules of international law.39 Some of these instruments 
embody rules of customary international law (i.e. the Geneva Conventions40 and 
the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
33 Ibid 1344.
34 Sadat (n 11) 309.
35 Sadat (n 1) 1245; M Eppinger, ‘Reality check: Detention in the war on terror’ (2013) 62 Catholic Uni-
versity Law Review 325, 355-356.
36 Compare	definition	in	J	Scholtes,	‘Smart	power	in	action	-	A	rule	of	law	Judge	Advocate’s	reflections	
from Basrah, Iraq’ (2011) 44 Creighton Law Review 1091, 1096.
37 Sadat (n 1) 1205.
38 Satterthwaite (n 11) 1333.
39 For example: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Geneva Conven-
tions (GCs) consisting of Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded 
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949 (GC I), Geneva Convention for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 
August 1949 (GC II), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 
1949 (GC III), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 
August 1949 (GC IV), Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment of 1984 (CAT).
40 Hereafter referred to as �the GCs”.
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or Punishment (CAT)).41 Infringements of these rules therefore constitute a grave 
breach of the rule of law irrespective of the status or identity of the perpetrator.
3.4	 Torture
The prevalence of torture42 in cases of extraordinary rendition has earned it 
the alternative ominous labels of ‘outsourcing torture’43 and ‘torture by proxy.’44 It 
is important to note that the US does not refer to interrogation techniques practised 
by its operatives as torture, ill treatment or even cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, but euphemistically as ‘enhanced interrogation techniques.’45 Torture is pro-
hibited	by	CAT,	which	was	also	signed	and	ratified	by	the	US	and	various	African	
states that aided the US.
3.5	 Further	issues	created	by	extraordinary	rendition
In extraordinary rendition cases people are sometimes captured in a state other 
than the US and transferred to a third state.46 The state in which the individual 
is captured is either aware or unaware of the event (but perhaps they just do not 
publicly admit to such knowledge).47 However, should the state be unaware of the 
capture this would be an infraction on state sovereignty.48
A further issue is that the US has argued that the GWOT is a new kind of war 
and therefore international humanitarian law and other international human rights 
instruments do not apply to it. International scholars do not agree that the GWOT 
41 Sadat (n 11) 320.
42 The term ‘torture,’ in this context, refers to ill treatment of such severity that, in the writer’s opinion, 
it constitutes torture. However, there are various opinions as to what degree of severity of ill treatment 
would actually constitute torture and what would merely constitute cruel, inhumane and degrading 
treatment and/or punishment. The case law will be discussed in this paragraph, and these issues will be 
addressed.
43 Weissbrodt and Bergquist (n 11) 593.
44 Satterthwaite and Huckerby (n 12) 15, Hasbargen (n 20) 90.
45 M Garcia, ‘Interrogation of detainees: Requirements of the Detainee Treatment Act’ (2009) Congres-
sional Research Report for Congress 1-2.
46 Sadat (n 1) 1225.
47 Ibid.
48 State sovereignty is protected by international law, which therefore also dictates the conditions, includ-
ing the limits, which rule its existence. According to the principle of state sovereignty, a state has the 
right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and its permanent population and the right to armed de-
fence of its territorial integrity in certain circumstances. It does not, however, have the right to interfere 
in	the	internal	affairs	of	other	states,	except	when	they	violate	basic	human	rights.	Compare	M	Shaw,	
International law (Cambridge University Press 2008) 212.
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falls in a legal vacuum and as such the US is free to act as they please.49 There are 
four schools of thought regarding the applicability of international humanitarian 
law (IHL):50 First, that IHL may not apply to the GWOT, but that international 
human rights laws still apply. Second, that although it might not be best suited, it 
is	best	to	view	the	GWOT	as	a	non-international	armed	conflict	and	therefore	the	
rules	applicable	to	non-international	armed	conflicts	should	apply.	Third,	that	the	
GWOT should be judged on a case-by-case basis to ascertain which laws would be 





gaged in seeking out perpetrators in Afghanistan who engage in acts of 
terror, and in mounting retaliatory exercises calculated to neutralise said 
perpetrators according to military intelligence.
b)	 It	is	an	undeclared	armed	conflict	in	which	the	US	and	its	allies	engage	
in military operations against the former Taliban regime.
c)	 It	is	a	non-international	armed	conflict,	originally	waged	in	Afghanistan	
between the Taliban and its domestic rivals, but was internationalised in 
due course by a combined intervention mounted by the US and its allies 
in 2001.
d)	 It	is	an	undeclared	international	armed	conflict	in	which	the	US	and	its	
allies conduct military operations against Al Qaeda, a non-state entity, 
aiding the Taliban.
e)	 It	is	an	undeclared	international	armed	conflict	in	which	the	US	and	its	
allies conduct military operations against a range of non-state entities 
and individuals targeted as terrorist groups or individuals in accordance 
with military intelligence.
f) It subsists in continual crime control activities conducted against interna-
tional terrorists with metaphorical use of �war” rhetoric.51
49 Satterthwaite (n 11) 1404.
50 Ibid.
51 Fitzpatrick (2003) 249.
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Scholars supporting the position that the GWOT is neither an international 
nor	 a	 non-international	 armed	 conflict52 disagree with the general view that the 
GWOT by its nature cannot be subject to rules of any kind.53 In contrast, the Bush 
administration held that extraordinary rendition could not be unlawful since it took 
place outside the US54 and was implemented by governments that gave assurances 
that detainees held within their precincts would be treated humanely. The US under 
Bush steadfastly held immovably that the GWOT was a new kind of war entailing 
actions	that	were	not	readily	classifiable	according	to	received	views	concerning	
warfare.55
In other words, the US position under Bush can be summed up as a thinly 
veiled	demand	for	a	licence	to	engage	in	lawlessness,	or	put	differently,	to	be	a	law	
unto	itself.	Some	scholars	argue	that	it	is	important	not	to	define	the	GWOT	as	war	
and treat Al Qaeda operatives as combatants because this elevates them to be more 
than mere criminals, thereby securing elevated protections within the framework 
of IHL.56
The	crux	of	the	whole	matter,	finally,	is	that	even	if	the	GWOT	is	a	new	type	
of war and the traditional dimensions of warfare have evolved or expanded, it is 
still	a	war.	Whether	it	is	an	undeclared	new	type	of	war	or	an	armed	conflict	under	
IHL, some basic legal principles remain in force, regardless of them being sub-
sumed	under	IHL	or	IHRL.	The	advocacy	of	what	effectively	amounts	to	a	state	of	
licence is therefore baseless.
4 Attributing responsibility to African governments for their role in 
extraordinary rendition
The responsibilities of African states (as with any other state) under interna-
tional law with regard to extraordinary rendition include:
(i) Taking care not to assist a process of extraordinary rendition knowled-
gably or otherwise. Since assistance will be traceable by following the 
cause-effect	lin�age	to	the	offence	in	question	the	association	thus	aris-
52 Satterthwaite (n 11) 1412.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid 1419-1420.
55 J Waldron, Torture, terror, and trade-offs: Philosophy for the White House (Oxford University Press 
2010); Satterthwaite (n 11) 1419-1420.
56 M O’Connell, ‘When is a war not a war? The myth of the global war on terror’ (2005-2006) 12 Inter-
national Law Student Association Journal on International and Comparative Law 535, 538.
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ing will result in acts that seem innocuous becoming punishable. For 
example: refuelling a plane is normally quite unremarkable, but the act, 
or rather those enabling or conniving at it, will attract criminal liabil-
ity charges if it transpires that the state concerned knew or should have 
known in all conscience that the plane was carrying extraordinary rendi-
tion	victims	and	would	have	been	unable	to	ma�e	it	to	its	final	destina-
tion if it did not refuel at the assisting state’s airport.57
(ii) To assert jurisdiction over instances of torture if the charge and its pursuit 
is pursuable within the legitimate area of the countries jurisdiction.58
(iii) To take into custody, investigate and then extradite or prosecute a person 
who is alleged to have committed acts of torture or was complicit in or 
participated in such acts.59
African governments60 have been involved in extraordinary rendition in vari-
ous ways:
a) Detaining, interrogating, torturing and abusing victims;
b) Rendering assistance in dealing with the transport and capture of vic-
tims;
c)	 Permitting	 the	 use	 of	 domestic	 airspace	 and	 airports	 for	 secret	 flights	
transporting victims of extraordinary rendition;
d) Providing intelligence leading to the extraordinary rendition of victims;
e) Interrogating individuals secretly held in the custody of other govern-
ments;
f) Failure to protect individual persons from extraordinary rendition within 
the bounds of their territory; and
57 All Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition Briefing: Torture by proxy: International law ap-
plicable to ‘extraordinary renditions’ (December 2005) 13. African countries that assisted with refuel-
ling and use of airspace and/or airports included South Africa, Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Malawi. See 
Singh (n 2) 65-100.
58 All Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (n 58) 13. 
59 Ibid.
60 Although the focus here is on African governments, a total of 54 foreign governments have been iden-
tified	 as	 participating	 in	 extraordinary	 renditions	 and	 these	 include:	Afghanistan,	Albania,	Algeria,	
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iceland, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Libya, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malawi, Malay-
sia, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, UK, Uzbekistan, Yemen and 
Zimbabwe. See further Singh (n 2) 6.
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g)	 Failure	to	conduct	effective	investigations	critically	aimed	at	the	conduct	
of	officials	 and	agencies	 that	have	participated	 in	 extraordinary	 rendi-
tions.61
Human rights organisations have tried to create a diligent list of persons who 
have disappeared as a result of extraordinary renditions, but the numbers remain 
a mystery.62 These numbers remain undocumented because victims are forced into 
silence by threats, brutality, torture, and fear for their own and their families’ safe-
ty.63 Many have been silenced by death at the hands of their captors.64 To date only 
one case has been brought against an African government for its part in the extraor-
dinary rendition of a Pakistani national, Khalid Rashid, from the Waterkloof Air 
Force Base in South Africa.
Khalid Mehmood Rashid was arrested at his home in Kwazulu-Natal, South 
Africa, on charges of being an illegal alien, whereupon he was handed over to puta-
tive	Pa�istani	officials.65 The South African Government did not obtain assurances 
of compliance with international human rights conventions with regard to his pos-
sible treatment in captivity in the receiving country.66 The High Court upheld the 
irregular transfer of Khalid Rashid and declared that the Government could not be 
expected to gain assurances for all transfers.67
61 Singh (n 2) 6, 65-95.
62 Hasbargen (n 20) 81.
63 Ibid 82.
64 Ibid.
65 Jeebhai v Minister of Home Affairs and another 2007 (4) ALL SA 773 (T) at 774. ‘A story of extraordi-
nary rendition from South Africa’ (March 14 2006) <http://www.indymedia.ie/article/74841> accessed 
21 July 2014; see also Strumpf and Dawes, ‘Khalid Rashid: Govt’s cover is blown’ Mail and Guardian 
(9 June 2006). 
66 Pakistan is a country known to be amenable and inclined to the practice of torturing persons in captivity 
(including children); therefore assurances should have been secured. Pakistan is included among the 
‘torture	countries’	identified	by	Human	Rights	Watch. Pa�istani	police	officials	are	�nown	for	abduct-
ing individuals and resorting to torture to extract information, for example, to secure a confession in 
criminal investigations, but certainly also as a routine measure to gain military intelligence. Children 
have been tortured in order to obtain confessions or information from their parents. During 2003, hun-
dreds of children were detained in torture cells where they were stripped and whipped in order to coerce 
information. See also A Hasan, ‘Soiled hands: The Pakistan army’s repression of the Punjab farmers’ 
movement’ (2004) 16 Human Rights Watch 28.
67 The Court held that ‘…[t]he prayer sought, namely, that the South African Government be ordered to 
intervene as Rashid could be facing a death sentence, cannot be granted if the authorities were not aware 
of those facts. It cannot be that the duty arises in respect of every person deported without such prior 
knowledge; this would be unworkable. All the authorities knew that he was being taken back to his own 
country. As it is, it can be argued that on Mohamed’s judgment, all that a person anywhere in the world 
facing capital crimes in their country need to do is to come to South Africa, even illegally, and receive 
insurance against the death penalty. It follows that Rashid’s deportation cannot be declared invalid for 
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This High Court decision was overturned by the Supreme Court of Appeal,68 
which held that Rashid’s detention and deportation was in fact unlawful,69 but that 
his	illegal	deportation	was	not	a	crime	against	humanity	as	it	did	not	suit	the	defini-
tion given by the Rome Statute.70 Although the appeal judgment addresses some 
issues created by the High Court judgment, it does not grant satisfactory relief to 
the victim.
Rashid was rendered to Pakistan on 6 November 2005. On 6 June 2006, his 
whereabouts was still unknown. Later it became known that he was released from 
custody during December 2007. This is two years after his arrest and disappearance. 
The appeal judgment was only handed down in March 2009, which is more than 
three years after the incident occurred and more than two years after his release.
Contrary to the African example, some countries believe that perpetrators 
of extraordinary rendition should be held accountable for the varying degrees in 
which they participated in this phenomenon. Sweden, for example, conducted an 
investigation into extraordinary rendition and found that the European security ser-
vices colluded with the US to execute extraordinary renditions and gave the US 
full discretion to act at will within the bounds of European territory despite total 
prohibition by the Council of Europe of the activities perpetrated there with the full 
knowledge of the said services.71
Shortly after the above, Germany launched an investigation into extraordi-
nary	renditions	and	requested	the	extradition	of	thirteen	CIA	officials,	but	pressure	
from the US ended the inquiry.72	Italy	also	convicted	21	CIA	officials	and	imposed	
five-year	sentences	for	the	extraordinary	rendition	of	Abu	Omar.	Charges	against	
three others were dropped due to their diplomatic immunity. On being convicted 
these	individuals	fled	the	country	and	are	fugitives	from	Italian	law.73 This is the 
the reason that the South African authorities did not extract an undertaking from the Pakistani Govern-
ment that his life would not be in danger. Such a duty cannot routinely exist in respect of every deportee. 
Rashid was sent back to his own country.’ See Jeebhai (2007) (T) 773.
68 Jeebhai and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2009 (5) SA 54 (SCA) handed down 31 
March 2009.
69 Ibid para 53.
70 Ibid para 50.
71 R Bejesky, ‘Sensibly construing the �more likely than not” threshold for extraordinary rendition’ (2013-
2014) 23 Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 221, 256-257.
72 Ibid 257.
73 I Fisher and E Povoledo, ‘Italy seeks indictments of CIA operatives in Egyptian’s abduction’ (5 De-
cember 2006) The New York Times Sabrina de Sousa who was one of the CIA operatives convicted in 
absentia stated the following: ‘Clearly we broke the law, and we’re paying for the mistakes right now 
of whoever authorised and approved this…I was a representative of this Government, and I should have 
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only	�nown	example	of	a	conviction	of	officials	by	a	state	for	their	involvement	in	
extraordinary rendition. It should be noted too in this regard that Canada is the only 
country to issue a public apology to a victim of extraordinary rendition, namely 
Maher Arar.74
Australia, Canada and the UK have all settled claims with former Guantánamo 
Bay detainees rather than risk divulging state secrets of their own, or of the US.75 
It should be borne in mind here that an element of coercion helped to persuade the 
UK authorities to join the US in settling claims. The coercive measure, emanating 
from the US, was its threat to reduce intelligence sharing with the UK if courts in 
that country were to ‘spill the beans’ by revealing US State secrets in any way.76 In 
US v Khadr77 a Canadian court refused to extradite a suspected terrorist to the US 
due	to	the	treatment	he	suffered	at	the	hands	of	the	US	in	Pa�istan.78
In 2012, the European Court of Human Rights handed down the landmark 
judgment concerning the extraordinary rendition of Khalid El-Masri.79 The Court 
found that El-Masri established his version of events beyond reasonable doubt80 
and further found the Government of Macedonia guilty of several violations of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Court held that the Macedo-
nian Government was responsible for his abduction and transfer to the CIA when 
there was good cause to believe he would be tortured.81 The Court also held that 
been protected.’ See further Bejesky (n 72) 258.
74 Singh (n 2) 6.
75 Australia	and	the	UK	in	the	context	of	confidential	settlements.	See	further	Singh	(n	2)	62;	K	Roach,	
‘Substitute justice? Challenges to American counterterrorism activities in non-American courts’ (2013) 
82 Mississippi Law Journal 907, 910.
76 Roach (n 76) 910.
77 US v Khadr (2011) ONCA 358 Court of Appeal for Ontario.
78 Ibid para 24.
79 El-Masri v The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (13 December 2012) European Court of Hu-
man Rights Application no 39630/09.
80 Ibid para 167.
81 It found that the applicant had been tortured and ill-treated and that the burden of responsibility would 
therefore have to be borne by the respondent state for having transferred him deliberately to the custody 
of the CIA despite substantial reasons to believe that he might be subjected to treatment contrary to Ar-
ticle 3 of the Convention. It also found that the applicant was detained arbitrarily, contrary to Article 5. 
The	respondent	State	also	failed	to	carry	out	an	effective	investigation	as	required	under	Articles	3	and	5	
of the Convention. In addition, the Court found that the applicant’s rights under Article 8 had been vio-
lated. Lastly, it found that responsibility devolved on the respondent state for having failed to provide 
an	effective	remedy	within	the	meaning	of	Article	13	of	the	Convention	for	the	applicant’s	grievances	
on grounds submitted in terms of Articles 3, 5 and 8, in consideration whereof the Court found that the 
applicant	had	suffered	non-pecuniary	damage	that	could	not	be	made	good	on	grounds	of	a	violation	
alone. See further El-Masri (n 80) para 269.
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El-Masri’s treatment at the Skopje hotel was a violation of Article 30 of the ECHR. 
The treatment of El-Masri when he was handed over to the CIA was a violation of 
Article 7. The treatment was imputable to Macedonia as it was carried out in the 
presence of its representatives who failed to prevent the action and was therefore 
held responsible in the matter.82
This	is	a	landmar�	ruling	because	it	is	the	first	international	ruling	to	the	ef-
fect that extraordinary rendition amounts to torture.83 The further fact that the Court 
held Macedonia responsible for the ill treatment of El-Masri at the hands of the 
CIA	has	definite	implications	for	other	governments	that	connive	at	or	aid	and	abet	
extraordinary rendition.84
The scope of this thesis does not allow a comprehensive account of foreign 
governments’ involvement in extraordinary rendition. Hence, the account present-
ed	here	will	be	confined	to	a	select	few.
5 Brief case studies from the African continent
5.1	 Algeria
Algeria permitted the use of its airspace and airports in aid of US extraor-
dinary	 rendition	flights.85 It was also implicated in the detention of former CIA 
detainees Jamaldi Boudra and Abu Nakr Muhammed Boulghiti.86 Stopovers were 
also made at Algerian airports during the illegal transfers of infamous extraordinary 
rendition victims Binyam Mohamed and Khaled El-Masri.87
5.2	 Egypt
The	first	notable	agreement	 the	US	concluded	with	a	 foreign	government	
was to enlist Egypt’s assistance in capturing and rendering terrorist suspects on 
82 ‘The respondent State must be considered directly responsible for the violation of the applicant’s rights 
under this head, since its agents actively facilitated the treatment and then failed to take any measures 
that might have been necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent it from occurring.’ See fur-
ther El-Masri (n 80) para 211.
83 Orpiszewska M, ‘El Masri v Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: Implications for the CIA ex-
traordinary rendition program’ (2014) 39 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial 
Regulation 1165, 1167.
84 Ibid.
85 Singh (n 2) 67.
86 Ibid.
87 Grey (n 2) 81, Singh (n 2) 67.
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behalf of the US.88 It is believed, too, that Egypt may have been made the ally 
of choice in this nefarious scheme on grounds of its reputation for subjecting 
its subjects to torture.89 It is alleged that Egypt embraced the idea as the US 
could apparently assure the capture and transportation of the suspects to Egypt, 
at its expense.90	Considering	these	alluring	benefits,	and	since	Egypt	was	eager	
to capture Egyptians implicated in Al Qaeda activities,91 the authorities in that 
country seemed eager to participate. Although US law requires an assurance that 
suspects will not be subjected to torture in the country they are being rendered to,92 
no	written	 evidence	 to	 this	 effect	 exists.93 Individuals extraordinarily rendered 
to Egypt included Mohammed Omar Abdel-Rahman, Ahmed Agiza, and Abu 
Omar.94
5.3	 Ethiopia
Mohammed Ali Isse was extraordinarily rendered to Ethiopia by the CIA and 
subsequently detained and subjected to electric torture by Ethiopian interrogators.95 
Other African governments involved in US extraordinary renditions include Ken-
ya, Libya, Malawi, Gambia, Somalia, Zimbabwe, and Djibouti.96
6 General issues with accountability of states
Due to the hybrid nature of extraordinary rendition, it is has proven to be dif-
ficult	to	hold	states	accountable	for	their	various	roles	in	this	practice.	At	this	point	
88 Singh (n 2) 14.
89 Johnston (n 16) 364.
90 J Mayer, ‘Outsourcing torture: The secret history of America’s �extraordinary rendition” program’ The 
New Yorker (14 February 2005) 106 at 109.
91 Mayer (n 90) 109.
92 Section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Public Law 105-277, which 
states	that:	‘It	shall	be	the	policy	of	the	United	States	not	to	expel,	extradite,	or	otherwise	effect	the	
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believing the 
person would be in danger of being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically 
present in the United States.’ Also see Mayer (n 91) 107.
93 Former CIA counter-terrorism agent, Michael Scheuer, told reporter Jane Mayer that the assurances 
were	sought,	but	he	was	“not	sure”	whether	any	documents	confirming	the	arrangement	were	signed.	
See Mayer (n 90) 109.
94 Singh (n 2) 77.
95 P Salopek, ‘Nobody is watching, America’s hidden war in Somalia’ Chicago Tribune (24 November 
2008); Singh (n 2) 78.
96 Singh (n 2) 65-105.
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it	is	important	to	consider	that	there	is	no	official	legal	definition	for	extraordinary	
rendition in international law.97 As already explained, extraordinary rendition is 
clearly not conformable to a unitary concept of a clear-cut, indivisible illegal act; 
rather it comprises a concatenation of interlocking phases that individually and 
collectively contribute to the illegal nature of extraordinary rendition as a whole; 
that	is	to	say,	each	phase	is	fraught	with	illegality	in	its	own	right	and	confirms	and	
compounds the illegality of the whole.98 It cannot be reduced to a single act but is a 
process comprising a multi-stranded, multi-phased fabric of illegality.
There is also the further issue of applicable legal regimes. Which legal regime 
should	be	ta�en	as	definitive	in	formulating	a	description	of	and	criminalising	ex-
traordinary rendition?99 At this stage it is common cause that the actions and pro-
cedures constituting extraordinary rendition infringe various international laws and 
principles, but that the complex nature of the phenomenon and the various intricate 
legal arguments adduced by the US on the applicability of legal regimes cast a 
cloud of uncertainty over the issue and thus leave it unresolved.
The gist of the latest argument regarding legal regimes is that the GWOT is a 
new kind of war requiring new rules and conformity to new parameters of warfare, 
thus voiding at once whatever legal regimes were hitherto applicable. In light of 
the above, the fundamental question is: Can extraordinary rendition be criminalised 
and should contributing state actors be held accountable? An act has to be duly 
defined	to	be	criminalised.	Defining	a	crime	as	a	series	of	phases	ma�es	it	almost	
impossible to even start considering prosecution. Apart from these elemental issues 
the	more	pressing	issue	is	agreeing	on	a	definition.	Judging	from	the	interminable	
wrangling	over	 a	 definition	of	 the	 crime	of	 aggression,	 it	 seems	 li�ely	 that	 ‘the	
law’s	delay’	will	assert	itself	once	more	in	an	indefinite	time	lapse	if	the	same	exer-
cise had to be repeated for a new crime.
Presupposing	that	the	obstacles	of	formulating	a	consensual	definition	were	
overcome, would the crime thus formulated and agreed upon be a new crime, or 
would it be categorised under one of the existing International Criminal Court (ICC) 
crimes? Even if it were a viable assumption that extraordinary rendition could be 
classified	as	a	crime	under	the	Rome	Statute	of	the	ICC	(Rome	Statute),	how	would	
jurisdiction for its prosecution be vested? Most of the African states listed in this 
chapter are state parties to the Rome Statute. However, if the recent events concern-
97 See (n 15).
98 See paragraph 2 in general.
99 See paragraph 3.5.
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ing Omar Al Bashir are any indication of African commitment to international laws 
and policy, this argument is moot.
Furthermore,	 should	extraordinary	 rendition	be	properly	defined	as	a	crime	
and participating government actors were to be held accountable before the ICC, 
how would the ICC prosecute the crime? There is no clear line of evidence due to 
the smokescreen behind which this crime is committed. How will it pass the gravity 
test of the ICC if there is no evidence to present?
Consideration should also be given to the multi-phased, multi-stranded nature 
of the illegalities comprising extraordinary rendition. Would the various elements 
of criminality be prosecuted as separate crimes? Would this procedure unduly strain 
the legal process? Even so, how would the nexus and the actus reus be determined 
for a crime that consists of various crimes and that is committed over an extended 
period of time? There is no causal link, no crime scene and no evidence.
In light of all the above and counting the many variables and uncertainties 
involved, it would clearly be a formidable task to seek and obtain legal redress for 
extraordinary rendition.
7 Conclusion
African government participation in extraordinary rendition directly contrib-
utes to the host of international legal issues created by this practice which includes 
torture, detention without trial, denial of legal representation, enforced removal 
from public view and normal surrounds, forcible transfer, arbitrary arrest, and the 
absence of assurances from receiving states, to name but a few. Therefore African 
governments	are	just	as	responsible	for	the	effects	of	extraordinary	rendition	as	the	
main culprit, the US.
However, as mentioned above in paragraph 4, only a handful of states have 
taken responsibility for their part in extraordinary rendition. Most of the African 
governments	 involved	 have	made	 no	 effort	 to	 hold	 anyone	 accountable	 for	 the	
atrocities committed.
Referring	to	paragraph	6,	it	is	clear	that	there	is	a	multitude	of	difficulties	to	be	
addressed in order to attribute accountability to states for the practice of extraordi-
nary rendition and to hold their government actors accountable under international 
law. Furthermore, due to all the challenges discussed in paragraph 6, subjecting 
state actors to the jurisdiction of the ICC seems to be impossible at this stage.
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Africa stands to learn a valuable lesson from Sweden, Italy, Canada and the 
UK and should proceed to handle these matters within its own jurisdiction. In this 
regard there are two possible options that may grant interim solutions to vesting 
individual criminal responsibility in Africa.
The	first	option	would	be	to	consider	the	Malabo	Protocol.100 This Protocol 
provides for the creation of a criminal jurisdiction within the existing African Court 
of Justice and Human Rights, thus providing for jurisdiction over a host of interna-
tional crimes as well as important regional and transnational crimes. Therefore, the 
Court will have jurisdiction over the four core crimes in the Rome Statute101 as well 
as	other	crimes	specifically	provided	for	in	articles	28A	through	28M.102
Article 28C deals with crimes against humanity and includes the crime of 
enforced disappearances.103 Although it is not recommended that extraordinary ren-
dition be pulled under the blanket of enforced disappearances104 this may be a tem-
porary means of attributing individual criminal responsibility to African citizens 
guilty of assisting in one or more facets of extraordinary rendition.
The	issue	here	would	be	the	fact	that	this	Protocol	requires	ratification	from	
fifteen	member	states	of	the	African	Union	in	order	to	enter	into	force.105 Therefore, 
the actual prosecution through this means would have to wait until the Protocol 
enters into force.
A further issue would be Article 46Abis, which	effectively	grants	immunity	
to	heads	of	government	and	senior	government	officials	during	their	tenure	of	of-
fice.	Ta�ing	 the	nature	of	 extraordinary	 rendition	 into	 account	 the	guilty	parties	
would	more	often	than	not	be	either	senior	government	officials	or,	at	least	in	some	
capacity, heads of government. Therefore, this would make attributing individual 
criminal	responsibility	difficult.
100 The 23rd Ordinary Session of the African Union Malabo Press Release 18/23rd AU Summit at <http://
summits.au.int/ar/sites/default/files/PR%2018%20-%2023rd%20AU%20Assembly%20ends%20
in%20Malabo%20(3).pdf> accessed 28 September 2015).
101 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998). The crimes are: genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and the crime of aggression.
102 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court on Justice and Human 
Rights (15 May 2014) First Meeting of the Specialised Technical Committee on Justice and Legal 
Affairs 15-16 May 2014 Addis Ababa Ethiopia at <https://www.iccnow.org/documents/African_Court_
Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf> accessed 29 September 2015).
103 Draft Protocol (n 103), art. 28C(1)(g).
104 See (n 15).
105 Draft Protocol (n 103), art. 11(1).
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The second option would be to consider domestic jurisdictions. Most of the 
African	 countries	 discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 have	 ratified	 a	 number	 of	 important	
international instruments dealing with issues such as torture, safety and security of 
persons, abduction etc. The individuals responsible for assisting in extraordinary 
rendition could be held accountable by their governments through domestic judi-
cial systems. Although extraordinary rendition is a multi-phased and multi-strand-
ed phenomenon that combines various crimes,106 those aiding and abetting could be 
prosecuted	for	the	specific	elements	of	extraordinary	rendition	they	are	accused	of	
aiding in. This may range from torture to aiding in abductions.
The	difficulty	with	this	option	is	the	ris�	that	the	gravity	and	severity	of	ex-
traordinary rendition as a hybrid theory107 may be undermined by breaking it up 
into singular crimes. Therefore, this approach would not be advised as a permanent 
global solution to extraordinary rendition. The US as the main culprit, and some 
governments assisting with various facets of extraordinary rendition, must still be 
held	fully	accountable	for	it	once	a	proper	definition	has	been	drafted	and	it	has	
been properly criminalised. This option is merely explored as a temporary solution 
to attributing individual criminal responsibility to those governments that have as-
sisted the US in one way or another. Pending the establishment of a solid means to 
prosecute guilty parties under the jurisdiction of the ICC, African states should, in 
the meantime, hold true to their commitments to promote and enforce international 
laws by holding those within their jurisdiction accountable for their crimes, either 
through domestic enforcement or through exploring possible options in the context 
of the Malabo Protocol.
106 See paragraph 2 of this chapter.
107 See paragraph 2 of this chapter.
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By establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), the member state parties 
to the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) were determined to end impunity for 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community 
and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes. In order to measure the 
impact of the ICC, particularly in Africa, it is necessary to consider the current and 
concrete obstacles faced by the Court in its mission to put an end to impunity. This 
paper addresses this question by focusing on the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). 
It investigates the OTP’s work on the ground and specifically in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) and compares the results of the OTP’s work with the 
expectations and needs of African victims.
Following initial investigations, prosecutions and trials, the strategy adopted by 
the OTP has elicited several criticisms. Consequently, the Prosecutor reviewed and 
adapted its strategy. However, further efforts are needed in order to make the Court 
effective. It must also be remembered that the efficiency of the ICC is dependent on 
the support of states parties and the relationship with other actors in the region.
*  This contribution has been translated from the original French.
**  LLB LLM (Université Protestante au Congo), PhD Candidate at the Université d’Aix-Marseille 
(France), Chairman of the Club des amis du droit du Congo, DRC. The author thanks Jacques Mbokani 
and Emmanuelle Siou for proofreading this work and for their contributions. Thanks also to Elke Al-
lemeersch for the page setting.
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1 Introduction
The	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC	or	the	Court)	was	established	to	fight	
impunity1 and to contribute to the prevention of the most serious crimes of inter-
national	concern.	Within	 the	ICC,	 the	Office	of	 the	Prosecutor	 (OTP)	 is	 the	real	
linchpin	in	the	fight	against	impunity,	to	the	extent	that	it	holds	the	responsibility	of	
conducting investigations and initiating prosecutions.2
The coming into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute), on 1 
July 2002, raised several expectations, especially in Africa, where 34 states ac-
cepted this permanent court charged with trying ‘the most serious crimes of inter-
national concern.’3 The jurisdiction of the Court is based on the principle of com-
plementarity. This is one of the unique features of the ICC, which entrusts member 
states with the primary responsibility of conducting investigations and instituting 
proceedings for international crimes committed within their territories. 
The intention of the ICC is not only to reduce impunity in respect of interna-
tional crimes, but also to act on behalf of victims by enabling them to participate 
in judicial proceedings and by way of reparations. The Trust Fund for Victims4 was 
created for purposes of implementing orders for payment of reparations issued by 
the Court and also to assist victims and their families. 
In	2004,	Kofi	Annan	noted	that	‘the	Court	already	has	a	big	impact	by	playing	
the role of a catalyst in the adoption of national laws against serious international 
crimes.’5 It is clear that by virtue of its existence the Court has encouraged the 
member states to incorporate the crimes falling under the ICC’s jurisdiction into 
their national laws. The recourse to these national laws – even before the Court 
opens	its	first	investigation	–	constitutes	a	decisive	step	in	the	path	towards	bringing	
the perpetrators of atrocities to justice.6
1 Impunity	may	be	defined	as	‘the	impossibility,	de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of viola-
tions to account – whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings – since they 
are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, 
sentenced to appropriate penalties, and to make reparations to their victims.’ See D Orentlicher, ‘Report 
of the independent expert to update the set of principles to combat impunity’ E/CN 4/2005/102/Add.1 
of (8 February 2005) 6.
2 J Mbokani, ‘L’impact de la stratégie de poursuite du Procureur de la CPI sur la lutte contre l’impunité 
et la prévention des crimes de droit international’ (2008-2009) 7 Droits Fondamentaux.
3 Rome Statute, arts. 1 and 5(1).
4 Rome Statute, art. 79.
5 Rapport du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies, S/2004/616 (23 August 2004) 16.
6 ‘Communication relative à certaines questions de politique générale concernant le BDP’ (September 
2003).
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All these observations lead to one question: what are the current and concrete 
obstacles the Court is facing in its mission to put an end to impunity? This paper 
will try to answer this question in two parts. Part 2 focuses on the strategy of the 
OTP and its implementation, while Part 3 investigates the work of the OTP in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
2 Prosecution strategies of the OTP in Africa 
As	a	prosecutorial	office	within	an	international	legal	institution,	the	OTP	fac-
es the reality that it must carry out its investigations abroad. This makes the OTP 
largely dependent on cooperation from national authorities. In these circumstances, 
the Prosecutor is often confronted with a lack of cooperation, not only from the 
national authorities in the territory where the crimes were committed, but also from 
the local population. Worse still, the OTP is sometimes faced with national rhetoric 
that is hostile to international prosecutions. It is not uncommon to see public opin-
ion	influenced	by	such	rhetoric,	which	may	lead	to	limited	support	from	within	the	
concerned state(s). Due to the material and political constraints facing the OTP, the 
issue of the feasibility of investigations and prosecutions is a cardinal factor in the 
exercise of its duties and responsibilities.7 In light of the above, the implementation 
of	a	prosecutorial	strategy	that	ensures	coherent	case	selection	and	efficient	pros-
ecutions is vitally important.8
2.1	 Fundamental	elements	to	the	OTP’s	strategy
2.1.1 Mandate of the ICC
The mandate and jurisdiction of the ICC - as provided for in the Rome Statute 
– has a fundamental impact on the functioning of the OTP. 
First, the Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed within the territory of 
a state party or by a national of a state party.9 Nonetheless, the ICC acts on the basis 
of the principle of complementarity.10 It encourages proceedings undertaken at the 
national level, since a matter shall be judged inadmissible before the ICC if national 
7 VJ Goldston, ‘More candour about criteria: The exercise of discretion by the Prosecutor of the ICC’ 
(2010) 8(2) Journal of International Criminal Justice 395.
8 Ibid 46.
9 Rome Statute, art. 12.
10 Rome Statute, art. 1.
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investigations or prosecutions regarding the same conduct and incidents are being 
conducted at the national level. Thus, the Court shall have jurisdiction only if the 
State concerned does not have the will or the capacity to conduct these investiga-
tions or proceedings.11 
The principle of complementarity has major consequences for the OTP. Initial-
ly, it is this principle that determines whether a matter is admissible to the Court.12 
In plain terms, the principle of complementarity prevents the OTP from choosing 
from a larger pool of potential situations and cases.13 The application of the princi-
ple of complementarity is illustrated in the case of the arrest warrant issued against 
Al-Senussi, former Libyan intelligence chief and brother-in-law of Colonel Muam-
mar	Gaddafi,	where	the	Court	declared	the	case	inadmissible	because	it	was	under	
national investigation by competent Libyan authorities.14 
Beyond formal complementarity as entrenched in the Rome Statute, the OTP 
has shown support for the concept of positive complementarity. The measures taken 
by the Prosecutor to encourage proceedings at the national level include establish-
ing a database and training programs for national prosecutors in order to increase 
their capacities on the ground.15 Guinea and Colombia are two examples of the 
application of positive complementarity. In Colombia, preliminary analyses have 
played a role in undertaking national investigations and prosecutions concerning 
crimes committed by mainly paramilitary structures.16 In Guinea, the Prosecutor’s 
proactive measures favoured national proceedings in response to the crimes com-
mitted during the events on 28 September 2009, when Guinean security forces 
massacred hundreds of opposition party members.17
Secondly,	the	functioning	of	the	OTP	is	influenced	by	the	method	of	referral	to	
the ICC. Within the Rome Statute, there are three ‘trigger mechanisms’18 that may 
activate the jurisdiction of the ICC, namely, referral by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC); referral by the State Party; and the initiation of proceedings mero 
11 Rome Statute, art. 17.
12 Ibid.
13 Mbokani (n 2) 1.
14 Prosecutor v Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Abdullah 
Al-Senussi against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the 
admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi,’ (24 July 2014) ICC-01/11-01/11, paras 297-298.
15 ICC-OTP, ‘Communication relative à certaines questions de politique générale concernant le BDP’ 
(2003) 4; Mbokani (n 2) 20.
16 FIDH,	‘Office	of	the	Prosecutor	of	the	ICC	-	9	years	later’	(December	2011),	No.	5971,	5.
17 ICC-OTP, ‘Statement to the Guinean Press’ (24 May 2010) para 5. See also FIDH (n 16) 20.
18 W Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial discretion versus judicial activism at the International Criminal Court’ 
(2008) 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 5.
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motu by the OTP itself.19	In	the	first	two	cases	neither	the	Prosecutor,	nor	judges	
have any discretionary power in respect of the Court’s jurisdiction. This may be 
regarded as an entrenchment of respect for state sovereignty by way of the act of 
the state referring the matter and deference to the international community (acting 
collectively through the UNSC).
Experience in relation to self-referrals has shown that investigations have 
mostly	only	focused	on	one	party	to	the	conflict.20 This represents a further de facto 
limitation as regards the scope of the OTP’s activities. Some have associated this 
limitation with a lack of impartiality on the part of the OTP.21
In deciding whether or not to initiate an investigation, the OTP considers 
three factors:22 whether the information in its possession provides a reasonable 
basis to believe that a crime falling under the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed;23 whether the matter would be admissible, which involves assessing 
the notion of ‘gravity’;24 and whether initiation of proceedings would serve the 
‘interests of justice.’25 The criteria of ‘gravity’ and ‘interests of justice,’ in particu-
lar, provide the prosecution with a broad discretion in the exercise of its powers.26 
However, in practice the OTP is restrained by a lack of resources and also by the 
reality of having to operate regularly in a hostile environment, where its activi-
ties may be obstructed.27 The OTP must therefore choose from among the many 
situations falling under the jurisdiction of the Court, those cases with a reasonable 
prospect of producing positive outcomes.28 It is submitted, however, the OTP can-
19 Rome Statute, arts. 13, 14 and 15. The prosecutor may also decide that there is simply no case and 
decide not to prosecute, subject to review of the decision by the Trial Chamber (see Rome Statute, art. 
53).
20 For example, the investigations in Kivu exclusively directed against FDLR. See in this regard Human 
Rights	Watch,	‘Un	travail	inabouti	-	Des	lacunes	à	combler	dans	la	sélection	des	affaires	traitées	par	la	
CPI’ (September 2011) 19.
21 See, for example, Mbokani (n 2) 10, 45.
22 Schabas (n 18) 6.
23 Rome Statute, art. 53(1)(a).
24 Rome Statute, arts. 17 and 53(1)(b).
25 Rome Statute, art. 53(1)(c).
26 Concerning the situation in Uganda, Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo declared: �If a solution to end the 
violence is found and that the proceedings do not appear to serve the interests of justice, then my duty 
is to stop” « Le Procureur de la CPI prêt à suspendre les poursuites si la paix l’exige », Agence France 
Presse, 16 April 2005 (cited in A Poitevin, ‘Cour pénale international: Les enquêtes et la latitude du 
Procureur’ (2004) 4 Droits Fondamentaux 1).
27 This was the case in Sudan for example.
28 I Fassassi, ‘Le Procureur de la CPI et le jeu d’échecs’ (2014) 3 Revue de droit international et de droit 
comparé 382.
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not function on the basis of expected positive outcomes, but rather in terms of its 
mandate to follow the evidence.
Undoubtedly, the method of referral has an impact on the prosecutions. In 
light of the principle of complementarity, the large number of crimes committed 
and the limited resources of the ICC, it is clear that a measure of selectivity is 
required.	The	OTP	must	therefore	put	in	place	a	well-defined	prosecutorial	strategy.
2.1.2 Operational challenges
In order to conduct investigations and proceedings, the OTP must have ac-
cess to the territory of the state in question. Though this point seems obvious, the 
OTP	actually	may	find	its	access	to	the	territory	denied.	This	was,	for	example,	the	
case in Darfur.29 Initially, the Sudanese authorities cooperated with the ICC and 
authorized the OTP to carry missions in Khartoum30 in order to determine whether 
national	proceedings	had	been	underta�en.	However,	when	the	ICC	issued	its	first	
warrants of arrest against Ahmad Harun, Assistant Minister in Charge of the Inte-
rior, and Ali Kushayb, the head of security and militia leader, all cooperation ceased 
and the access to the territory was denied.31 Worse still, after the ICC issued a war-
rant of arrest against President Al Bashir, he ordered the expulsion of international 
organisations working to improve the living conditions of the local population in 
refugee camps.32 The Sudanese Government also expelled any organisation collect-
ing information on the occurrence of sexual violence in Sudan.33
A second operational challenge relates to the search for, and securing of wit-
nesses.	In	respect	of	the	Sudan	conflict,	witnesses	were	often	interviewed	in	refu-
gee camps located in bordering states where there were hardly any structures to 
hear them and take their testimonies. Even if the structures were there, they were 
extremely limited and the health conditions were catastrophic.34 Cases of arbitrary 
arrests in the camps for internally displaced persons were also reported.35 Moreover, 





33 The Sudanese Government expelled 13 international NGOs (INGOs) and closed down three national 
NGOs. See L Tonnessen, ‘From impunity to prosecution? Sexual violence in Sudan beyond Darfur’ 
Noref Report	(February	2012)	3	<http://www.cmi.no/file/1939-noref-report.pdf>	accessed	9	November	
2015.
34 ‘Catastrophic conditions for Sudanese refugees in Chad’ Doctors without Borders 11 May 2004.
35 15th ICC Prosecutor’s Report (n 29) 11.
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during the attempts to put in place national proceedings, threats and acts of torture 
against some witnesses were reported as well as interferences from security forces.36
In the case of Kenya, the issue of witness interference was also problematic 
and led the prosecution to withdraw the charges against President Kenyatta.37 The 
same scenario occurred in the case of Muthaura, the former Head of Public Service 
and Secretary to the Cabinet,38 because a key witness’s testimony was withdrawn39 
and other witnesses were unwilling to testify for fear of possible repercussions. 
A few months later, a warrant of arrest was issued against a Kenyan journal-
ist40 for perverting the course of justice. Walter Barasa was suspected of bribery or 
attempted bribery of three prosecution witnesses in the trial of the Deputy President 
William Ruto. It is said that he promised them money so that they can withdraw 
from testifying. More importantly, eight witnesses were unwilling to cooperate or 
declared that they were not ready to testify.41 As a result, the Prosecutor asked the 
Kenyan authorities to take the necessary measures to ensure and guarantee security 
for the said witnesses until they appear in Court. 
In the case of the DRC there have also been legal complications with respect 
to witnesses, particularly in the case of three defence witnesses who participated in 
the Katanga case and who applied for asylum in the Netherlands. The ICC secured 
their transfer from the DRC to The Hague, but encountered problems when a Dutch 
judge denied their request for asylum. This situation illustrates the remaining com-
plications as regards state cooperation with the Court. The use of videoconference 
technology may be considered as a viable option, but must be done in the presence 
of	a	presiding	officer	for	testimonies	in situ. 
Finally,	it	is	very	difficult	to	arrest	fugitives	without	cooperation	from	govern-
ments. At present, nine suspects are still at large. The most famous among them 
is the current President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir. The warrants of arrest issued 
against him in 2009 and 2010 did not prevent him from being elected to public of-
fice.	Nor	did	it	prevent	him	from	travelling	to	more	than	ten	states	without	the	fear	
36 Ibid 10.
37 See, for example, the fears relating to the safety of witnesses cited in N Kulish and M Simons, ‘Setbacks 
rise in prosecuting the President of Kenya’ New York Times 19 July 2013.
38 Ibid.
39 ICC, ‘Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the notice to withdraw charges against Muthaura’ (11 March 
2013).
40 ‘Evenson: First time arrest warrant has been issued in Kenyan case’ DW 2 October 2013.
41 ICC Press Release, ‘Ruto and Sang case: Chamber V(a) calls upon eight witnesses to appear and re-
quests the Kenyan Government’s cooperation’ 17 April 2014. 
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of being arrested, even though some of these states are parties to the Rome Statute 
and as such are under an obligation to cooperate with the ICC in respect of his ar-
rest and surrender.
The leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Joseph Kony, is another infamous 
fugitive before the Court. His infamy is largely the result of a popularised viral 
video,42 which explained his alleged involvement in the enrolment of over 20 000 
child soldiers. In view of the pressure from the international community it was 
reasonable to believe that the warrant of arrest (issued in 2005) was going to be 
executed. Unfortunately, the lack of cooperation from member states allows him to 
continue taking part in activities that may amount to war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. 
The	difficulties	faced	by	the	OTP	constitute	a	real	hurdle	to	international	jus-
tice. It is, therefore, important that the Prosecutor continuously takes into consid-
eration these challenges and adapts his strategy as the situation demands. However, 
any	strategy	will	ultimately	be	ineffective	without	the	cooperation	of	states.	
2.2	 Initial	strategy	of	the	OTP43
2.2.1 Principles of the initial strategy of 2003
The extent and the number of violations of international crimes is such that 




Prosecutor of the Court, Luis Moreno Ocampo – is built around three guiding prin-
ciples: the principle of complementarity; the principle of targeted investigations 
and prosecutions; and the principle of ‘maximizing the impact of the activities of 
the OTP.’44
42 See the website of the Invisible Children campaign <http://invisiblechildren.com/kony-2012> accessed 
11 November 2015.
43 The content of this point is also inspired by the presentation of the Serge Brammertz, Prosecutor of 
the ICTY, during the third edition of intensive courses on human rights and international criminal law, 
held on 18 August 2014 in Kinshasa. See Serge Brammertz �Procès pénal international : Stratégies de 
poursuite des crimes internationaux » in Recueil des cours intensifs sur les droits de l’homme et le droit 
international pénal (March 2015).
44 ICC-OTP, Rapport relatif à la stratégie en matière de poursuites (2006) 6.
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The	second	principle	entails	that	the	OTP	focuses	its	efforts	only	on	‘the	most	
serious crimes and on the people bearing the greatest responsibility.’45 Accordingly, 
the OTP selects a limited number of incidents and a limited number of witnesses.46 
This aspect relates to the ‘gravity’ of the crimes that constitutes a condition of ad-
missibility as mentioned above.47 As such, the OTP has discretionary power in de-
termining the level of gravity. The investigation and prosecution of crimes that do 
not measure up to the gravity threshold are left to national criminal justice systems. 
The purpose of this is to limit the number of prosecutions so as to avoid the long 
proceedings we could observe at the ad hoc tribunals. 
Concerning the third principle, the OTP aimed to prevent the commission of 
international crimes. In practice, the dissemination of information in relation to the 
opening of investigations and the idea of monitoring a situation could play a key 
role in prevention, since they increase the risk of sanction even before the start of 
any criminal proceedings.
2.2.2 Critical assessment of the initial strategy of prosecution
Following	the	first	investigations,	prosecutions	and	judgments,	several	critical	
observations were made in respect to the second and third principles. It was argued 
that the policy of targeted investigations led to cases that were unrepresentative 
of all crimes committed. In this regard, Prosecutor Ocampo wanted to avoid long 
proceedings	and	justified	this	choice	by	highlighting	the	necessity	of	 ta�ing	into	
consideration the implications of security and safety for the victims of investiga-
tions	and	prosecutions	conducted	during	ongoing	armed	conflicts.48
The prosecution of Lubanga was criticised on the basis that the charges 
brought against him were formulated too narrowly and were thus not representa-
tive	enough	of	the	crimes	committed	in	the	DRC	conflict.49 In this case, the accused 
was only prosecuted for recruitment, enrolment and use of child soldiers,50 which 
represented only a tiny sample of the crimes committed. The OTP had announced 
45 See Invisible Children (n 42).
46 Ibid.
47 Mbokani (n 2) 36.
48 FIDH (n 16) 10.
49 Human Rights Watch, ‘CPI: Procès de Bosco Ntaganda pour crimes qui auraient été commis en DRC, 
Questions et réponses au sujet du procès tenu à la CPI’ (27 August 2015). 
50 Prosecutor v Lubanga (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-01/06, para 1.
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that it would add extra charges, but never did.51 As a result, only a small number of 
victims were able to participate in the case.
In the Katanga case, the charges covered a wider range of crimes, but related 
to only one incident, namely, the attack on Bogoro Village in 2003. The OTP was 
criticised for only focusing on this attack when many other, arguably, more serious 
attacks involving many more victims had taken place.52 However, the Prosecutor 
recently53 implemented a new strategy that has widened the scope of charges.54
With respect to the third principle (the goal of prevention), criticisms focused 
on the idea of prosecuting only those who bear the greatest responsibility for inter-
national	crimes.	The	OTP	made	this	part	of	the	strategy	official	in	its	‘Communica-
tion in relation to some general policy issues’ of September 2003, and emphasized 
the need to focus on ‘heads of state or organisations presumed to be responsible for 
the crimes.’55 Some observations arising from NGOs and victims’ associations56 
were	heard	after	 the	first	 investigations	and	prosecutions,	mainly	concerning	 the	
trials of Lubanga57 and Katanga.58
The Rome Statute does not limit the jurisdiction of the Court only to ‘those 
persons bearing the greatest responsibility.’59 According to Article 1 of the Statute, 
personal jurisdiction of the ICC is exercised over ‘the most serious crimes of inter-
national concern.’60 Focusing on perpetrators bearing the greatest responsibility in 
respect of international crimes is a way of meeting the gravity threshold that is built 
into the Rome Statute.61 As William Schabas observes, Pre-Trial Chamber I makes 
a	lin�	between	the	threshold	of	gravity	and	the	focus	on	senior	state	officers.62 
According to the Chamber, the additional factor of gravity is composed of 
three elements: the hierarchical position of the persons; the role they played within 
51 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Prosecutor’s information on further investigations (28 June 2006) ICC-01/04-
01-06-170.
52 Ibid.
53 See mainly, Prosecutor v Sylvestre Mudacumura (13 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/12.
54 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan (June 2012-2015) 6.
55 ICC-OTP, Communication relating to certain issues of general policy concerning the OTP of September 
2003, point 2.15.
56 See, for example, FIDH (n 16) 10 and Security Council, S/Res/1534 (2004), 26 March 2004, para 5.
57 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ICC-01/04-01/06.
58 Prosecutor v Germain Katanga ICC-01/04-01/07.
59 Mbokani (n 2) 46.
60 Rome Statute, art. 1.
61 Mbokani (n 2) 36.
62 Schabas (n 18) 12.
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the state organs, organizations or armed groups to which they belong; and the role 
played by these state organs or groups in the perpetration of crimes.63 As we will see 
later on, the Appeal Chamber in Ntaganda dismissed these criteria without giving 
its own criteria for determining the gravity threshold.64 In Lubanga, the Chamber 
was of the opinion that it is only by focusing on these type of individuals (senior 
state	officers),	that	the	deterrent	effect	of	the	Court	can	be	maximized,	since	this	
sends	out	a	message	to	other	senior	state	officers	that	they	can	escape	the	attentions	
of the Court by preventing the occurrence of similar crimes.65
In addition to the above, there is also the issue of the compatibility of such cri-
teria	with	the	different	modes	of	responsibility	contained	in	the	Rome	Statute.	For	
example, the responsibility of the commander as provided under Article 28 of the 
Statute constitutes a lesser form of criminal responsibility. As a result, the ‘great-
est responsibility’ criterion may exclude prosecutions against some commanders.66
Additionally, the OTP has been criticised for a lack of coherence in the sense 
that the Prosecutor did not apply his strategy consistently. For instance, in Lubanga 
and Katanga it was alleged that the accused persons were not the ones bearing 
the greatest responsibility.67 Those bearing the greatest responsibility of the crimes 
committed in Ituri would be those who armed and supported the militias, including 
politicians and soldiers from foreign governments.68 In this case one is left with the 
impression	that	the	Prosecutor	exercised	his	discretion	with	a	view	to	finding	an	
accused that would be ‘accessible’ for the Court.69
Finally, the warrants of arrest issued against Bemba,70 the Vice-President of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Commander-in-Chief of the Movement for 
Liberation of Congo; against Al Bashir,71 the current President of Sudan; or even 
against	Gadhafi,	the	former	President	of	Libya,	brought	some	credibility	to	the	ICC.	
These indictments removed some of the doubts as regards the capacity of the OTP 
63 Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I decision of 10 Febru-
ary 2006 and the Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo (24 February 2006) ICC-01/04-01/06, para 54.
64 Ruling of the Appeals Chamber, ruling of 13 July 2006, Judgment on the appeal by the prosecutor 
against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the prosecutor’s request for the issuance 
of arrest warrants under Article 58’ para 82. 
65 Ibid paras 51-52.
66 Mbokani (n 2) 36.
67 See HCDH, Rapport du projet mapping de l’ONU, para 1025; Human Rights Watch (n 20) 13.
68 FIDH (n 16) 13.
69 Ibid 12.
70 Prosecutor v Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo ICC-01/05-01/08.
71 Prosecutor v Omar Hassan Al Bashir ICC-02/05-01/09.
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to	pursue	the	most	senior	state	officers,	even	if	the	question	of	their	arrest	remains	
problematic.
2.2.3 Reconciling the aims of peace and justice
The	issue	of	reconciling	peace	and	justice	was	raised	for	the	first	time	between	
2006 and 2007 during the peace negotiations in Uganda. A delegation of leaders 
from Northern Uganda approached the Prosecutor to express their fears that the 
investigation would harm the peace process. Threats of prosecutions could be an 
obstacle	to	the	signing	of	a	‘cease-fire’	agreement.72 Joseph Kony, against whom a 
warrant of arrest was issued in 2005, had demanded the cancellation of this warrant 
of arrest in exchange for signing the peace agreement with Uganda’s Government.73 
According to the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor shall not initiate an investi-
gation if it does not serve the ‘interests of justice.’74 Prosecutor Ocampo, while 
stressing that ‘impunity is not possible,’ stated that he could suspend prosecutions 
if they ‘do not serve the interests of justice or of the victims,’ adding that the main 
interest of victims now is their life.75	The	question	was	whether	the	effect	of	pros-
ecutions on peace negotiations is a factor that is included in Article 53, in other 
words,	whether	it	affects	the	determination	of	what	is	in	the	‘interests	of	justice.’	
Ultimately, the OTP argued that the issues of peace and international security were 
not part of its mandate.76
These concerns illustrate the dilemma faced by the Court. The Court must 
find	a	way	to	prosecuting	the	‘most	serious	crimes	of	concern	to	the	international	
community’ without taking the risk of creating an environment favourable to the 
prolongation	of	conflicts,	and	consequently	perpetuating	 the	commission	of	new	
crimes, which goes against the Court’s mandate.77 In other words, the Prosecutor 
faces the challenge of reducing the tension between peace and justice.
72 Poitevin (n 26) 2.
73 FIDH (n 16) 13.
74 Rome Statute, arts. 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c).
75 Déclaration du Procureur de la CPI et de la délégation de leaders Acholi du Nord de l’Ouganda Press 
Release ICC-OTP 2005-042-Fr.
76 ICC-OTP, Policy paper on the interest of justice (2007) 8.
77 Poitevin (n 26) 2.
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2.2.4 Sequential approach
According to the sequential approach, the OTP examines other groups to the 
conflict	only	after	completion	of	field	 investigations	of	a	particular	group.78 The 
OTP’s	approach	of	only	focusing	on	one	party	to	the	conflict	at	a	time,	as	it	was	the	
case in Ituri,79	or	of	announcing	the	possibility	of	prosecuting	some	officials	with-
out doing so,80 has raised questions regarding the impartiality of the ICC.
It has also been argued that such an approach would increase ethnic tensions81 
and the risk of destroying evidence.82 However, it seems that the OTP has realized 
the negative impact of this approach and tried to remedy it in the Kenya case by 
summoning members of the two opposing parties to appear and also by conducting 
parallel investigations around the two parties.83 
2.2.5 Timeline 
Lastly,	the	excessively	long	time	between	the	confirmation	of	charges	and	the	
trial stage as well as the extremely long duration of the preliminary examinations 
in some situations (particularly in Ivory Coast), have been criticized. In respect 
of preliminary examinations, the delay can be explained by the lack of access to 
information	and	evidence	(as	is	the	case,	for	example,	in	Afghanistan);	by	an	effec-
tive implementation of the principle of complementarity; or due to issues related to 
the jurisdiction of the Court (as is the case, for example, in Palestine).84 However, 
it remains hard to explain why the preliminary examinations in Ivory Coast took 
seven years.
78 ICC-OTP, Draft policy paper 12-13 (cited in Human Rights Watch (n 20) 22).
79 In	dealing	with	conflict	in	Ituri,	which	had	started	in	1999,	the	OTP	first	arrested	Lubanga	in	2006.	The	
latter was the leader of Union des patriotes congolais (Union of Congolese Patriots), a militia group 
associated	with	the	Hema	ethnic	group.	In	2007,	Germain	Katanga,	the	Chief	of	Staff	of	Forces de résis-
tance patriotiques in Ituri and a member of Ngiti ethnic community, was arrested. In 2008, Ngundjolo, 
former	Chief	of	Staff	of	Front nationaliste et intégrationniste, was also arrested. The delay in obtaining 
different	warrants	of	arrest	against	the	officials	of	different	parties	led	to	criticisms	relating	to	‘selec-
tiveness of justice.’ See Human Rights Watch, ‘Courting history: The landmark International Criminal 
Court’s	first	years’	(2008)	58.
80 L Moreno-Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, Speech to the Assembly of State Parties, New York (30 November 
2007)	4.	Thus,	for	example,	while	he	had	announced	the	possibility	of	prosecuting	officials	of	Ugandan	
Army, the statement never came to pass and no explanation was given.
81 Human Rights Watch (n 79) 58.
82 FIDH (n 16) 23.
83 Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang ICC 01/09-01/11 and Prosecutor v Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta ICC 01/09-02/11.
84 Ibid 20-21. It is important to note that Palestine has become a state party to the ICC.
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2.3	 General	policy	of	the	OTP	(2006-2009)
2.3.1 Guiding principles
According to the Draft Policy Paper of the OTP of 2006, it appears that there 
are four principles guiding the OTP in the decision to initiate an investigation, 
namely, independence, impartiality, objectivity and non-discrimination.85
Independence	requires	an	absence	of	influence	from	external	sources,	notably,	
in the context of cooperation (even considering the quality of that cooperation).86 
The OTP’s independence is also expressed through the power it has to open an 
investigation on its own initiative (as it did in Kenya). Nevertheless, the OTP has a 
policy that encourages and promotes voluntary referrals from states parties, which 
referrals remain the most used ‘trigger mechanism.’87 
The question is whether the policy of encouraging voluntary referral complies 
with the requirements of the principle of independence of the OTP. The answer to 
this question will actually depend on the choice of incidents and individuals who 
will be prosecuted. According to Human Rights Watch, it is clear that the ‘war-
rants of arrest issued so far in situations related to a voluntary referral only target 
rebel leaders.’88 It is easy to understand why a regime only refers its opponents to 
the ICC and is very cooperative in respect of those proceedings. In these circum-
stances the policy of encouraging voluntary referrals inevitably lead to discrimi-
natory	prosecutions	based	on	political	 affiliation.	 It	may	violate	 the	principle	of	
non-discrimination.89
Impartiality and objectivity are measured not only in the OTP’s ability to re-
spect and uphold the presumption of innocence and that of resisting pressure from 
public opinion, media, victims and even NGOs, but also in its ability to investi-
gate exonerating circumstances, as required by the Rome Statute.90 As regards the 
presumption of innocence, the OTP still has work to do concerning the making of 
potentially prejudicial statements in the media.91
85 General Policy of the OTP, First Draft 1-2 (cited in Human Rights Watch (n 79) 43).
86 Ibid. 
87 ICC-OTP, Rapport sur les activités mise en œuvre au cours des trois premières années (juin 2003-juin 
2006), 12 September 2006, 7. 
88 Human	Rights	Watch	(n	79)	46.	Clarification	that	the	case	where	voluntary	referral	targets	leaders	in	
power is Côté d’Ivoire (Warrant of arrest against Laurent Gbagbo after the disputed elections of 2010).
89 Mbokani (n 2) 8.
90 It is the spirit of Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute.
91 Consider, for example, the statement by Prosecutor Luis Moreno Ocampo cited by Mr. Nkwebe Advo-
cate (Defence Counsel of Bemba): ‘I have never lost a case and I don’t even think how I am going to 
99The International Criminal Court and the Fight against Impunity in Africa: Current Challenges
2.3.2 Investigation criteria
Three criteria guide the opening of an investigation by the OTP: the existence 
of a legal basis, admissibility and the interests of justice. Admissibility includes two 
criteria: complementarity (Article 17) and gravity (Article 17(1)(d)).
The gravity standard is a statutory criterion of admissibility.92 This criterion is 
difficult	to	assess	and	easily	leads	itself	to	subjective	interpretations.	In	his	strategy	
the OTP evaluates complementarity and gravity with respect to the most serious 
crimes allegedly committed by people who appear to bear the greatest responsi-
bility.93 The ‘interests of justice,’ as per Article 53(1)(c), consists of three elements: 
the exceptional nature of the context; the interpretation of Article 53 in accordance 
with the goals and objectives of the Rome Statute; and the distinction between the 
interests of justice, the interests of peace and victims’ interests.
2.4	 Selection	strategies	of	the	OTP	(2009-2012)
In a recent article, Ambos and Stegmiller critically assess the four fundamen-
tal principles at the heart of the strategy for selection of situations and trials at the 
OTP, namely, targeted investigations; positive complementarity; the interests of 
victims; and impact of the OTP activities.94
2.4.1 Targeted investigations
As mentioned above, this guiding principle consists in focusing on ‘the most 
serious crimes’ and ‘those who bear the greatest responsibility.’ While this termi-
nology	 allows	 for	 some	flexibility,	 the	 ICC	Prosecutor	 focuses	mainly	 on	 those	
perpetrators at the top of the hierarchy in the chain of command.95 The other cases 
are left to national criminal justice systems, encouraging territorial states and third 
states to take action. 
lose this.’ See also Article 34 of Rule of Procedure and Evidence.
92 Rome Statute, art. 17(1)(d).
93 Décision relative à la demande d’autorisation d’ouvrir une enquête dans le cadre de la situation au Ke-
nya, rendu en application de l’article 15, Chambre préliminaire II, , ICC-01/09-19-corr-tFRA, para 50.
94 K Ambos and I Stegmiller, ‘Prosecuting international crimes at the International Criminal Court: Is 
there a coherent and comprehensive prosecution strategy?’ (2013) 59(4) Crime, Law and Social Change 
415.
95 Ibid 394.
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As discussed above, the OTP initially adopted a sequential approach, inves-
tigating cases one by one and selecting them according to their gravity.96 The OTP 
has	 recently	adopted	a	more	flexible	approach.	 In	 the	proceedings	 in	 relation	 to	
Kenya, for example, the OTP has carried out simultaneous investigations, bringing 
two cases to be prosecuted at the same time (Prosecutor v William Samoei Ruto, 
Kiprono Henry Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang and Prosecutor v Francis Kirimi 
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali). The sequential 
approach is not explicitly contained in the 2009-2012 strategy.97
2.4.2 Positive complementarity
Concerning positive complementarity, where the Court encourages states to 
take their own initiatives regarding the prosecution of international crimes, it is ap-
propriate to recall that, in the Ituri, the OTP had collected several pieces of evidence 
against all active armed groups. This evidence may have been enough to enable 
national prosecutions. However, the OTP correctly invoked the absence of national 
legislation for protection of witnesses and victims to justify its refusal to cooperate. 
This is an example of where positive complementarity should intervene. However, 
the notion remains frustratingly inadequate.98 




the approach of positive complementarity in the country remains very theoretical. 
2.4.3 The interest of the victims
The third principle requires the OTP to examine systematically and continu-
ously the interests of victims within the framework of its activities. As such, vic-
tims can send information relating to the alleged crimes (called ‘communications’) 
to the OTP during the preliminary phase and written representations during an in-
vestigation.99 This allows the OTP to address a range of crimes. The interests of 
victims also constitute the basis for their participation in the judicial proceedings as 
96 ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecution Strategy (n 44) 5.
97 Ambos and Stegmiller (n 94) 395.
98 For this reason, the National Assembly in DRC is considering a Bill dealing with the protection of wit-
nesses and victims.
99 Rome Statute, art. 15; Prosecution Strategy of the OTP (2009-2012) 1 February 2010, para 22.
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provided for in the Rome Statute.100 Furthermore, the OTP will evaluate the inter-
ests of victims when determining the interests of justice as provided in Article 53. 
The judges in the Lubanga case pointed out that by virtue of Article 68(3) of 
the Rome Statute, the victims have attended the trial, asking for documents, ques-
tioning witnesses and presenting written and oral submissions (with the leave of the 
Chamber), with the assistance of their legal representatives. The need to take into 
account the interests of victims at all stages of the proceedings is a principle that 
forms part of the strategy of the Court regarding victims.
2.4.4 Optimisation of the impact of the activities of the OTP
The fourth guiding principle of the prosecution strategy aims to optimize the 
impact of the OTP’s activities from the preliminary analysis phase through to the 
trial phase.101 It is possible that ICC involvement in and of itself may have a deter-
rent	effect.	As	such,	the	fact	that	the	ICC	is	�nown	to	be	monitoring	a	situation	may	
prevent crimes from being committed, given that it creates a threat of punishment. 
This	effect	is	not	limited	to	the	situation	under	investigation,	but	applies	to	all	states	
parties and perhaps even globally.102
2.5	 The	new	strategy	of	the	OTP	(2012-2015)
In 2012, the appointment of Fatou Bensouda as the new Prosecutor brought 
about amendment of the OTP’s initial strategy. Bensouda sought to address some 
of the problems with the OTP’s initial strategy and also to react to the various criti-
cisms thereto. The prosecution strategy has thus been revised on several levels103 
and breaks away from previously established practices.
2.5.1 Perpetrators to be prosecuted
Concerning the selection of cases and perpetrators to be prosecuted, it is inter-
esting to note that the combination of the ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches 
as envisaged by the ad hoc tribunals seem to have been taken into account. The 
new strategy provides for prosecution with a limited number of mid-level and high 
ranking criminals in order to have a reasonable chance of getting a conviction for 
100 Prosecution Strategy of the OTP (n 99) para 22.
101 Ibid para 23.
102 Ibid 8.
103 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan (June 2012-2015) 11 October 2013.
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the main culprits. Moreover, the Prosecutor does not exclude prosecution of lower-
level crimes, especially when particular criminal conduct has gained notoriety.
2.5.2 Non-restrictive detailed investigations 
The	OTP’s	approach	to	investigations	has	been	redefined.	The	initial	concept	
of targeted investigations was replaced by the principle of ‘non-restrictive detailed 
investigations.’ Though the new principle preserves a certain aspect of the targeted 
approach, it nonetheless envisages the expansion of investigations in order to in-
crease and diversify the collection of evidence. Regarding the expansion of inves-
tigations, the OTP is now applying a staged approach, making use of presumptions 
in the initial phase that relies on broader notions of incriminating and potentially 
exculpatory (defence) evidence. Obviously, such a redirection of investigations 
would require additional resources to be spread over a number of years. 
The experience drawn from ad hoc tribunals also showed the need to focus 
on having access to quality information as well as the capability to analyse such 
information. The OTP should also put in place investigative standards regarding 
the selection of investigators and especially by encouraging the use of forensics. 
Recall that the quality of investigations is an issue that was raised with virulence 
by ICC’s judges in both the Lubanga and Ngudjolo cases.104 Quality investigations 
require adequate resources and good management. For example, the cost of sending 
Anglophone investigators with translators into Francophone countries, like in the 
Katanga trial, could easily have been avoided. 
In respect of the collection of evidence, the Prosecutor initially favoured an 
approach that ensured that the evidence collected, although limited in amount, was 
of	a	high	evidential	standard.	However,	with	the	new	objective	of	diversification	
of evidence, the OTP can address more adequately the problems associated with 
witnesses who were previously exposed, including their protection. Though the 
OTP	set	the	new	goal	of	being	ready	for	trial	right	from	the	stage	of	the	confirma-
tion of charges, in the Gbagbo case the Chamber found that ‘all the evidence of 
the	Prosecutor,	although	apparently	insufficient,	does	not	appear	to	lac�	relevance	
and probative value.’ Therefore, even though the judges did not drop the charges 
against Gbagbo they once again reprimanded the OTP for the weakness of its evi-
dence and investigations.105 
104 It was the case when the Chamber in Lubanga Trial ruled that: ‘The Prosecution would not have del-
egated its investigative powers to intermediaries despite the existing serious security problems.’ See 
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 (14 March 2012) ICC-01/04-
01/06, para 482.
105 S Maupas, ‘Faute de preuves, la CPI reporte le procès Laurent Gbagbo ’ France 24 (3 June 2013).
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2.5.3 Setting or widening a number of strategic goals
The Prosecutor created strategic objectives within the new strategy. Accord-
ing to the new objectives, the OTP must pay particular attention to sexual and gen-
der-based crimes as well as crimes against children. The nature of these crimes is 
taken into account in the determination of ‘gravity.’106 The OTP has also improved 
his contacts with the victims of such crimes by training its investigators to conduct 
interviews with victims of sexual and gender-based violence as well as to conduct 
psychosocial assessments to determine if the witness may be questioned without 
the risk of being re-traumatized.107
The new Prosecutor aligned with her predecessor by seeking to enhance com-
plementarity and cooperation with member states in the context of situations under 
preliminary examination or investigation.108 It must also put in place measures to 
strengthen	cooperation	between	states,	to	assist	the	affected	jurisdiction	so	as	to	en-
able	it	to	conduct	effective	investigations	and	prosecutions.	Ultimately,	it	should	be	
remembered that the Prosecutor:
unlike a chess player, is engaged in an endless game. He may case after case, trial after 
trial, get conviction of criminals, but his real opponent, is impunity itself. It is a mobile 
enemy that he has to defeat, but without never get subdued by it.109




ence, the ICC has focused almost exclusively on African suspects, including heads 
of state. This situation has fuelled criticisms, prominent among which is the notion 
that the ICC operates on the basis of an aggressive and discriminatory prosecution 
106 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan (2012-2015) 12.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid 31 (objective 4).
109 Fassassi (n 28) 392.
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policy against African people.111 In response to this critique, the ICC insists that it is 
simply following its mandate to put an end to impunity by pursuing those who bear 
the greatest responsibility for international crimes and, accordingly, that the Court 
is responding primarily in the best interest of African victims.112
3.1	 Overview	of	cases
To	overcome	 the	 ineffectiveness	of	 its	 judicial	organ	 in	prosecuting	crimes	
committed on its territory, the DRC - through a letter from President Joseph Kabila 
to the ICC – extended the competence of the ICC for the crimes described in the 
Rome Statute ‘in the entire country since the 1st of July 2002.’113
The ICC is currently engaged with six cases relating to the situation in the 
DRC, namely:
— Lubanga (conviction judgment);114
—	 Ngunjolo	(confirmation	of	acquittal	on	appeal);115
— Katanga (conviction judgment without appeal);116
—	 Mbarushimana	(no	confirmation	of	case);117
— Ntaganda (trial stage);118 and
— Mudacumura (arrest warrant).119
111 J Mbokani, ‘La Cour Pénale Internationale: Une cour contre les Africains ou une cour attentive à la 
souffrance	des	victimes	Africaines?’	(2013)	26(2)	Revue québécoise de droit international 44.
112 It is noteworthy that it is the UN Security Council that referred the Sudanese (Darfur) and Libyan situa-
tions to the ICC while the DRC, Uganda, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire and Mali referred 
themselves to the ICC.
113 Request by DRC for opening of ICC investigations in DRC signed by President Kabila (letter dated 3 
March 2004).
114 See Prosecutor v Lubanga (n 104); see also Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgement on the 
appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against his conviction (1 December 2014) ICC-01/04-01/06 A5.
115 The case against of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo were initially joined but later severed in 
November 2012 in. This led to a judgment of acquittal of Mr. Ngudjolo in December 2012 and con-
tinuation of the proceedings against G Katanga. See Judgement on the Prosecutor’s appeal against the 
decision of trial Chamber II entitled ‘Judgement pursuant to Art 74 of the Statute’.
116 Germain	Katanga	filed	an	appeal	 followed	by	 the	Prosecutor.	Then	Germain	Katanga	withdrew	this	
appeal and the prosecutor did likewise. See Judgement pursuant to art 74 of the Statute (7 March 2014) 
ICC-01/04-01/07.
117 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of the charges (10 December 2011) ICC-
01/04-01/10.
118 Prosecutor v Ntaganda, Decision pursuant to arts 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the charges 
of the Prosecutor against Bosco Ntaganda (9 June 2014) ICC-01/04-02/06.
119 Warrant of arrest (13 July 2012) ICC-01/04-01/12.
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In	these	cases,	the	ICC	is	contributing	to	the	fight	against	impunity	for	serious	
crimes in the DRC. Nevertheless, some concerns remain. These concerns relate in 
particular to the lack of any prosecutions following the investigation of crimes in 
Bukavu120 and also the lack of capacity building for internal justice in the context 
of	 ‘positive	 complementarity.’	The	 assessment	 of	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 the	 ICC’s	
actions in the DRC brings us back to the issue of the OTP’s strategy of narrow-
ing down the charges. The hopes of the victims have not been realized, especially 
in the Lubanga case, where, consequent to limited charges, a lot of victims were 
neglected, while those taken into account, namely child soldiers, have committed 
crimes themselves (even though at a lower level of responsibility).
3.2	 Normative	impact	of	the	ICC	at	the	international	level	
The	field	of	international	criminal	law	is	rather	young	and	the	Court’s	juris-
prudence contributes to the establishment and stabilisation of fundamental norms 
and principles. As regards the jurisprudence of the Court in cases concerning the 
DRC,	the	following	may	be	regarded	as	having	potentially	the	greatest	effect	on	the	
OTP’s activities: 
—	 The	 definition	 of	 the	 crime	 of	 participation	 of	 children	 in	 hostilities	
(Lubanga case); 
—	 The	definition	of	 the	concept	of	participation	 in	 the	crime	 (Mbarushi-
mana case); and
— The conditions under which the Chamber can modify the charges ini-
tially	defined	by	the	OTP	(Katanga case).
3.2.1 An indirect active participation in hostilities
It	is	important	to	stress	the	historic	decision	of	the	ICC	finding	the	Congolese	
militia leader, Thomas Lubanga, guilty of war crimes for recruiting and conscript-
ing	children	under	fifteen,	and	using	them	to	participate	actively	 in	hostilities	 in	
the DRC from 1 September 2002 to 13 August 2003. The Chamber concluded that 
active participation (of children) in the hostilities was committed because the child, 
despite being far from the front line, became a ‘potential target.’ To the Chamber, 
this ‘means that though absent from the place of hostilities, the child is still actively 
involved in it.’121 The Chamber held that:
120 It pertains to crimes committed when the town of Bukavu fell to the rebels led by Nkunda in 2004. See 
Human Rights Watch Report, ‘Crimes de guerre à Bukavu RDC’ (June 2004) 5.
121 Prosecutor v Lubanga, Résumé du jugement (14 March 2012) ICC -01/04-01/06-2842-tFra, para 24.
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The decisive factor, therefore, in deciding if an ‘indirect’ role is to be treated as active 
participation in hostilities is whether the support provided by the child to the combatants 
exposed him or her to real danger as a potential target. […] these combined factors – 
the child’s support and this level of consequential risk – mean that although absent from 
the immediate scene of the hostilities the individual was nonetheless actively involved in 
them.122
For Eric David, assessing active participation of children in hostilities in the 
light of a risk criterion - that of becoming a target of hostilities - the Chamber 
clearly solved the problem of determining the notion of active participation of chil-
dren in hostilities.123	For	the	OTP,	it	means	a	clarification	of	the	evidence	needed	to	
prove	that	the	crime	of	child	enrolment	in	the	conflict	has	been	committed.	Here,	
the level of evidence has been lowered.
3.2.2 The scope of criminal participation
In the Mbarushimana	case,	the	definition	of	criminal	participation	concerned	
the Executive Secretary of the Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda (FDLR), 
who	was	 the	 fourth	or	fifth	person	 in	 the	hierarchy	commanding	 the	movement	
(after the President and two Vice-Presidents). However, for the majority of the Pre-
Trial Chamber, he was essentially the spokesperson of the movement in Paris, and 
had no authority over the military leaders and soldiers of the FDLR in Rwanda.124 
He was therefore not able to contribute in the crimes committed by the FDLR. 
On the contrary, Judge Sanji Monageng Mmasenomo held that Mbarushima-
na’s encouragement of crimes in press releases constituted a contribution to the 
crimes (material element)125 committed with intention.126 Eric David expressed his 
regret over the abandonment of the prosecution against Mbarushimana by a major-
ity of judges in the following terms:
Law is not an exact science and the subjectivity of judges often outweighs realities that can 
seem rather objective. We can conclude that it lead to impunity for Mbarushimana whose 
crimes will forever remain unpunished.127 
122 See Prosecutor v Lubanga (n 104) para 628.
123 E	David,	‘CPI:	Principales	avancées,	défis	et	leçons	à	tirer	des	premiers	cas’	(2015)	Recueils des cours 
intensifs sur les droits de l’homme et le droit international pénal 3ème édition, 2.
124 Prosecutor v Mbarushimana, Decision on the confirmation of charges (16 December 2011) ICC-01/04-
01/10, para 297.
125 Ibid paras 105 and 112.
126 Ibid Paras 116 and 122.
127 David (n 123) 2.
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3.2.3	 Requalification	of	charges
Rule 55 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Court pertains to the 
requalification	of	charges	against	the	accused	and	provides	for	the	opportunity	to	
‘change the legal characterization of the charges so that they are consistent with the 
crimes provided under Articles 6, 7 or 8 and with the form of participation of the 
accused in the said crimes under Articles 25 and 28.’ In such cases, the Chamber 
shall inform the participants in the proceedings of such a possibility, and shall al-
low them ‘to make oral or written submission and may suspend the proceedings to 
ensure	that	participants	have	the	time	and	facilities	needed	to	prepare	effectively	for	
the consequences of this change.128 
The application of Rule 55 remained the most controversial debate over pro-
cedure in the Katanga	case.	The	Chamber	applied	 the	 requalification	of	charges	
to the form of responsibility. The initial form considered by the OTP was ‘direct 
perpetrator of the crimes’ committed in Bogoro (Rome Statute, Art. 25(3)(a)), and 
was	modified	as	 ‘complicity’	of	 these	crimes	 (Rome	Statute,	Art.	25(3)(d)).	The	
participants	in	the	proceedings	were	informed	of	the	requalification	and	were	able	
to	ma�e	submissions	in	respect	of	such	requalified	charges.129 
Judge Van Den Wyngaert issued a dissenting opinion in which she held that 
the	defence	did	not	have	enough	time	to	prepare	for	the	requalification	of	charges	
and that Articles 67 and 74 of the Rome Statute had been violated. The majority of 
the Chamber responded to these criticisms by noting that the defence did take ad-
vantage of the latitudes granted by the Chamber.130	The	majority	justified	the	need	
for	requalification	on	the	basis	of	the	hierarchical	authority	that	Katanga	possessed	
and the supply of arms to the Ngiti militia that attacked the Hemas of Bogoro, 
which was organized under his supervision (material elements);131 combined with 
his acknowledgement of having wanted to attack Bogoro132 as well as his personal 
knowledge regarding the methods of warfare used in Ituri and the ruthless reputa-
tion of the Ngiti combatants (mental element).133
128 Prosecutor v Katanga (n 58) para 1438.
129 Ibid para 1493 et  seq.
130 Ibid para 1587.
131 Ibid para 1680.
132 Ibid para 1682.
133 Ibid para 1685 et seq.
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3.2.4 The Katanga judgment: Controversies and contributions
A few points from the Katanga judgment are worthy of special consideration. 
Some have argued that the Katanga judgment was a small step in the right direction 
and also a signal to perpetrators that justice shall be done. Others saw it as a missed 
opportunity. As Carsten Stahn noted, ‘it is a bit unfortunate for justice that the key 
points and the disputed legal questions remain unanswered after several years of 
trial and without the possibility of appeal to resolve the outstanding issues.’134 
Originally, Katanga was accused jointly with Mathieu Ngunjolo. The Pros-
ecutor alleged that the two accused had a common criminal plan to ‘wipe out’ Bo-
goro, which resulted in the commission of crimes by Front for Patriotic Resistance 
of Ituri and Nationalist and Integrationist Front combatants.135 Stahn noted that the 
Prosecution failed to establish the necessary degree of command and control either 
by Katanga or Ngunjolo to ensure a conviction.136 The indictment contained impor-
tant	flaws,	both	in	terms	of	the	legal	qualifications	and	evidence.137 The Trial Cham-
ber	acquitted	Ngunjolo	in	December	2012,	arguing	that	‘it	could	not	find	beyond	
reasonable	doubt	that	the	accused	was	the	leader	of	the	Lendu	fighters	who	too�	
part in the Bogoro attack on 24 February 2003.’138 As for Katanga, he was convicted 
on	the	basis	of	the	requalification	of	his	mode	of	responsibility.	The	majority	held	
that the contribution of Katanga strengthened the capacity of the militia to lead the 
attack on Bogoro and enabled its implementation. The main point of disagreement 
between the judges revolved around the interpretation of Article 25(3)(d)(ii) and 
the assessment of the charges and evidence. It is important to note that Katanga had 
made an admission of guilt. This was a major reason for the majority’s reliance on 
Rule 55 to requalify the charges.139
A notable contribution of the Katanga case is the application of the concept 
of ‘indirect co-perpetration’ in order to establish joint responsibility of the accused 
persons	 for	 the	actions	of	 their	own	fighters	by	virtue	of	Article	25(3)(a).	Stahn	
states that this concept introduces the idea that individuals can be held responsible 
as indirect perpetrators for crimes committed by others, under pressure existing 
134 C Stahn, ‘Justice delivered or justice denied? The legacy of the Katanga judgment’ (2014) Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 4.
135 Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngunjolo, Ruling on confirmation of charges, ICC-01/04-01/07-717.
136 Stahn	(n	134)	5;	on	the	basis	of	the	charges	confirmed	by	the	Pre-Trial	Chamber	on	21	November	2012.
137 Ibid 26.
138 Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 (18 December 2012) ICC-01/04-
02/12-3, para 503. 
139 The Court would be criticized for not convicting someone who had pleaded guilty of the charges lev-
elled against him.
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within the structure of power. Thus, for the majority of the judges, the control of 




the perpetrator and that a lack of consent does not need to be demonstrated positive-
ly in cases of rape.141	These	two	important	additions	clarified	the	definitional	scope	
of these crimes and, in so doing, made a valuable contribution towards substantive 
international criminal law. 
3.3	 Normative	impact	of	the	ICC	at	the	national	level	
3.3.1 An impact limited by external factors
The	DRC	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	on	11	April	2002,	thereby	presenting	the	
Court	with	 its	first	cases	as	well	as	 its	first	opportunity	 to	apply	the	principle	of	
complementarity.142 The transposition of the Rome Statute’s provisions into the 
Congolese Military Penal Code had a noticeable but small impact on the domestic 
level. Military courts based in some provinces were able to try cases of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. However, the transposition was incomplete because 
the	definitions	of	war	crime,	crime	against	humanity	and	genocide	are	not	identical	
to those given in the Rome Statute.143	The	Military	Penal	Code	confuses	the	defini-
tions of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ as provided in the Rome Stat-
ute.144 Consequently, there is a concern about the ICC’s ability to usher in reform in 
national judicial sectors.
Nonetheless, the impact of the ICC on prosecutions and arrests at the national 
level has been limited by a number of external factors for which the Court cannot 
be held responsible. The main obstacle is the fact that the OTP relies on the coop-
140 Stahn (n 134) 15.
141 Prosecutor v Katanga (n 58) para 963.
142 Some	Congolese	lawyers	also	consider	that	the	ratification	of	the	Rome	Statute	by	the	DRC	is	vitiated	
by irregularities. Balanda, for example, notes that ‘lack of an enabling law consequently vitiates the 
procedure	of	ratification	of	this	category	of	treaties	by	the	Head	of	State.’	See also JK Mpiana, ‘A Cour 
Pénale Internationale et la République Démocratique du Congo : 10 ans après. Étude de l’impact du 
Statut de Rome dans le droit interne Congolais’ (2012) 25(1) Revue québécoise de droit international 
57-90. Bula	Bula	 (cited	by	Mpiana)	 indicates	 that	 the	Rome	Statute	was	ratified	by	 the	DRC	under	
conditions which did not guarantee ‘transparency of the process.’ 
143 M Adjani and G Mushiata, ‘L’impact du Statut de Rome et de la CPI en RDC’ (2010) Rapport ICTJ 4. 
144 Mpiana (n 142) 6.
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eration of the national police to investigate and arrest suspects. This is an area in 
which	there	is	a	�nown	lac�	of	effectiveness	and	consistency	in	general.	The	un-
derlying obstacle here is political, which explains the incomplete support of mem-
ber states and the African Union for the OTP’s activities. Furthermore, the Court 
must	not	be	considered	accountable	for	the	difficulty	of	creating	a	proper	legislative	
framework and the lack of judicial reform in the DRC. Thus, the normative impact 
of	the	ICC	is	connected	to	efforts	made	at	the	political	level.	In	order	to	be	effective,	
these	efforts	must	be	coordinated	on	both	sides.	Such	efforts	could	then	lead	to	the	
prosecution of warlords in Ituri, in addition to the current rebel leaders imprisoned 
in	The	Hague.	Unfortunately,	most	of	the	‘big	fish’	still	enjoy	impunity.
3.3.2 Consequences for the search and preparation of witnesses
The Lubanga trial raised various questions as regards the reliability and cred-
ibility	of	prosecution	witnesses.	The	first	of	these	related	to	the	use	of	intermediar-
ies	by	the	prosecution	to	find	witnesses.	In	order	to	locate	witnesses	on	the	ground,	
the Prosecutor made use of intermediaries. The Prosecutor explain the use of inter-
mediaries as follows: 
[...]	due	to	the	difficulties	in	the	DRC	and	the	OTP’s	lac�	of	a	police	force,	it	was	necessary	
to rely on intermediaries. It is suggested that their role was limited, in the sense that the 
intermediaries were excluded from the decision-making process and, save exceptionally, 
when the witnesses were screened and interviewed.145 
After examining the testimonies of witnesses procured by intermediaries, the 
Chamber criticized this method of locating witnesses on the basis that some witness 
statements so obtained contained notable inconsistencies and should not have been 
considered as evidence. The Chamber held the view that:
the prosecution should not have delegated to intermediaries its investigative responsibilities 
in the manner discussed in the judgment, regardless of the many security challenges it 
faced. This trial has seen the appearance of a series of people whose testimony cannot 
serve as a reliable basis for judgment, due to the fact that three of the main intermediaries 
acted without proper supervision.146 
Furthermore, the Chamber observed that the lack of proper supervision of the 
intermediaries leads to another consequence of leaving them the opportunity to 
145 Prosecutor v Lubanga (n 104) para 181.
146 Ibid para 17.
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abuse the situation of witnesses with whom they developed a relationship.147 The 
Chamber concluded that there was a risk that intermediaries could have persuaded, 
encouraged or assisted witnesses to give false testimony. It could be that these 
intermediaries	are	guilty	of	the	offenses	referred	to	in	Article	70	of	the	Statute.148
A	further	question	concerned	the	issue	of	‘witness	proofing.’	‘Witness	proof-
ing’ broadly refers to the ‘coaching’ of witnesses before the hearing, rehearsing 
examination-in-chief and preparation for cross-examination to which these wit-
nesses may be subjected. Some common law systems seem to allow this prac-
tice of ‘chambering’ the witness. Nonetheless, it creates an environment in which 
witnesses can be bribed more easily in order to commit perjury.149 The ICC has 
excluded	witness	proofing	on	the	basis	that	this	practice	was	not	a	general	principle	
of internal procedure. It stated that its use at other international criminal tribunals 
was	not	transposable	to	the	ICC,	where	the	rules	of	procedure	are	different,	and	that	
it	affects	the	spontaneity	of	witness	testimony.	The	Chamber,	however,	stated	that	
this did not preclude a pre-hearing meeting with the Victims and Witnesses Unit 
(VWU) of the Court, but only for the purpose of familiarizing witnesses with the 
place of the hearing and the procedure to be followed.150
3.4	 Impact	of	the	ICC	on	prevention	and	reconciliation
In order to appreciate the prospect for prevention and reconciliation in the 
DRC, two observations have to be made. First, the DRC has had roughly 42 armed 
groups within its territory (many of which are still active). As such, the ICC alone 
cannot	produce	a	deterrent	effect	and	must	be	supported	by	 the	national	 judicial	
system, which must be reinforced and strengthened. The ICC’s deterrent impact is 
mostly non-existent in the Eastern part of the country, where most of the tensions 
and	conflicts	are	concentrated.	Secondly,	the	Court	has	heard	only	two	cases,	where	
two out of three accused were convicted. Thus, it is important to remember that the 
Court is still very young and its work without precedent. It will take time for inter-
national criminal justice to be legitimate and real to people. More than anything, 
this will require the risk of prosecution to be internalized. Accordingly, the recent 
discovery of two mass graves in Kibumba in Eastern DRC, the most dangerous part 
of the country, where the forces of M23 executed their victims, including children, 
147 Ibid para 18.
148 Ibid paras 482-484.
149 David (n 123) 2.
150 Prosecutor v Lubanga (n 104) paras 29-35. 
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women and the elderly,151 is not surprising and must not be interpreted immediately 
as resulting from the ICC’s impossibility to have an impact on prevention in the 
long-term.
Furthermore,	 the	ICC’s	ability	 to	prevent	 future	crimes	 is	difficult	 to	deter-
mine because there are so many interrelated factors.152 No national system has been 
able to succeed in deterring criminal conduct. Whiting stresses that the ICC will 
probably not be in a position to deter the next violent dictator. However, the Court 
may be able to limit the actions of such future perpetrators by creating standards, 
which will limit the space in which to commit crimes.153 According to Whiting, it 
could	ta�e	decades	before	a	deterrent	effect	can	be	observed	in	the	world,	but	there	
are already indications that the Court contributes to the stabilisation of international 
criminal norms.154
However, a number of factors will limit the ICC’s impact on prevention and 
reconciliation in the future. As regards the goal of prevention, it is important to con-
sider	that	only	one	or	two	people	per	conflict	are	arrested	or	brought	to	trial,	which	
means	that	conflicts	can	continue	or	resume	very	easily.	Furthermore,	all	trials	and	
sentencing proceedings are conducted abroad (The Hague), away from the scene of 
the	conflict	in	which	the	crimes	were	committed.
Accordingly,	it	is	less	li�ely	that	people	will	be	affected	psychologically	in	a	
way that will deter them from committing crimes. First, arrests are very rare, which 
creates an environment wherein there is little risk of being arrested. Second, if they 
are made, arrests are seldom immediately executed, which means that, while peo-
ple may respond to an immediate threat of arrest, that threat is largely hypothetical 
and	also	unli�ely	to	ta�e	place	in	the	immediate	future.	Third,	arrests	are	difficult	
since	the	ICC	relies	on	the	effort	of	national	police,	which	ma�es	the	ICC	ineffec-
tive in that it often poses no real threat to perpetrators of international crimes in 
the highest echelons of government. Finally, convicted perpetrators are imprisoned 
extra-territorially and so, the threat and stigma of imprisonment is a less tangible 
threat to the local populace than would otherwise have been the case. 
As regards the role of the ICC in reconciliation, Siou argues that:
151 Speech by the DRC before the Assembly of State Parties to the ICC on 20 November 2013.
152 D	Subrahmanyam,	‘Whiting	offers	views	on	the	International	Criminal	Court’s	impact’	Harvard Law 
Today 15 October 2012.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
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The	mandate	of	the	Court	officially	limits	its	range	of	actions	to	determining	cases	and	
setting the amount reparations for the victims. This leads to consider the impact of the ICC 
on prevention and reconciliation given a time frame. Thus, the question of how can the 
ICC impact on prevention and reconciliation translates into when can the ICC impact on 
prevention and reconciliation.155 
Moreover, Siou argues that the psychological impact of the judgment and rep-
arations	on	the	victims	lies	within	the	framewor�	of	the	particular	conflict.	Defining	
good and evil; establishing the truth; and providing the feeling that justice has been 
done, are three essential elements to reconciliation that international criminal jus-
tice can provide.156 The fact that only a few individuals are arrested and imprisoned 
extra-territorially limits the potential for reconciliation via international criminal 
justice. Thus, the impact of the ICC is more likely to be felt in the long-term than 
in the short-term.157
To increase its impact in the short-term, Siou suggests that the ICC could 
work with local actors on the allocation of reparations for the victims. The Fund for 
Victims has an important role to play in this regard.158 However, obstacles remain. 





The ICC’s mandate is to put an end to impunity for serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole. As part of this mandate, the OTP is 
called upon, inter alia,	to	conduct	quality	investigations;	to	formulate	an	effective	
prosecution strategy; to act in the interests of the victims; and to encourage the 
prevention and prosecution of international crimes on the national level (positive 
complementarity). Having assessed the situation in the DRC, it is clear that a more 
concerted	effort	is	needed	in	order	for	the	ICC	to	be	effective	in	Africa.	The	OTP’s	
ability to meet its current challenges is vital for the credibility of the ICC. It is also 
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vital for supporters of the Court (state parties and the United Nations); those who 
have	not	yet	ratified	the	Rome	Statute	(non-state	parties);	and	civil	society	to	coop-
erate and assist the Court in the execution of its mandate. 
Finally, to echo Brammertz, we may wonder whether this is the beginning of 
the end of the ‘naivety’ surrounding international criminal justice.160 One thing is 
true;	the	Court	alone	should	not	bear	all	criticisms	relating	to	the	failures	in	the	fight	
against	impunity	in	Africa	and	elsewhere.	In	order	to	effectively	fulfil	its	mandate,	
the ICC needs the support and cooperation of the international community. The lat-
ter has repeatedly declared its commitment to ending impunity for the most serious 
crimes.	Cooperation	with	the	ICC	is	a	concrete	way	to	give	effect	to	this	objective.
The long-term value of the Rome Statute system lies in both the punishment 
of	perpetrators	and	prevention	of	future	crimes.	There	have	been	some	significant	
contributions in this regard. But as the Court enters its second decade of existence, 
it	will	have	to	improve	its	effectiveness	in	the	fight	against	impunity	whilst	main-
taining respect for the rule of law. Moreover, if African states are serious about the 
fight	against	impunity,	they	must	demonstrate	it	through	action	at	the	national	level.	
This	is	the	price	to	pay	in	order	for	the	fight	for	justice	to	have	meaning.
160 S Brammertz, ‘International justice: Beginning of the end, or end of the beginning?’ Conference Paper, 
Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, Washington University in St Louis, School of Law, 3 March 
2015.
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Abstract
The success of the project of international criminal justice is primarily vested in the 
willingness and ability of national courts to investigate and prosecute those most 
responsible for crimes under international law and to cooperate effectively with 
other states and international courts in respect of efforts to bring such offenders 
to account. It is widely anticipated that the prioritisation of indirect enforcement 
of international criminal law will, in the long run, offer not only a more realistic, 
but also a more efficient means of ending the culture of impunity in respect of 
international crime. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the 
prioritisation of indirect enforcement of international criminal law will raise new 
and unique challenges.
The article seeks to draw general lessons for states and domestic courts from the 
successes and failures of the application of international criminal law in South 
Africa. It explores whether domestic courts offer an effective, legitimate and 
credible means for securing justice in respect of the crimes contained in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court and reflects on some of the essential 
prerequisites for domestic courts to be so enabled.
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1 Introduction
The success of the project of international criminal justice is primarily vested 
in the willingness and ability of national courts to investigate and prosecute those 
most	 responsible	 for	crimes	under	 international	 law	and	 to	cooperate	effectively	
with	 other	 states	 and	 international	 courts	 in	 respect	 of	 efforts	 to	 bring	 such	 of-
fenders to account. This movement towards indirect enforcement of international 
criminal law represents arguably the	defining	characteristic	of	the	modern	system	
of international criminal justice. It is widely anticipated that the prioritisation of in-
direct	enforcement	of	international	criminal	law	will,	in	the	long	run,	offer	not	only	
a	more	realistic,	but	also	a	more	efficient	means	of	ending	the	culture	of	impunity	
in respect of international crime. Notwithstanding the optimism that generally sur-
rounds this development, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the prioritisation 




the enforcement and application of international criminal law in domestic courts. 
These	are,	first,	the	Constitutional	Court’s	judgment	on	universal	jurisdiction	and	
the obligation to investigate international crimes committed beyond the borders 
of South Africa.2 Secondly, South Africa’s duty to arrest a (sitting) head of state 
subject to International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court) arrest warrants for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.3
The article seeks to draw general lessons for states and domestic courts from 
the successes and failures of the application of international criminal law in South 
Africa.	It	explores	whether	domestic	courts	offer	an	effective,	legitimate	and	cred-
ible means for securing justice in respect of the crimes contained in the Rome Stat-
ute	of	the	ICC	(Rome	Statute)	and	reflects	on	some	of	the	essential	prerequisites	for	
domestic courts to be so enabled. 
1 See generally N Roht-Arriaza, ‘Just a �bubble”? Perspectives on the enforcement of international crimi-
nal law by national courts’ (2013) 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice 537-543.
2 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litiga-
tion Centre and Another 2014 (12) BCLR 1428 (CC).
3 Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others 
[2015] Case Number: 27740/2015.
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2 Indirect enforcement and the project of international criminal 
justice
Various authors take the view that international criminal justice may be viewed 
as a project.4 The next logical question is – whose project is it? It is possible to de-
fine	international	criminal	justice	as	a	collective	venture	on	the	part	of	the	notional	
international community (or civitas maxima). Thus, one might view the movement 
towards indirect enforcement within the project of international criminal justice as 
a deliberate and collective attempt on the part of the international community to cir-




Direct enforcement of international criminal law occurs where international 
crimes are prosecuted on the international level before an international court.5 As 
such, direct enforcement refers to ‘the supranational enforcement of international 
criminal law.’6 Indirect enforcement is state-centred and occurs where internation-
al criminal law is enforced by way of national prosecution.7 According to Van den 
Wyngaert, the indirect enforcement of international criminal law broadly includes 
‘extraterritorial applications of penal law, extradition, judicial assistance, transfer 
of criminal proceedings and prisoners, and compensation of victims.’8 In the ICC 
era of international criminal justice, one may add prosecution and cooperation with 
the ICC in accordance with the principle of complementarity to the aforementioned 
list.
4 See, for example, L van den Herik, ‘The Dutch engagement with the project of international criminal 
justice’ (2010) 57(2) Netherlands International Law Review 303–322; I Tallgren, ‘The sensibility and 
sense of international criminal law’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 561-595; MR 
Damaska, ‘What is the point of international criminal justice?’ (2008) 83(1) Chicago Kent Law Review 
329-368, 354; and MA Drumbl, Atrocity, punishment and international law (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) 21.
5 H Satzger, ‘German criminal law and the Rome Statute – A critical analysis of the new German code of 
crimes against international law’ (2002) 2 International Criminal Law Review 261–282, 263.
6 C van den Wyngaert, ‘International criminal law as an integrated course’ (1988) 1 Touro Journal of 
Transnational Law 203-207, 206.
7 When it comes to the indirect enforcement of the core crimes under international law, a distinction must 
be made between, on the one hand, state’s acting within the framework of complementarity as provided 
for in the Rome Statute and, on the other, national prosecution of international crimes beyond state ob-
ligations	in	terms	of	the	Rome	Statute.	A	further	distinction	must	be	made	between	different	modalities	
of indirect enforcement, namely, national prosecutions, extradition and mutual cooperation with state 
or international courts in respect of the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.
8 Van den Wyngaert (n 6) 206.
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The shift towards indirect enforcement of international criminal law is broad-
ly the result of two parallel movements of international criminal law enforcement: 
First, the proliferation and increased incorporation of treaties placing international 
legal obligations as regards the enforcement of international criminal law on states 
and, secondly, the establishment of the permanent ICC by way of the Rome Statute. 
More than anything, it was the establishment of the ‘complementarity-centred’ ICC 
that shifted the balance of international criminal law enforcement towards domestic 
courts. The vision was not for domestic courts to complement the ICC, but rather 
for the ICC to complement the work of domestic courts or – as it is often expressed 
– to act as a court of last resort.
3 The domestication of the Rome Statute in South Africa: An overview 
of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002
As regards the legal status of international law in South Africa, it must be 
noted that South Africa follows the dualist tradition. According to Section 231(2) 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996: 
An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution 
in both the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces […].
Further, in Section 231(4): 
Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is enacted into law by 
national legislation […].
Also, according to Section 232, customary international law is binding law in 
South Africa ‘unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’ 
Finally, in accordance with Section 233, South African courts ‘must prefer any rea-
sonable interpretation of [national] legislation that is consistent with international 
law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.’
At the beginning of the constitutional era, democratic South Africa showed 
itself to be a strong proponent of the project of international criminal justice. South 
Africa has incorporated the law of the Rome Statute into its domestic law by way 
of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
27 of 2002 (Implementation Act). The Act aims, inter alia,	 to	effectively	 imple-
ment	the	Rome	Statute	and	to	give	effect	to	South	Africa’s	obligations	in	terms	of	
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the Rome Statute.9 The Act was also a means to criminalise the core international 
crimes under South African law. As such, the crimes of genocide, crimes against 
humanity	and	war	crimes	may	be	viewed	as	national	crimes	reflective	of	interna-
tionally protected values and interests. The Act further seeks to enable, ‘in accord-
ance with the principle of complementarity,’ prosecutions at national level as well 
as cooperation with the ICC.10
3.1	 Jurisdiction	under	the	Implementation	Act
Section	4(1)	of	the	Act	confirms	the	substantive	jurisdiction	provided	for	in	
the Rome Statute by proscribing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
and	ma�ing	persons	liable	to	punishment	on	conviction	of	such	offence(s).
South Africa’s (prescriptive) jurisdiction in respect of the core crimes is regu-
lated by Section 4(3) of the Act, which provides for four grounds of jurisdiction 
in order to try an individual for core crimes committed outside the territory of the 
Republic. A court in South Africa may try ‘any person who commits a crime con-
templated in subsection (1) outside the territory of the Republic’ if:
(a)  that person is a South African citizen;
(b)  that person is not a South African citizen but is ordinarily resident in the 
Republic;
(c)  that person, after the commission of the crime, is present in the territory 
of the Republic;
(d)  that person has committed the said crime against a South African citizen 
or against a person who is ordinarily resident in the Republic.
Section	4(3)(c)	 of	 the	Act	 is	 of	 particular	 significance.	 It	 extends	 the	 (pre-
scriptive) jurisdiction of South African courts in respect of the core crimes to non-
nationals and non-residents who are present in South African territory and also to 
non-nationals who have committed any of the core crimes against South African 
citizens.
3.2	 Immunity	under	the	Implementation	Act
The Act further addresses the applicability of immunities under international 
law for purposes of the prosecution of the crimes contemplated therein. According 
9 Implementation Act 2002, s 3.
10 Implementation Act 2002, s 3.
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to Section 4(2), irrespective of ‘any other law to the contrary, including custom-
ary or conventional international law,’ an individual’s status as a current or former 
head of state or government may neither be regarded as a substantive defence, nor 
a mitigating factor in respect of the prosecution or conviction of persons for crimes 
contemplated in the Act. Also, in terms of Section 10(9) of the Act, an individual’s 
status as a current or former head of state or government may not constitute a bar to 
that person’s surrender to the ICC in terms of the Act.11
The issue of immunity is of particular relevance to the enforcement of interna-
tional	criminal	law.	In	this	regard,	one	must	distinguish,	first	of	all,	between	func-
tional immunity and personal immunity.12	Functional	immunity	or	official	capacity	
(immunity ratione materiae)	attaches	to	persons	acting	in	an	official	capacity	on	
behalf of a state. This form of immunity bars neither direct, nor indirect enforce-
ment of international criminal law.13 
The position is less clear as regards personal immunity from prosecution (im-
munity ratione personae). Personal immunity does not excuse criminal responsi-
bility, but creates a temporary obstacle to the prosecution of the perpetrator. This 




from impunity in respect of those crimes due to their being insulated from national 
prosecution and at the same time also out of reach of foreign or international courts. 
11 Implementation Act 2002, s 10(9): ‘The fact that the person to be surrendered is a person contemplated 
in section 4(2)(a) or (b) does not constitute a ground for refusing to issue an order contemplated in 
subsection (5).’ 
12 See G Werle, Principles of international criminal law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 273-279. 
13 Whether	before	international	or	national	courts,	official	capacity	does	not	affect	criminal	liability	under	
international	law.	Concerning	the	irrelevance	of	official	capacity	before	international	courts,	see	Rome	
Statute, art. 27(1); and Werle (n 12) 273-275.	Notable	cases	concerning	the	irrelevance	of	official	capac-
ity	before	national	courts	are:	First,	case	law	relating	to	efforts	of	Spain	to	extradite	Augusto	Pinochet	
from England (see R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (1999) 4 All ER 
897; R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate (Bartle) ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) (1999) 1 All ER 
577; R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (1999) 2 All ER 97); and, 
secondly,	Belgium’s	effort	to	prosecute	Abdulaye	Yerodia	Ndombasi,	the	incumbent	foreign	minister	of	
the Democratic Republic of Congo, by way of an international arrest warrant, see Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v Belgium (The �Arrest Warrant” case), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, 3.
14 See	D	A�ande	and	S	Shah,	‘Immunities	of	state	officials,	international	crimes,	and	foreign	domestic	
courts’ (2010) 21 (4) European Journal of International Law 815–	852,	818:	‘The	predominant	justifi-
cation for such immunities is that they ensure the smooth conduct of international relations and, as such, 
they	are	accorded	to	those	state	officials	who	represent	the	state	at	the	international	level.’
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Thus the need for international criminal law as an alternative framework of criminal 
law	that	targets	specifically	a	unique	species	of	crime	(especially	state	criminality)	
committed by a unique species of criminal (especially those bearing the greatest 
responsibility for crimes of international concern).15 However, foreign and interna-
tional case law illustrates the enduring controversy over personal immunity under 
international law as a bar to criminal prosecution before foreign national courts. 
In the Arrest Warrant case, the ICJ ruled that international law only permits the 
prosecution	of	current	governmental	officials	before	foreign	national	courts	where	
the	state	in	question	has	waived	such	official’s	immunity.16 In the Pinochet case, 
the	House	of	Lords	held	that	the	immunities	afforded	to	acting	heads	of	state	un-
der international law constitute a bar to prosecution before national courts.17 These 
cases support the assertion that personal immunity under international law cannot 
be trumped by domestic legislation for the purposes of prosecuting international 
crime on behalf of the international community.18 
However,	 Section	 4(2)	 of	 the	 Implementation	Act	 specifically	 disqualifies	
‘any law to the contrary, including customary and conventional international law’ 
and	ma�es	specific	reference	to	acting heads of state and members of government. 
Compared to Article 27 of the Rome Statute, Section 4(2)(a) of the Implementa-
tion Act can be regarded as a considerably bolder proclamation of the irrelevance 
of personal immunity in respect of the prosecution of core crimes.19 Du Plessis has 
noted this as a proactive improvement in the Implementation Act, but warned that 
a	South	African	court	‘might	find	that	[Section	4(2)(a)]	does	not	do	away	with	per-
15 W Lee, ‘International crimes and universal jurisdiction’ in Larry May and Zachary Hoskins (eds.) Inter-
national criminal law and philosophy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 21. 
16 See ICJ, Arrest Warrant case (n 13) para 58.
17 See R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (1999) 4 All ER 897 (Pinochet I) 
at 938 and R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) (1999) 2 All ER 97 
(Pinochet III) 905H.
18 M du Plessis, ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’ Conference Paper <http://www.csvr.org.za/
wits/confpaps/duplessis.htm> accessed 25 August 2015. 
19 Rome Statute, art. 27: 
	 ‘Irrelevance	of	official	capacity	-	
1.	 This	Statute	shall	apply	equally	to	all	persons	without	any	distinction	based	on	official	capacity.	
In	 particular,	 official	 capacity	 as	 a	 head	of	 state	 or	 government,	 a	member	 of	 a	 government	 or	
parliament,	 an	 elected	 representative	or	 a	government	official	 shall	 in	no	case	 exempt	 a	person	
from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for 
reduction of sentence.
2.	 Immunities	or	special	procedural	rules	which	may	attach	to	the	official	capacity	of	a	person,	wheth-
er under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over 
such a person.’
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sonal immunity.’20 As will be discussed below,21 this became more than a theoreti-
cal question when President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan attended the African Union 
(AU) Summit in South Africa in June 2015.
4 Overview of recent developments concerning the indirect 
enforcement of international criminal law in South Africa
4.1 The ‘torture docket’ matter: National	Commissioner	of	the	South	African	
Police	Service	v	Southern	African	Human	Rights	Litigation	Centre	and	
Another22
In 2008, the Southern Africa Litigation Centre (SALC) submitted a compre-
hensive dossier (the so-called ‘torture docket’) to the Priority Crimes Litigation 
Unit (PCLU). The docket contained evidence of the involvement of Zimbabwean 
security	officials	in	the	perpetration	of	state-sanctioned	torture.	Also	included	in	the	
doc�et	were	numerous	affidavits	from	persons	attesting	to	acts	of	torture	perpetrat-
ed against them while in police custody subsequent to a police raid that took place 
during March 2007 at the headquarters of the main opposition party in Zimbabwe, 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). It was alleged that these acts of 
torture were committed in a widespread and systematic manner against the po-
litical opponents of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front 
(ZANU-PF), therefore constituting crimes against humanity.23 The crimes were al-
legedly committed by Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe against Zimbabweans. It should 
be noted that Zimbabwe is not a party to the Rome Statute. 
The applicants had approached the court for judicial review of the decision not 
to investigate the matter, arguing that the respondents had a legal duty to investigate 
allegations of international crimes in the torture docket. The respondents argued 
that	such	refusal	was	justified	due	to	there	being	insufficient	evidence	to	proceed	
with the matter as well as concerns regarding the practicality of any further inves-
tigation and the diplomatic relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe. In par-
ticular, the respondents also raised concerns regarding the jurisdiction provided for 
in the Implementation Act, arguing that jurisdiction on the basis of the ‘anticipated 
20 M du Plessis, ‘South Africa’s implementation of the ICC Statute’ (2007) 5 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 460-479, 474.
21 See Section 4.2 below.
22 National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
and another (Dugard and others as amici curiae) 2014 (12) BCLR 1428 (CC).
23 See South African Litigation Centre and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others 
(North Gauteng High Court) Case No. 77150/09, 8 May 2012, para 1.13 (at 9).
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presence’	of	an	offender	cannot	be	read	into	Section	4	of	the	Act.	
The High Court found that the respondents’ decision not to investigate was 
‘unlawful, inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid.’ The PCLU 
was ordered to investigate ‘so far as practicable and lawful.’ The respondents then 
turned to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) where the appeal was dismissed.
The matter proceeded to the Constitutional Court, where, once more, the Court 
considered whether South African law enforcement authorities had a duty to investi-
gate the international crimes in question in light of South Africa’s international and 
domestic legal obligations.24 In particular, the Court was required to delineate the 
circumstances under which any such duty would be activated.25 The dispute related 
to the investigation (as opposed to the prosecution) of international crimes by South 
African courts.26 Section 4(3)(c) of the Implementation Act is silent on the matter of 
the duty to investigate the crimes provided for in the Act as well as the scope of any 
such duty. Thus, there was a need for clarity as to what is required for the initiation 
of	an	investigation	under	the	Act.	Is	the	physical	presence	of	the	alleged	offender	an	
indispensable pre-requisite for investigation? If not, must there be an anticipation 
that the alleged perpetrator will be physically present at some future time?
From a broader perspective, the Court was also required to consider the extent 
of ‘South Africa’s domestic and international powers and obligations to prevent im-
punity and to ensure that perpetrators of international crimes committed by foreign 
nationals beyond our borders are held accountable.’27
In the judgment, the Court highlighted the fact that the requirement of the 
anticipated	presence	of	the	offender	as	a	trigger	for	investigation	would	fundamen-
tally inhibit the underlying purposes of the Implementation Act, which, in turn, 
reflects	the	objects	of	the	Rome	Statute:
Requiring presence for an investigation would render nugatory the object of combating 
crimes	against	humanity.	If	a	suspect	were	to	enter	and	remain	briefly	in	the	territory	of	
a state party, without a certain level of prior investigation, it would not be practicable to 
initiate charges and prosecution. An anticipatory investigation does not violate fair trial 
rights of the suspect or accused person. A determination of presence or anticipated presence 
24 National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
and another (n 22) paras 4 and 21.
25 Ibid para 21.
26 As opposed to trying an accused in absentia, which would be unconstitutional in accordance with Sec-
tion 35(3)(e) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
27 National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
(n 22) para 4.
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requires	an	investigation	in	the	first	instance.	Ascertaining	a	current	or	anticipated	location	
of a suspect could not occur otherwise. Furthermore, any possible next step that could arise 
as a result of an investigation, such as a prosecution or an extradition request, requires an 
assessment of information which can only be attained through an investigation.28
The Court further held that:
There is not just a power [to investigate the allegations of torture], but also a duty. While 
the	finding	that	the	SAPS	does	have	the	power	to	investigate	is	unassailable,	the	point	of	
departure is that the SAPS has a duty to investigate the alleged crimes against humanity of 
torture. That duty arises from the Constitution read with the [Implementation] Act, which 
we must interpret in relation to international law.29
However, the Court was also at pains to draw attention to international law 
principles limiting the duty to investigate international crime.30 First, in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity, a foreign national court may only invoke univer-
sal jurisdiction if the state on whose territory the crime was committed or the state 
in	which	 the	offender	has	nationality	 is	 unable	or	unwilling	 to	prosecute.	There	
seems to be no reason to think that this principle would not apply over situations 
not involving the commission of core crime under international law.31
Secondly, in accordance with the principle of practicability, it must be asked 
whether it is reasonable and practical to investigate the matter considering the cir-
cumstances of the particular case. In the ‘torture docket’ matter, for example, the 
fact that Zimbabwe is a neighbouring country of South Africa as well as the in-
formation that the suspects in question were shown to have visited South Africa 
from	time	 to	 time	may	be	regarded	as	crucial	considerations	 that	where	specific	
and relevant only to the matter at hand. One could postulate that, if these particular 
considerations	were	missing,	the	outcome	of	the	case	may	well	have	been	differ-
ent. As noted in the judgment, ‘anticipated presence of a suspect in South Africa 
is not a prerequisite to trigger an investigation. It is only one of various factors 
that need to be balanced in determining the practicability and reasonableness of an 
investigation.’32 
28 Ibid para 48.
29 Ibid para 55.
30 Ibid paras 61-64.
31 Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, an interesting question in this regard relates to the deter-
mination of ability and willingness by domestic courts. Should it, for example, be modelled on the ad-
missibility criteria in the Rome Statute, namely, complementarity and gravity? Or, should states develop 
their own criteria with reference to international legal principles?
32 National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre 
(n 22) para 81. Emphasis added.
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4.2	 The	Al	Bashir	matter:	Southern	Africa	Litigation	Centre	v	Minister	of	
Justice	and	Constitutional	Development	and	Others33
On 31 March 2005, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred the 
situation in Darfur, Sudan, to the Prosecutor of the ICC.34 In 2010, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber (PTC) I of the ICC issued warrants of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide allegedly committed in the Darfur 
region	of	Sudan.	This	was	the	first	time	that	a	sitting	head	of	state	of	a	non-ICC	
state party faced such charges. In accordance with Article 59 of the Rome Statute, 
the ICC requested state parties to arrest President Al Bashir should he enter into 
their jurisdiction.
In January 2015, the South African Government agreed to act as the host state 
for the AU Summit. Before the meeting, the South African Government received 
word that President Al Bashir would be in attendance as well as a request for the 
granting of the necessary privileges and immunities. 
On 14 June 2015, whilst President Al Bashir was attending the Summit and 
pursuant to an application for his arrest by SALC, the South Gauteng High Court 
issued an interim order preventing President Al Bashir from leaving South Africa 
pending	the	ma�ing	of	a	final	order.	The	next	day,	the	Court	ruled	that	the	failure	
of the respondent to arrest President Al Bashir was inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and invalid and ordered the respondents to take reasonable steps to arrest and 
detain President Al Bashir, pending a formal request for his surrender from the ICC. 
However, it has been established that President Al Bashir had at that stage already 
left the country in a clandestine fashion.
In providing reasons for the order above, the Court was called upon to delimit 
South Africa’s international and domestic legal obligations in respect of the arrest 
of sitting heads of state accused of international crimes falling within the substan-
tive jurisdiction of the Rome Statute.
The respondents argued that the promulgation of a Government notice in 
terms of Section 5(3) of the Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 
(Immunities Act) by the Minister of International Relations was an embodiment of 
the terms of the host agreement between South Africa and the AU and that the latter 
agreement’s provision for immunity of African heads of state attending the meeting 
33 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others 
2015 (9) BCLR 1108 (GP).
34 UNSC Res. 1593 (2005).
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served a legal basis for South Africa’s non-compliance with its obligations towards 
the ICC in respect of the arrest of President Al Bashir.35
The Court was unequivocal in its assertion that none of the grounds relied 
upon by the respondents could lawfully trump the provisions in the Implementation 
Act. It highlighted South Africa’s domestic legal obligation in respect of coopera-
tion with the ICC.36 The Court held that, despite the various arguments raised by the 
respondents, President Al Bashir could only be entitled to personal immunity under 
the rules of customary international law.37 However, the Court found that:
[...] the Rome Statute expressly provides that heads of state do not enjoy immunity under 
its terms. Similar provisions are expressly included in the Implementation Act. It means 
that the immunity that might otherwise have attached to President Bashir as head of state 
is excluded or waived in respect of crimes and obligations under the Rome Statute.38
Furthermore, it was held that the Minister of International Relations cannot 
exercise the power to grant immunity in terms of the Immunities Act so as to pre-
vent the arrest and surrender of a person pursuant to a lawfully authorised request 
to	this	effect	from	the	ICC.	
A	 compelling	 issue	 raised	 by	 the	Al	Bashir	matter	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 Sudan’s	
status	as	non-state	party	to	the	Rome	Statute	and,	more	specifically,	whether	Sudan	
can be bound to the terms of an international agreement that it has not signed.39 In 
this regard, the Court referred to the following dictum of the ICC PTC: 
[…] the immunities granted to Omar Al Bashir under international law and attached to 
his position as a Head of State have been implicitly waived by the Security Council of the 
United Nations by resolution 1593(2005) referring the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the 
Prosecutor of the Court […].40
35 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (n 33) para 22.
36 Ibid para 11. As regards the obligations of state parties towards the ICC in respect of cooperation and 
judicial assistance, the most relevant provisions in the Rome Statute are:
Art. 86: ‘States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the 
court [ICC] in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court;’ and 
Art. 89(1): ‘The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the 
material supporting the request outlined in Article 91, to any State on the territory of which that 
person may be found and shall request the cooperation of that State in the arrest and surrender of 
such a person. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure 
under their national law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.’
37 Ibid para 28.7.
38 Ibid para 28.8.
39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), art. 34: ‘A treaty does not create either obligations 
or rights for a third State without its consent.’
40 Southern African Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others, 
para 28.9 and Prosecutor v Al Bashir (Decision following the Prosecutor’s request for an order further 
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The Court also relied on the decision of the ICC PTC II in an earlier decision 
On the cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding Omar Al 
Bashir’s arrest and surrender to the Court41 to assert that the Respondents’ argu-
ments in respect of immunity were ‘misguided.’42
It is interesting (and perhaps also surprising) that the judgment contains no 
direct reference to Article 98 of the Rome Statute. According to Article 98(1): 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless 
the	Court	can	first	obtain	the	cooperation	of	that	third	State	for	the	waiver	of	the	immunity.
In the context of the Al Bashir matter, the following questions arise: Did the 
ICC request require South Africa to act contrary to its international legal obliga-
tions in respect of personal immunity? Was President Al Bashir entitled to such 
immunity before a South African court under international law? 
It is widely accepted that personal immunity under international law may un-
der certain conditions constitute a bar to legal proceedings, including extradition 
proceedings, directed towards the determination and allocation of criminal and civ-
il liability before foreign national courts.43 However, it may be asked whether such 
immunity presents a bar to domestic proceedings directed towards the surrender of 
a suspect not to a state, but to the ICC (or any other international court)?44
clarifying that the Republic of South Africa is under the obligation to immediately arrest and surrender 
Omar Al Bashir) (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber, 13 June 2015, para 9.
41 On the Cooperation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo regarding Omar Al Bashir’s arrest and 
surrender to the Court ICC 02/05-01/09 (9 April 2014).
42 Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development (n 33) para 32.
43 See ICJ, Arrest Warrant case (n13); see also R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3) (1999) 2 All ER 97, 111-112: ‘[...] immunity enjoyed by a head of state in power and an 
ambassador in post is a complete immunity attaching to the person of the head of state or ambassador 
and rendering him immune from all actions or prosecutions whether or not they relate to matters done 
for	the	benefit	of	the	state.	Such	immunity	is	said	to	be	granted	ratione	personae.’	See	generally	A�ande	
and Shah (n 14).
44 The Rome Statute distinguishes between �surrender” and �extradition” in Art. 102:
‘For the purposes of this Statute:
(a) ‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this Statute.
(b) ‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by treaty, 
convention or national legislation.’
 This distinction is important for ensuring that the rules and principles of extradition law (which applies 
between states) are not applicable to the surrender of suspects to the ICC for proceedings in terms of 
the Rome Statute. See G Sluiter, ‘The surrender of war criminals to the International Criminal Court’ 
(2003) 25(3) International and Comparative Law Review 607-608.
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The nature of extradition proceedings was considered in Minister of Justice 
and Another v Additional Magistrate, Cape Town.45 It was held that enquiries held 
before a magistrate for the purposes of extradition do not constitute ‘criminal pro-
ceedings.’ Such proceedings are not administrative in nature, but sui generis judi-
cial proceedings not involving any dispute between the state in question and the 
individual suspect that is the subject of the extradition request.46 This being so, the 
court in the requested state is merely called upon to determine whether there is suf-
ficient	evidence	to	warrant	the	suspect’s	prosecution	in	a	foreign	state.47 Thus, it is 
not about prosecution and conviction in any immediate sense, but rather concerns 
‘the delivery of the person requested for the purposes of trial and sentencing in the 
territory of the requesting State.’48 Furthermore, any detention that may be imposed 
by the court would only be for the purposes of extradition and not as a form of 
punishment. In this regard, in Geuking v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others, it was held that:
[…] extradition proceedings do not determine the guilt or innocence of the person 
concerned. They are aimed at determining whether or not there is reason to remove a 
person to a foreign state in order to be put on trial there.49 
If President Al Bashir had been arrested in South Africa, the question of his 
surrender to the ICC would have been subject to an inquiry before a magistrate in 
terms of Section 10 of the Implementation Act. It is submitted that the nature of ju-
dicial proceedings to determine whether President Al Bashir should be surrendered 
must be viewed as legally akin to extradition proceedings as described above. This 
submission	finds	further	support	in	the	similarity	between	the	wording	of	Section	
9(2) of the Extradition Act and Section 10(3) of the Implementation Act.50 
45 Minister of Justice and Another v Additional Magistrate, Cape Town 2001 (2) SACR 49 (C).
46 Ibid 61C.
47 See Extradition Act 67 of 1962, s 10(2), according to which it is not necessary for requesting state to 
establish prima facie guilt prior to the granting of a request for extradition: ‘For purposes of satisfy-
ing	himself	or	herself	that	there	is	sufficient	evidence	to	warrant	a	prosecution	in	the	foreign	State	the	
magistrate	shall	accept	as	conclusive	proof	a	certificate	which	appears	to	him	or	her	to	be	issued	by	an	
appropriate authority in charge of the prosecution in the foreign State concerned, stating that it has suf-
ficient	evidence	at	its	disposal	to	warrant	the	prosecution	of	the	person	concerned.’
48 President of the Republic of South Africa v Quagliani 2009 (2) SA 466 (CC), para 1.
49 Geuking v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2004 (9) BCLR 895 (CC), para 44.
50 See Extradition Act, s 9(2): ‘Subject to the provisions of this Act the magistrate holding the enquiry 
shall proceed in the manner in which a preparatory examination is to be held in the case of a person 
charged	with	having	committed	an	offence	in	the	Republic	and	shall,	for	the	purposes	of	holding	such	
enquiry, have the same powers, including the power of committing any person for further examination 
and of admitting to bail any person detained, as he has at a preparatory examination so held.’
 See also ICC Act 2002, s 10(3): ‘The magistrate holding the enquiry must proceed in the manner in 
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Thus, when engaged with extradition proceedings, the extraditing state is act-
ing on the basis of a pre-existing legal agreement with the requesting state in terms 
of which it has agreed to act not on its own behalf, but on behalf of (or as a tem-
porary extension of) the requesting state’s criminal justice system in respect of the 
suspect in question. Under these �normal” circumstances a sitting head of state may 
claim personal immunity before the courts of the extraditing state. This is because 
his/her prosecution in the requesting state – irrespective of the nature of the crimes 
involved – would be contrary to the rules of personal immunity under international 
law. Ipso facto, an extraditing state would be facilitating the violation of the inter-
national law rules pertaining to personal immunity by acceding to such a request.
However, when a surrendering state is acting on the behalf of the ICC (one 
could say also acting on behalf of criminal justice system of the international com-
munity), the situation may be viewed as sui generis. Under these circumstances, 
Article 27 of the Rome Statute explicitly renders personal immunity (including 
immunity for sitting heads of state) to be irrelevant in respect of the prosecution of 
individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. If, in addition, 
the surrendering state is acting at the behest of a binding UNSC Resolution implic-
itly rendering such immunity irrelevant, there is certainly room to argue that such 
proceedings should be recognized as a narrow exception to the general rule that 
sitting heads of state are immune from any domestic legal proceedings that could 
facilitate or enable their prosecution.
5 Lessons learnt
In light of the above, it appears that both the legal and political characteris-
tics	of	a	state	have	a	crucial	 impact	on	 its	ability	 to	dynamically	 reflect	modern	
international criminal justice via its legal system. The following aspects appear to 
be	crucial	to	effective	indirect	enforcement	of	international	criminal	law	by	states:
5.1 The limitations of domestic jurisdiction in respect of international crimes
In principle, a national court asserting universal jurisdiction has authority to 
punish	 certain	 offences	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 the	 international	 community	 ‘without	 re-
which a preparatory examination is held under Chapter 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act 51 
of 1977), and has, for the purposes of holding the inquiry, the same powers as he or she would have had 
in respect of a preparatory examination so held, including the power to commit any person for further 
detention or to release such person on bail.’
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gard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the […] perpetrator, 
the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such 
jurisdiction.’51	Crimes	that	are	offensive	to	the	international	community	as	a	whole	
represent the legitimising link between the proscribed conduct and the prosecut-
ing state (or forum deprehensionis). ‘Pure’ or ‘absolute’ universal jurisdiction (or 
‘universal jurisdiction in absentia’52) is by now accepted to be an untenable concept 
when it comes to the enforcement of international criminal norms before foreign 
domestic	courts.	Beyond	the	practical	difficulties	that	arise	in	this	context	(for	ex-
ample, the limits on criminal procedural activities such as investigation and arrest), 
there are compelling arguments against such a liberal invocation of universal juris-
diction. First, it violates the fundamental international law principles of territorial 
sovereignty and sovereign equality. Secondly, if used unscrupulously, the principle 
poses a real risk of potentially destabilising political abuse by states. Finally – and 
not unrelated to the aforementioned concern – its acceptability is called into ques-
tion	by	considerations	of	fairness	(it	may,	for	example,	come	into	conflict	with	hu-
man rights principles, such as, the principle ne bid in idem).
As	a	result,	universal	jurisdiction	is	now	accepted	as	a	qualified	concept	(some	
refer to it as ‘conditional’” universal jurisdiction). This is taken to mean that, while 
states may proscribe certain conduct as universally criminalised under its national 
criminal laws, a state is severely limited in the enforcement of such rules as en-
forcement jurisdiction is strictly limited under international law to the territory of 
the prosecuting state. Thus, when we speak of universal jurisdiction in a broad 
sense, we are actually broadly referring to universal prescriptive jurisdiction ac-
companied by the actual presence of the accused within a state’s territory.53 This 
may seem like a pedantic point, but as recent South African case law illustrates, this 
understanding	of	universal	jurisdiction	may	be	of	great	significance	when	it	comes	
to the indirect enforcement of international criminal law. Domestic investigative 
authorities and courts must be aware of the distinction between wide prescriptive 
jurisdiction (as, for example, provided for in Section 4(1) of the Implementation 
Act) and narrow enforcement jurisdiction (as, for example, provided for in Section 
4(3) of the Act) as well as the international legal principles limiting the duty to in-
vestigate international crimes.
51 Princeton principles on universal jurisdiction (2001), Principle 1(1).
52 See ICJ, Arrest Warrant case (n 13).
53 See R O’Keefe, ‘Universal jurisdiction – clarifying the basic concept’ (2004) 2 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 735-760.
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Beyond the limitations as regards enforcement jurisdiction, it must further be 
accepted that domestic courts are likely to continue to be constrained in respect of 
the indirect enforcement of international crimes by the rules of immunity ratione 
personae. The judgment in the Al Bashir case may be considered as highly posi-
tive from the perspective of the aim of the project of international criminal justice, 
namely, ending the culture of impunity. However, it may be asked whether the 
judgment sets a dangerous precedent from the perspective of international political 
and diplomatic peace and security. In this latter respect, it must be remembered that 
the judgment above does not purport to render personal immunity irrelevant to do-
mestic prosecution of international crimes under all circumstances. In this regard, 
an earlier – and lesser-known – legal matter involving the Implementation Act may 
provide a good example. In 2013, the Muslim Lawyers Association (MLA) sub-
mitted a complaint to South African authorities in terms of, inter alia, the Imple-
mentation Act, requesting the institution of a criminal investigation as well as the 
arrest and prosecution of US President Barack Obama (who was scheduled to visit 
South Africa) for war crimes, genocide as well as crimes against humanity. Alterna-
tively, it was asked that President Obama should be surrendered to the ICC to stand 
trial. The allegations (contained in the so-called ‘Obama docket’) arose from US 
drone strikes in the Middle East and some African countries. The North Gauteng 
High Court dismissed the application on the basis that it lacked urgency.54 Needless 
to say, President Obama was not arrested when he later visited South Africa.
It is well known that the US is at present not a party to the Rome Statute. 
With reference to the facts above, one may create a useful hypothetical example in 
order to illustrate that personal immunity under international law may under cer-
tain circumstances constitute a bar to prosecution for international crimes before a 
foreign domestic court. Hypothetically speaking, a South African court considering 
an	application	for	the	arrest	and	surrender	(or	a	request	to	that	effect	from	the	ICC)	
of	an	incumbent	head	of	state	must	consider,	first,	whether	that	person	is	entitled	
to personal immunity under international law and, secondly, the fact that the state 
in question is not a party to the Rome Statute and therefore cannot be bound by its 
terms. If, furthermore, the case had not been referred to the ICC by way of a UNSC 
Resolution, it must be concluded that personal immunity under international law 
would constitute a temporary bar to prosecution before the foreign national court in 
question. That would be the case irrespective of whether the national legislation of 
that state contains a provision explicitly rendering immunities under international 
54 See Muslim Lawyers Association, Press Release <http://www.mlajhb.com/obama-docket-high-court-
press-release> accessed 4 September 2015.
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law to be irrelevant in respect of the prosecution of individuals for international 
crimes. A state that surrenders a sitting head of state to the ICC (a treaty-based 
institution) under these circumstances would be acting contrary to international 
law. To interpret the Implementation Act to the contrary would – under these par-
ticular circumstances – be inconsistent with Section 233 of the Constitution, which 
requires South African courts to opt for a reasonable interpretation of national leg-
islation that is consistent with international law over one that is not. 
5.2	 The	role	of	national	implementation	legislation
A curious feature of the cases discussed above is that all of them involve al-
legations against nationals of non-state parties to the Rome Statute. This illustrates 
the	true	significance	and	potential	of	domestic	prosecution	and	cooperation	in	re-
spect of international crime. Some form of ‘ICC involvement’ is not an indispen-
sable requirement in order for states to enforce the norms of international criminal 
justice. In other words, the reach of states’ collective prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction is much broader than that of the ICC, which jurisdiction is – but for 
those cases referred to the Court by the UNSC – limited to the bases of national-
ity and territoriality via states party to the Statute.55 Du Plessis and Maunganidze 
have highlighted the importance of domestic implementation legislation within the 
broader project of ending the culture of impunity for international crimes:
[…] to the extent that [domestic implementation legislation] provide[s] for universal 
jurisdiction – [domestic or state] authorities can investigate and prosecute crimes that fall 
outside the Rome Statute system’s net: namely, those occurring in states that are not ICC 
members, or by national of such states […].56
The ability and potential for national implementation legislation to spread the 
net of accountability in respect of international crimes was also underscored by the 
Constitutional Court:
The need for states parties to comply with their international obligation to investigate 
international crimes is most pressing in instances where those crimes are committed by 
citizens of and within the territory of countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute, 
because to do otherwise would permit impunity. If an investigation is not instituted by 
non-signatory countries in which the crimes have been committed, the perpetrators can 
only be brought to justice through the application of universal jurisdiction, namely the 
55 See Rome Statute, arts. 12 and 13.
56 A du Plessis and O Maunganidze, ‘The ICC and the AU’ in C Stahn (ed) The law and practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford University Press 2015) 65-83, 75.
133Assessing the Role of Indirect Enforcement in the ‘Project’ of International Criminal Justice: Some Lessons from South Africa
investigation and prosecution of these alleged crimes by states parties under the Rome 
Statute.57
South Africa already has a rather impressive list of implementation legisla-
tion.58 As regards the goal of ending the culture of impunity in respect of interna-
tional crimes, this is laudable development. However, the domestication of inter-
national	crimes	is	only	the	first	step	towards	effective	application	of	international	
criminal law on the domestic level. Ideally, such legislation should provide for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of the core international crimes as well as 
provisions relating to the duties and powers of domestic authorities regarding the 
investigation of such crimes. Such legislation should also clearly provide for duties 
and powers of local authorities in respect of cooperation with the ICC.
Furthermore, domestic courts must be legislatively empowered to apply inter-
national law norms and adjudicate upon matters relating to the enforcement of in-
ternational criminal law. In this regard, it is important to raise awareness among the 
government, domestic lawyers, civil society and the general public of the central 
role of domestic prosecution and cooperation in the larger project of international 
criminal	justice.	The	cases	above	suggest	that	effective	domestic	enforcement	re-
quires,	first,	an	enforceable	domestic	legal	framewor�	and,	secondly,	buy-in	or	pro-
active engagement with this legal framework from government and, perhaps more 
importantly, from other domestic role players such as civil society organisations.59 
This type of engagement with an enforceable legal framework is especially impor-
tant in countries following the accusatorial system of criminal justice as judges in 
those countries do not choose the cases that come before them. 
Finally,	 a	minimum	 requirement	 for	 the	 effective	 domestic	 enforcement	 of	
international criminal law is that of impartiality and independence in the judiciary 
and the national prosecuting authority. Naturally, these domestic legal attributes 
are largely dependent on the political and legal characteristics of the state in ques-
tion. However, judicial and prosecutorial independence should, as far as possible, 
also be provided for in domestic legislation concerning the indirect enforcement of 
international criminal law.
57 National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litiga-
tion Centre and Another (n2), para 32.
58 See Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002; Protection 
of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004; Implementation 
of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012; and Prevention and Combatting of Torture of Persons Act 13 
of 2013.
59 Du Plessis and Maunganidze (n 56) 68.




of	states	 to	fulfil	 their	 international	and	domestic	 legal	obligations	regarding	 the	
enforcement of international criminal law norms on the domestic level. Politics re-
mains as much of an inhibiting factor to the administration of international criminal 
justice at the national level as it has always proven to be at the international level. 
Decision making in respect of the investigation and prosecution of crime is 
inherently politicised. National decision making as regards the investigation and 
prosecution	of	international	crime	is	no	different.	The	‘de-politicisation’	of	national	
decision making in respect of international crimes is beyond the reach of internation-
al legal rules. Nonetheless, there is potential to regulate or minimise the impunity-
generating	effects	of	such	decision	ma�ing	by	way	of	national	legislation.	Section	
5 of the Implementation Act, for example, regulates the institution of national pros-
ecutions in South Africa. In accordance with Section 5(1) of the Act, the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) must consent to the prosecution of any of 
the crimes contemplated in the Act at the national level. The Act also, however, 
requires that the NDPP must take into account, in reaching any such decision, that 
South Africa has responsibility to prosecute such persons in line with the principle 
of complementarity.60 Another useful example can be found in Section 5(6) of the 
Act, according to which the NDPP’s decision not to prosecute a person for genocide, 
crimes against humanity or war crimes ‘does not preclude the prosecution of that 
person in the Court.’ This provision may be viewed as a legislative endorsement 
on the part of the state of the subsidiary jurisdiction of the ICC by acknowledging, 
albeit indirectly, the relationship between prosecutorial decision making under the 
Act and the admissibility regime in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.
From a broader perspective, the question over the arrest and surrender of Pres-
ident Al Bashir to the ICC can be approached from two perspectives, namely, legal 
idealism (as represented by the letter of international law) or political realism (the 
demands of diplomatic or political stability). In this latter respect, the overarching 
narrative seems to be that it would have been legally correct, but politically impos-
sible to surrender President Al Bashir to the ICC.61 The larger political backdrop 
60 ICC Act 2002, s 5(3).
61 See, for example, B Olugbuo, ‘Law and Politics at the International Criminal Court’ Open Democ-
racy	(24	August	2015);	T	Mazwai,	‘Letting	Bashir	go	helped	�eep	SA	conflict	free’	Rand Daily Mail 
(2015/07/01).
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– the well documented tension between the ICC and the AU – must also be kept in 
mind.	The	Al	Bashir	matter	as	well	as	the	ICC-AU	conflict	is	symptomatic	of	the	
general tension between the idealism of the project of international criminal jus-
tice and the realities of the anarchic and politically dominated international order. 
However, it is wrong to view the Al Bashir matter as a total defeat for international 
criminal law. In fact, both justice and politics – if there truly is such a ‘battle’ to 
speak of – have grounds for claiming a symbolic victory. As opposed to a defeat, 
President Al Bashir’s departure from South Africa represents the latest loss in a 
long series of losses for international criminal law idealism against the demands 
of realpolitik. It is highly likely that we will be seeing similar ‘political victories’ 
again in the near future.
6 Conclusion
International criminal justice may be viewed as a collaborative legal initiative 
of the international community designed to achieve a particular aim. That aim of 
this	project	is,	first	and	foremost,	to	end	the	culture	of	impunity	in	respect	of	inter-
national crimes. This does not mean accountability at all costs, but maximised ac-
countability. Furthermore, within this project, domestic prosecution and coopera-
tion in international criminal law enforcement is envisioned as the primary means 
through which the goal to maximise accountability can be achieved.
The success of the project of international criminal justice – as with any other 
project – will depend primarily on the present and future disposition (the willing-
ness, goodwill and commitment) of its current (and future) proponents, namely, 
states (especially those acting within the framework of enforcement established by 
way of the Rome Statute). States with a genuine interest in the success of the pro-
ject of international criminal justice must prioritize indirect modes of international 
criminal law enforcement. Recent developments in South Africa illustrate that this 
requires	more	from	states	than	ratification	and	domestic	incorporation	of	the	Rome	
Statute.
Despite the role and potential for indirect enforcement in the project of inter-
national criminal justice, states must remain mindful of what is potentially the dark 
underbelly of the prioritisation of indirect enforcement of international criminal 
law. The risks associated with unscrupulous, abusive and politically compromised 
domestic prosecutions conducted under the guise of being in the interests of the 
international community are perilous and can therefore only be ignored to the detri-
ment of the project as a whole.
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Abstract 
In Africa, the drive towards the eradication of colonialism ushered in the promotion 
of non-interference, as well as the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence 
of states as enshrined in the Organization for African Unity (OAU) Charter. In 
the lead up to and with the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, 
however, these areas of focus were replaced with the ideals of economic integration, 
the quest for socio-economic development and the promotion of democracy and 
human rights. 
The departure from the OAU objectives encouraged progress towards ensuring 
an environment conducive for an emerging human rights culture on the continent, 
which would forge an entry point for international criminal justice. However, 
political will towards the promotion and implementation of international criminal 
justice on the continent has time and again proved to be inconsistent with this 
critical paradigm shift. 
This chapter adopts Slaughter’s view that law is politics and that it has always 
been dominated by power-based actors, namely states, and attempts to identify the 
key factors that have mitigated the negative political influences on international 
criminal justice on the continent for practical application by civil society actors 
and legal practitioners.
*  BSc (Howard), JD (W. Michigan), LLM (Turin) and Advocate of the High Court of Tanzania. 
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1 Introduction
How many pictures of dead children do you need to see before you understand 
that killing children is wrong?1
Abuses and mass loss of human life always strike a moral chord with the 
global community. Alongside regular exposure to such atrocities through civil so-
ciety briefs and media reports circulated in real time through readily accessible 
mediums, an increase in access to information has given rise to great societal ex-
pectations about the attainment of justice and the diminution of impunity through 
international criminal justice mechanisms.
However, such expectations are lowered by the perception of selective in-
vestigations, prosecutions and punishment of global international crimes. The In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC), for example, has been criticized for seemingly 
targeting African leaders to the exclusion of Western and Middle Eastern leaders 
who	have	been	embroiled	in	conflicts	that	have	caused	the	mass	violations	of	rights	
and the deaths of countless civilians in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel 
and Palestine to name a few.
As a result, African leaders have repeatedly cried foul over what they have 
viewed as injustices, and have made (sometimes popular)2 decisions to counter 
what has been labelled by some as neo-colonialism.3 For instance, the African 
Union (AU) in its 13th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government held in July 2009 in Sirte, Libya, famously reiterated its decision ‘not 
[to] cooperate with the ICC in the arrest and surrender of President Al Bashir of 
The Sudan.’4 This resolution has since been followed by the adoption of motions to 
withdraw from the ICC by Kenya’s Parliament,5 and more recently by South Afri-
ca’s ruling political party the African National Congress (ANC).6 These are poign-
1 S	Moore,	‘Sharing	pictures	of	corpses	on	social	media	isn’t	the	way	to	bring	ceasefire’ The Guardian 21 
July 2014.
2 The comments section of online media reports sometimes show popular support for retaliatory actions 
taken by African leaders against international criminal justice mechanisms supported by the West, such 
as the ICC. 
3 F Kuvirimirwa, ‘ICC agent of neocolonialism’ The Herald 29 May 2014.
4 See M du Plessis and C Gevers, ‘The obligation of African Union states to implement ICC arrest war-
rants’ EJIL: Talk! 4 February 2011.
5 G Gatehouse, ‘Kenya MPs vote to withdraw from the ICC’ BBC News 5 September 2013. According to 
the article, Kenyan parliamentarians voted to approve a motion to withdraw from the Rome Statute in 
September 2013.
6 M Raborife, ‘ANC wants SA to withdraw from ICC’ (11 October 2015) <http://www.timeslive.co.za/
politics/2015/10/11/ANC-wants-SA-to-withdraw-from-ICC> accessed 30 October 2015. The article 
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ant examples of a manifest escalation of the mistrust of, and discontentment with 
the ICC. Not to be forgotten is the unprecedented move in which the AU Summit 
approved an amendment to the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights,7	which	exempts	sitting	senior	government	officials	from	prosecution.8 
Many see these events and developments as attempts to create an alternative 
forum to the ICC for the prosecution of international crimes. This is, for some, an 
apt response to the ICC’s targeting Africa; and to others, a step backward in in-
ternational criminal justice and the manifestation of a lack of political will on the 
continent to advance the same.
In a passionate article voicing condemnation9 of the perceived unequal ap-
plication of international criminal justice, Aayesha Soni writes:
Why is George W Bush not being tried, the man who led a modern day crusade against Iraq 
and Afghanistan with fabricated motives and is responsible for the complete destruction of 
those countries? [...] That warrants a war crime worthy of trial.
Why is Benjamin Netanyahu not being tried, a man who launches an offensive on the 
besieged people of Gaza […] wreaking havoc and death that doesn’t spare children, 
hospitals and even UN shelters…	[E]xtensive	fact-finding	missions	[have	concluded]	that	
Israel is guilty of war crimes already. That warrants a trial, surely.10 (emphasis added) 
The	International	Court	of	Justice	(ICJ)	has	held	that	neither	financial	nor	re-
gional political concerns can absolve a state from its obligations in terms of interna-
tional instruments that are aimed at ending impunity for crimes under international 
law.11 However, practitioners and scholars alike have advanced various positions in 
response to the notion of disparate international criminal justice.
explains that on 15 June 2015, the Gauteng High Court had ordered the South African Government to 
arrest Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir when he was in Johannesburg in June 2015 for an African 
Union summit - but despite the court order, he left the country. The ICC had issued a warrant of arrest 
for Al Bashir, wanting him to stand trial on charges of war crimes and genocide. The High Court ruled 
that Government had acted unconstitutionally when it did not arrest him on the basis that the Implemen-
tation Act did not give heads of state immunity from prosecution on criminal charges.
7 The Protocol mandates the prosecution of international and other crimes.
8 A Mudukuti, ‘The African Union endorses impunity’ (2 July 2014) <http://www.southernafricalitiga-
tioncentre.org/2014/07/02/the-african-union-endorses-impunity/> accessed 20 October 2015.
9 Such sentiments have even been echoed by the likes of Nobel Peace Prize winner, Desmond Tutu. See 
‘Tony Blair should face trial over Iraq War, says Desmond Tutu’ The Guardian 2 September 2012. 
10 S Aayesha, ‘The ICC: When law becomes injustice’ <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/why-is-
the-icc-not-trying-bush-blair-and-netanyahu> accessed 8 August 2015.
11 G Kemp, ‘Taking stock of international criminal justice in Africa: Three inventories considered’ in B 
van der Merwe (ed) International criminal justice in Africa: Challenges and opportunities (2014) 7-32, 
quoting Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v Senegal), ICJ, 20 July 
2012. 
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According to Krisch, international law is always in a precarious position where 
it mediates between the demands of the powerful and the ideals of justice held by 
international society at any given moment.12 In the same vein, Wegner posits that 
the promotion of the rule of law internationally always remains subservient to po-
litical expediency.13 Through an exposition of international relations theory, Van 
der Merwe provides some guidance as regards state support for international crimi-
nal justice (or the lack thereof)14 and highlights inter alia the prominent view that 
law is a mere by-product of the political processes that bring about social change.15
Following	the	reasoning	of	these	authors,	this	author	finds	logic	in	concluding	
that	political	calculations	always	factor	into	the	decisions	and	efforts	to	pursue	inter-
national criminal justice universally. In this regard, African states have either been 
slow to act in certain respects, or have favoured the evasion of justice as a means of 
circumventing	the	accountability	of	senior	officials	through	trials	for	grave	crimes	
contrary to the traditional notions of state sovereignty and immunity for heads of 
state.16 Therefore, despite the traction gained in bringing the African international 
criminal justice system into proximity with the human rights and justice systems, 
competing interests have led to retrogression17 from what had ostensibly appeared 
to be positive and forward-looking developments in international criminal justice. 
This author recognizes that a study on the relationship between law and poli-
tics within the context of international criminal justice is not novel; indeed, several 
authors have widely interrogated this issue either through the lens of international 
relations, or, have assessed the practicability of this relationship against events of 
the time in international criminal justice. This chapter, however, seeks to isolate 
the factors, which have either facilitated, or have created an enabling environment 
for the achievement of justice for international crimes in Africa, even in the face of 
competing political interests. 
12 N Krisch, ‘International law in times of hegemony: Unequal power and the shaping of the international 
legal order’ (2005) 16(3) European Journal of International Law 369, 370.
13 P	Wegner,	‘Law	versus	politics	in	international	criminal	justice’	<http://justiceinconflict.org/2011/07/28/
law-versus-politics-in-international-criminal-justice/> accessed 1 October 2015.
14 HJ	van	der	Merwe,	 ‘The	 influence	of	politics	 in	 international	criminal	 law:	A	primer	 (for	 lawyers)’ 
(2014) African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 111-132, citing AM Slaughter ‘Interna-
tional law in a world of liberal states’ (1995) 6 European Journal of International Law 503, 506.
15 See also R Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford University Press 2000) 3.
16 E Keppler, ‘Bashir’s South Africa visit, actually a step forward’ The SADC Lawyer Magazine (August 
2015). 
17 The AU’s decision in Sirte not to cooperate with the International Criminal Court is one example. 
Another	example	is	the	AU	decision	to	adopt	provisions	espousing	immunity	for	sitting	senior	officials	
from prosecution against international crimes under the Protocol on Amendments to the 2008 Protocol 
on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (�Malabo Protocol”).
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The chapter comprises a primer on international criminal justice to overview 
basic notions in international criminal law; a description of some of the notable suc-
cesses and challenges in international criminal justice in Africa; and a conclusion 
that	see�s	to	answer	the	question:	which	factors	minimise	the	negative	influence	of	
politics on international criminal justice in Africa? 
2 Key developments in international criminal justice theory and 
practice
Crimes against international law are committed by [persons], not by abstract entities, and 
only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international 
law be enforced.18
Despite being a subset of public international law, international criminal law 
places	 responsibility	 squarely	on	 individuals	 for	proscribed	acts	 that	are	defined	
as crimes under international law,19 and an obligation on states to prosecute and 
punish international crimes.20	And	whilst	a	universal	definition	for	 ‘international	
crimes’ remains elusive,21 international criminal law derives legal force from treaty 
law, customary international law, general principles of law, judicial decisions and 
learned writings. It is regarded as a relatively new area of international law espe-
cially with regard to the application of human rights22 law to international crimi-
nal justice. In fact, the transformative developments in classical international legal 
theory have been key to establishing mechanisms to ensure that perpetrators of 
international crimes (wherever committed) can be brought to account before im-
partial fora.
18 Excerpt from the Judgment in Göring et al before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nurem-
berg, Germany in 1946.
19 See International criminal law and practice training materials, ‘Module 2: What is international criminal 
law?’ <http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_2_What_is_international_criminal_law.pdf> ac-
cessed 25 July 2015. 
20 K Obura, ‘Duty to prosecute international crimes under international law’ in C Murungu and J Biegon 
(eds) Prosecuting international crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press 2011) 11-31.
21 Ibid. It should, however, be noted that common international crimes include genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
22	 In	this	regard,	human	rights	are	defi	ned	as	‘fundamental	freedoms	to	which	all	human	beings	are	enti-
tled.’ See JS Albanese, Human rights: Oxford bibliographies online research guide (Oxford University 
Press 2009).
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To be sure, international criminal law has been in an expansionary phase, 
seeing an international leap forward in the 1990s caused by growing incidents of 
violence that were managed within the ambit of international humanitarian law, and 
has since expanded to include international cooperation in criminal matters between 
states.23 These developments have resulted in various modalities, which serve as in-
ternational criminal justice mechanisms to respond to international crimes. 




2. The exercise by national courts of extraterritorial jurisdiction;
3. The establishment of truth commissions; and
4. International tribunals.
This	section	provides	an	overview	of	the	significant	developments	in	interna-
tional criminal law and justice, which have given rise to these modalities. 
2.1	 The	individual	as	a	subject	of	international	criminal	law
The establishment of criminal norms in international law required the recogni-
tion of the individual as a subject of international law and the removal of the no-
tion of sovereignty.25	These	developments	first	too�	root	after	the	First	World	War	
with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles of 1919,26	which	saw	the	first	attempt	at	
establishing individual criminal responsibility under international law and interna-
tional criminal courts. 
Advocacy	efforts	 followed,	 led	by	what	 is	 now	�nown	as	 the	 International	
Committee of the Red Cross, resulting in the promulgation of the Geneva Conven-
tions and Additional Protocols from 1949 onwards. Following the Second World 
War, there was a proliferation of courts, laws and notions further transforming in-
ternational	criminal	jurisprudence,	the	most	significant	of	these	being	the	Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany (Nuremberg IMT).
23 I Tallgren, ‘The sensibility and sense of international criminal law’ (2002) 13 European Journal of 
International Law 561-595.
24 Kemp (n 11).
25 Ibid.
26 Signed between Germany and the Allied and Associated powers following WWI, forcing Germany to 
accept	blame	and	liability	for	the	war.	See	<http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/versailles.htm>	ac-
cessed 25 July 2015.
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Credited with ushering in the new international criminal justice dispensa-
tion, the Nuremburg IMT was established through a Charter executed by the allied 
forces in the Second World War27 with a view to realize the just and prompt trial 
and punishment of the major war criminals of the so-called European Axis. Lo-
cated at Nuremberg, Germany, the Tribunal conducted 22 trials better known as the 
‘Nuremberg Trials.’28 
Several authors have written extensively about the contribution of the Nurem-
burg IMT towards the developments of international criminal law, but of note to 
this chapter is Article 6 of the Charter, which provided for an accountability mecha-
nism for crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This pro-
vided for individual and collective responsibility for the said crimes, which is of 





Respected	authors	 in	 the	field	of	 international	criminal	 law	have	contended	
that the notion of a duty to prosecute and punish international law crimes is well 
established in international law. Such authors have argued that states have a general 
obligation to ensure the enjoyment of fundamental rights, which obligation is in-
compatible with impunity or blanket amnesties for international crimes.29
To	advance	 this	notion,	experts	argue	 that	once	a	crime	has	been	 identified	
as having jus cogens status, it inevitably imposes obligations erga omnes and that 
such obligations include the duty to prosecute and punish perpetrators of interna-
27 WWII Allied Forces comprised the US, France, Great Britain, and Soviet Union. See Article I of the 
Charter, <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp> accessed 25 July 2015. 
28 The Nuremberg Trials were heavily criticized for the Allies’ lack of impartiality, since the allied-victors 
were directly responsible for the administration of the trials to the exclusion of applicable crimes that 
may have been committed by the allied forces; and due to the appearance that the trials were a foregone 
conclusion on account that the list of the accused had been developed prior to the drafting of both the 
IMT Charter and the indictments. See <http://www.trial-ch.org/en/resources/tribunals/international-
military-tribunals/tribunal-militaire-international-de-nuremberg/the-significance-and-legacy-of-the-
tribunal.html> accessed 25 July 2015.
29 Obura (n 20), quoting D Orentlicher, ‘Setting accounts: The duty to prosecute human rights violations 
of a prior regime’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2537-2618; MC Bassiouni, ‘Searching for peace and 
achieving justice: The need for accountability’ (1969) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 9; and A 
Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 313.
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tional crime.30 Deductions made from the interpretation and application of interna-
tional conventions31 and customary international law32 have garnered widespread 
acceptance that states have an international obligation to prosecute and punish in-
ternational crimes, and that the use of amnesties and the failure to prosecute where 
international crimes have been committed, would be a breach of the international 
obligation to prosecute.33 
2.3	 Universal	jurisdiction
In	 international	 criminal	 law,	 states	 have	 jurisdiction	 over	 certain	 offences	
recognized by the community of nations as being of universal concern, which gives 
rise to the exercise by domestic courts of universal jurisdiction - the legal principle 
that	permits	states	having	custody	of	the	offender	to	punish	crimes	irrespective	of	
the	place	where	the	offence	was	committed.34 The duty of states under this doctrine 
has been explained thus:35
 [S]tates have a general duty under customary international law and certain international 
treaties36 to apply universal jurisdiction in order to prosecute international crimes. If states 
cannot prosecute suspects of these crimes there is an international customary law obligation 
to extradite suspects to other states willing and prepared to prosecute perpetrators of 
30 Obura (n 20), citing MC Bassiouni, ‘International crimes: Jus cogens and obligation erga omnes (1996) 
59 Law and Contemporary Problems 67. 
31 Obura (n 20), citing the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Additional Protocols, which place particu-
lar obligations on state parties to search for, prosecute, and punish perpetrators of these grave breaches 
unless they opt to hand over such persons for prosecution by another state party; Convention on the 
crime of genocide, which was intended to prevent genocide by ensuring its punishment; Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which imposes un-
equivocal	duty	on	state	parties	to	prosecute	acts	it	defines	as	criminal;	Rome	Statute	on	the	International	
Criminal Court, which obligates state parties to investigate and prosecute ‘core international crimes’; 
and human rights conventions (e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the (Euro-
pean) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights), which advance the 
duty to respect, protect, promote human rights through the investigation, prosecution and punishment 
of serious violations of physical integrity rights. 
32 Through opinio juris and state practice as evinced through international documents, activities and reso-
lutions of the United Nations, decisions of international and national courts and respected authors in the 
field	of	international	criminal	law.
33 Obura (n 20).
34 J van der Vyver, ‘Universal jurisdiction in international criminal law’ (1999) 24 South African Yearbook 
of International Law 105-132, 114-116.
35 K Kamanga, ‘The Rome Statute and Tanzanian legislation’ in R Shilamba (ed) Towards domesticating 
the Rome Statute in Tanzania: A position paper (CHESO 2012).
36 See, for example, the Geneva Conventions (1949) and the Convention against Torture (1984), arts 5(2) 
and 7(2). 
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international crimes, that is, according to the aut dedere, aut judicare37 rule. 
The crimes for which a state may exercise universal jurisdiction may be found 
in multilateral treaties, customary international law and domestic statutes. In the 
absence of a treaty, states may exercise universal jurisdiction for certain crimes un-
der customary international law.38 In this regard, it is not the defendants themselves 
who are stigmatised but the acts that they have committed.39
2.4	 Ad	hoc	courts
To overcome the challenges presented by practical, diplomatic and legal ob-
stacles to states implementing universal jurisdiction, courts have been created by 
the United Nations to try persons guilty of international crimes.40
Following the Nuremburg IMT, a recent example of such a court is the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The ICTY has provided 
victims with the opportunity to voice the horrors they witnessed and cemented the 
notion that an individual’s senior position can no longer protect them from pros-
ecution.41 Established by a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution,42 
in 1993, the mandate of the ICTY was to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed since 1991 in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia. 
2.5	 The	permanent	International	Criminal	Court
The principle of complementarity43 provides for primacy of the state in ques-
tion to prosecute international crimes over which it has jurisdiction.44 The ICC is a 
permanent international court, intended as a court of last resort – thus investigating 
37 Meaning extradite or prosecute.
38 N Roht-Arriaza and M Fernando, ‘Universal jurisdiction’ in B Brown (ed) Research handbook on inter-
national criminal law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 359-369.
39 HJ van der Merwe (n 14). 
40 H Jallow and F Bensouda, ‘International criminal law in an African context’ in M du Plessis (ed) Afri-
can guide to international criminal justice (Institute for Security Studies 2008). 
41 See ICTY website <http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY> accessed 25 July 2015.
42 Pursuant to Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
43 See Rome Statute, art. 1.
44 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, ‘Domestic Prosecution of International Crimes: Lessons for 
Kenya’ <http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/34947/1/domestic-prosecution-of-
international-crimes-final210215%20(2).pdf?1> accessed 25 July 2015.
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and, if necessary, prosecuting only where national courts are unwilling or unable to 
investigate or prosecute a case.45 
The Rome Statute of the ICC (Rome Statute) has been hailed as the most 
important international legal document since the UN Charter. The Rome Statute 
obliges States Parties to cooperate with the ICC in the investigation and prosecu-
tion of the Article 5 crimes46 and in the arrest and surrender of suspects. At present, 
123 countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute.47 
The ICC may exercise (non-retroactive) jurisdiction48 over natural persons49 
(irrespective	of	official	capacity)50 with respect to Article 5 crimes if a State Party 
refers a situation; or if the Security Council refers a situation in accordance with 
Article VII of the Charter of the United Nations;51 or if the Prosecutor investigates 
crimes on their own initiative (proprio motu).52 However, with the exception of 
UN Security Council referrals, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction over crimes 
committed in the territory – or by a national – of a State Party, unless a non-State 
Party consents.53 The Prosecutor may also seek information from reliable sources, 
including governments and non-governmental organizations, to establish whether 
there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. 
The Rome Statute provides a rigorous admissibility test, which considers 
measures already taken by a state as regards prosecution of the crime, in addition to 
a state’s capacity and willingness to prosecute, with respect to a situation.54 Upon 
satisfying itself that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC and that arrest is necessary, the Court may issue a warrant of arrest or sum-
mons to appear,55 which shall be issued by a custodial state in accordance with its 
laws.56 
45 Jallow and Bensouda (n 40).
46 Article 5 of the Rome Statute lists the following as crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction: geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression.
47 See ICC website <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20par-
ties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx> accessed 25 July 2015.
48 See Rome Statute, art. 24. 
49 See Rome Statute, art. 25.
50 See Rome Statute, art. 27.
51 Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations addresses actions with respect to threats to the peace, 
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.
52 See Rome Statute, arts. 13-15.
53 See Rome Statute, art. 12.
54 See Rome Statute, art. 17. 
55 See Rome Statute, art. 58.
56 See Rome Statute, art. 59.
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2.6	 Truth	commissions
Truth	commissions	are	usually	fact-finding	bodies	set	up	to	investigate	serious	
violations of human rights and international criminal law, often committed during 
an	internal	armed	conflict	or	during	the	time	that	a	repressive	regime	has	been	in	
power.57 They are usually mandated to propose methods for the compensation of 
the victims of the crimes investigated and to recommend measures for fostering 
national reconciliation. Occasionally, they are empowered to recommend the pros-
ecution of persons suspected of serious crimes.58
For purposes of this chapter, however, examples in the next section and the 
conclusion will exclude truth commissions in favour of judicial international crimi-
nal justice modalities.
3 International criminal justice in Africa: Judicial mechanisms
No other continent has paid more dearly than Africa for the absence of legitimate 
institutions of law and accountability, resulting in a culture of impunity.59
In spite of being largely absent60 from the earlier transformative developments 
in international criminal law, African states have evinced a willingness to embrace 
and apply judicial mechanisms relating to international criminal justice, particu-
larly in the 1990s.61 This section aims to highlight examples of judicial applications 
of international criminal law in Africa. 
3.1	 Exercise	of	universal	jurisdiction
The	proscription	and	punishment	of	international	crimes	finds	expression	in	
several pieces of legislation on the continent. According to Murungu, there are at 
least twelve countries and one sub-region whose legislation proscribes and pun-
57 Jallow and Bensouda (n 40), citing T Burgenthal, ‘Truth commissions: Between impunity and prosecu-
tion’ Transcript of the FK Cox International Law Centre lecture in global legal reform (2006–07) Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law.
58 Jallow and Bensouda (n 40).
59 P Mochochoko, ‘Africa and the International Criminal Court’ in E Ankumah and E Kwakwa (eds) Afri-
can perspectives on international criminal justice (Africa Legal Aid 2005).
60 By virtue of being colonies and/or due to the continent’s then principled focus on the independence and 
sovereignty of states.
61 E Siwingwa, ‘Domestication versus non-cooperation: The African Union dilemma on the domestication 
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’ in R Shilamba (ed) Towards domesticating the 
Rome Statute in Tanzania: A position paper (CHESO 2012) Chapter 5.
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ishes international crimes.62 Of those, the ones with laws that provide for universal 
jurisdiction over international crimes include: South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, Sen-
egal, Niger and Burkina Faso.63 
Three	�ey	cases	are	summarized	below,	which	show	the	influence	of	leader-
ship transitions, external pressure from the international community, civil society 
activism and the rule of law on international criminal justice.
3.1.1 Ethiopia: The case of Mengistu Haile Mariam
Ethiopia became a party to the Genocide Convention in 1949, but to date is 
not a party to the Rome Statute.64 The Penal Code of Ethiopia of 195765 prohibited 
and provided punishment for genocide, crimes against humanity and aggravated 
homicide.
Mengistu Haile Mariam, former President of the People’s Democratic Repub-
lic of Ethiopia, was responsible for toppling the Ethiopian monarchy in a popular 
uprising	 in	 the	1970s.	At	 the	 time,	Mengistu	was	 the	most	 prominent	 officer	of	
the Dergue (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police and Territorial 
Army).66 After assuming power, Mengistu’s regime targeted individuals and groups 
likely to pose a threat to military rule until he himself was toppled by a coalition of 
rebels in 1991.67
Starting	from	1992,	in	what	was	the	first	trial	on	the	African	continent	where	
representatives of an entire regime were investigated and tried before a national 
court, the transitional regime decided to bring Mengistu and his associates to trial 
for crimes committed during his reign:68
62	 CB	Murungu,	 ‘Immunity	 of	 state	 offi		cials	 and	 prosecution	 of	 international	 crimes	 in	Africa’	 (Doc-
toral Thesis, University of Pretoria 2011) Chapter 5. Murungu lists Rwanda, Burundi, the Republic of 
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Malawi, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Niger, Uganda, Senegal, 
Ethiopia and South Africa as the 12 countries with legislation proscribing and punishing international 
crimes; and the Great Lakes as the sub-region, which has a Protocol for the Prevention and the Punish-




65 Ibid. Murungu notes that this has since been repealed by way of the Criminal Code of 2005. This, to-
gether with the Constitution of Ethiopia, 1995, provides for the prohibition and punishment of genocide 
and crimes against humanity; the former includes war crimes.
66 Jallow and Bensouda (n 40).
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid.
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1.	 	A	special	prosecutor’s	office	was	established	and	held	 trials	 in	differ-
ent locations in the country against: i) policy and decision makers; ii) 
officials	who	passed	on	orders	or	 reached	decisions	on	 their	own;	and	
iii) those directly responsible for committing the alleged crimes. Of the 
5,198 people who were indicted, over 1,000 were convicted; and
2. Mengistu and his co-accused were put on trial before the Ethiopian Fed-
eral High Court on 211 counts of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
Twenty-five	of	the	55	accused	were	tried	in absentia. Mengistu and his 
co-accused were convicted on all counts in December 2006.
3.1.2 Senegal: The case of Hissène Habré
Hissène Habré, former President of Chad, ruled between 1982 and 1990 in a 
reign marked by severe political oppression, the torture and deaths of 40,000 indi-
viduals, and more than 12,000 victims of human rights violations.69 President Idriss 
Déby Itno deposed Habré in 1990 and subsequently appointed a truth commission 
to investigate the crimes allegedly committed during Habré’s regime. After being 
deposed,	Habré	fled	to	Senegal.
A	torture	victims’	group	filed	a	civil	party	complaint70 suit against Habré in 
Senegal71	and	a	Belgian	national	of	Chadian	origin	also	filed	a	suit	 invo�ing	the	
Convention against Torture (CAT) in Belgium.72 Habré was indicted in Senegal 
in 2000, but continuously sought dismissal of the suit in Senegal on the basis of 
immunity as a former head of state.73 Meanwhile, Belgium sought to exercise juris-
diction over the complaint that had been instituted in Belgium on the basis of uni-
versal jurisdiction (passive personality), as well as to compel Senegal to honour its 
obligations under the CAT by either bringing criminal proceedings against Habré, 
69 Ibid.
70 According to Jallow and Bensouda, the Senegalese legal system allows civil suits to be joined with a 
criminal investigation. 
71 Jallow and Bensouda (n 40).
72 Kemp (n 11).
73 See Jallow and Bensouda (n 40). The regime of the former President of Senegal, Abdoulaye Wade, 
was	complicit	in	the	delays	of	trying	Habré.	Then	UN	Secretary	General,	Kofi	Annan,	had	to	request	
Wade not to permit Habré to leave. The 25 year delay of bringing Habré to trial has even been labelled 
as ‘one of the world’s most patient and tenacious campaigns for justice’ by the New York Times; and 
an ‘interminable political and legal soap opera’ by Nobel Peace Prize Winner, Desmond Tutu. See 
HRW website <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/31/qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-african-
chambers-senegal#4> accessed 20 November 2015.
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or extraditing him to Belgium. Senegal refused, on three occasions, to extradite 
Habré to Belgium.74
According to Murungu,75 Senegal then proceeded to enact a law implement-
ing the Rome Statute, amended its Constitution to confer jurisdiction to its na-
tional courts to prosecute all persons (without exception) who commit international 
crimes, and amended its criminal procedure code to allow universal jurisdiction for 
international crimes.76	After	twenty-five	years,	these	events	culminated	in	the	es-
tablishment of the Extraordinary African Chambers,77 which instituted proceedings 
against	Habré	in	July	2015	–	the	first	in	the	world	in	which	the	courts	of	one	country	
prosecute the former ruler of another for alleged human rights crimes.78
3.1.3 South Africa: The Zimbabwe Torture Case
In 2008, South African authorities were approached by a group of individuals 
from the political opposition in Zimbabwe who alleged that acts of torture had been 
perpetrated against them by agents of the ruling Zimbabwean African National Un-
ion Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) in 2007.79
South Africa has domesticated the Rome Statute through the Implementation 
of the International Criminal Court Act (2007), which includes a duty to investigate 
and to prosecute international crimes. So with the assistance of the Southern Africa 
Litigation Centre (SALC),80 these individuals assembled a dossier, detailing the al-
74 Kemp (n 11). According to Kemp, Belgium instituted proceedings before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) against Senegal on the basis that Senegal was in breach of the CAT. The ICJ found that 
Senegal was in breach of its international obligations and had to either prosecute or extradite Habré.
75 Murungu (n 62).
76 Kemp (n 11). According to Kemp, Habré approached the Economic community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)	Court	of	Justice	with	a	request	that	court	find	that	his	human	rights	would	be	violated	by	
Senegal if criminal proceedings were instituted against him, particularly because of the retroactive 
application of the laws as a result of the legislative reform in Senegal. The court ruling directed that 
any prosecution must take place within the strict framework of special ad hoc international criminal 
proceedings. The African Union between 2011 and 2012 repeatedly expressed its desire for Habré’s trial 
to be held in Africa. 
77 The chambers were inaugurated by Senegal and the African Union in February 2013 to prosecute the 
�person or persons” most responsible for international crimes committed in Chad between 1982 and 
1990, the period when Habré ruled Chad. See HRW website <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/31/
qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-african-chambers-senegal> accessed 20 November 2015.
78 See HRW website <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/31/qa-case-hissene-habre-extraordinary-afri-
can-chambers-senegal> accessed 20 November 2015.
79 M du Plessis, ‘The Zimbabwe Torture Docket decision and proactive complementarity’ (November 
2015) ISS Policy Brief.
80 SALC is a South African NGO that promotes and advances human rights and the rule of law in southern 
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legations of torture, and delivered it to the Priority Crimes Litigation Unit of South 
Africa’s National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) in March 2008. The dossier was not 
acted	on,	although	earlier	indications	were	provided	by	the	NPA	to	the	effect	that	
prosecution	might	be	possible	if	the	police	first	investigated	the	allegations.81
In June 2009, SALC and the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum took this decision not to 
prosecute on review to the North Gauteng High Court (‘SALC Case’) to order the 
police to investigate the allegations. The High Court found that the State’s failure to 
open an investigation was unconstitutional and unlawful, and ordered the South Af-
rican police to do the necessary expeditious and comprehensive investigation. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal rejected an appeal by the police and the NPA in Novem-
ber 2013. An appeal by the police to the Constitutional Court found the following:82
1. South Africa can exercise universal jurisdiction over such crimes under 
both international and domestic law;
2. The presence of the suspect in South Africa was not required in interna-
tional or domestic law in order to begin an investigation; and
3. South Africa was under an obligation to investigate such crimes under 
international law and that under domestic law such obligations were to 
be discharged by law enforcement agencies.
3.2	 International	crimes	divisions	in	national	courts
In addition to the enactment of laws, which prohibit and punish international 
crimes, there are examples in Africa of special mechanisms that have been estab-
lished to investigate and prosecute international crimes.
3.2.1 Uganda
In 2008, an International Crimes Division (ICD) was established as a special 
division of the High Court of Uganda with a mandate to prosecute perpetrators of 
war	crimes,	crimes	against	humanity,	genocide,	 terrorism,	human	traffic�ing,	pi-
racy and other international crimes.83
Africa, primarily through strategic litigation support and capacity building. See website <http://www.
southernafricalitigationcentre.org/about/> accessed 4 November 2015.
81 M du Plessis (n 79).
82 Ibid.
83 Jurisdiction is derived from Section 6 of The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice 
Directions, NO.10 of 2011. See the Ugandan Judiciary website <http://www.judicature.go.ug/data/
smenu/18/International_Crimes_Division.html> accessed 25 July 2015.
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Whilst Uganda has domesticated the Rome Statute as The International Crimi-
nal	Court	Act,	2011,	the	ICD	was	established	as	a	way	of	fulfilling	the	Government	
of Uganda’s commitment to the actualization of the Juba Agreement on Account-
ability	and	Reconciliation,	which	was	the	result	of	the	peace	tal�s	to	end	the	conflict	
in northern Uganda between the Uganda Government and the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA).84
Reports indicate that there has been reluctance by ICD prosecutors to pros-
ecute crimes committed before the enactment of the International Criminal Court 
Act on account that it would give the act retrospective force, as well as a reluctance 
to prosecute conduct that had not been criminalized prior to the establishment of the 
ICD. Reports further indicate that the lack of adequate training and the lack of re-
sources to adequately protect witnesses85	hinder	the	ICD’s	ability	to	be	effective.86 
As of 2014, Uganda’s Judiciary reported that 7 cases had been brought before the 
Court and 2 cases were being prepared for committal.87
3.2.2 Kenya
Kenya has domesticated the Rome Statute through the International Crimes 
Act, 2008, allowing for the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
genocide committed in Kenya after 1 January 2009. After calls from various civil 
society actors for the establishment of a special division to deal with international 
crimes and the appointment of an independent prosecutor, Kenya proposed the es-
tablishment of an International and Organized Crime Division (IOCD) of the High 
Court in 2012.88
Critics have voiced concerns over the proposed merger of the prosecution of 
international crimes and organized crimes within a single division, arguing that a 
merged mandate would be too broad, whilst others question whether prosecuting 
84	 REDRESS	Briefi	ng	on	Uganda’s	 International	Crimes	Division,	 ‘Key	 limitations	 to	an	eff	ective	ac-
countability mechanism’
<http://www.redress.org/downloads/factsheet-on-icd-in-uganda-final.pdf> accessed 25 July 2015.
85 There has been a call from the Judiciary for the enactment of a Witness Protection Bill. See Interna-
tional	Crimes	Division,	‘Annual	Report	2014:	Enhancing	Public	Confidence	in	the	Judiciary’
 <http://www.judicature.go.ug/files/downloads/International%20Crimes%20Division%20Report%20
20130001.pdf> accessed 25 July 2015.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice, ‘A real option for justice? The International Crimes Division 
of the High Court of Kenya’ 
 <http://kptj.africog.org/a-real-option-for-justice-the-international-crimes-division-of-the-high-court-
of-kenya/> accessed 25 July 2015.
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international crimes domestically could actually achieve the objective of combat-
ing impunity.89 At present, the IOCD has not been established and it is unclear when 
it	will	be	established.	Meanwhile,	reports	indicate	that	the	Office	of	the	Director	of	
Public Prosecutions is in advanced stages of setting up the IOCD in Kenya.90
3.2.3 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
A	two-decade	long	conflict	continues	to	ravage	the	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo (DRC). According to one report:
Over	the	past	two	decades,	the	Democratic	Republic	of	Congo	has	been	ravaged	by	conflicts	
that have resulted in an estimated six million deaths. During the violence, warring groups 
have repeatedly committed mass atrocities amounting to violations of international law. 
The majority of these crimes remain unpunished, while the victims have had no redress.91 
Whilst the DRC domesticated the Rome Statute in 2002, through publish-
ing the same in the Government Gazette,92 there is no implementing legislation, 
although the DRC Government has referred cases to the ICC.93
Despite the few number of cases that are before the ICC as well as the grav-
ity of the situation in the country, attempts to create a Special Chamber within the 
Appeal Courts at Goma, Lubumbashi and Mbandaka and a Special Chamber of 
Appeal at Kinshasa have failed. Calls by civil society groups to constitute an ad hoc 
tribunal have also gone unheeded.94 
There is, however, domestic legislation criminalizing genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. Article 28 of the 2006 Constitution is also important 
as it excludes a defence of ‘following orders.’ Be that as it may, civil courts in the 
89 ICTJ	Briefing,	 ‘Prosecuting	 international	 and	 other	 serious	 crimes	 in	Kenya’ (April 2013) <https://
www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-Kenya-Prosecutions-2013.pdf>	accessed	25	July	2015.
90	 See	‘National	paper	of	the	Republic	of	Kenya	presented	by	the	Offi		ce	of	the	Attorney	General	and	De-
partment of Justice at the 13th UN Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice’
 <https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/Documentation/HLSstatements/transfer/KENYA.pdf> 
accessed 25 July 2015.
91 See N Elebe, ‘Why DRC lawmakers again rejected special chambers to prosecute international crimes’ 
OSISA 23 May 2014 <http://www.osisa.org/law/blog/why-drc-lawmakers-again-rejected-special-
chambers-prosecute-international-crimes> accessed 25 July 2015.
92 DRC ascribes to the monist theory of international law. See Club des amis du droit de Congo, ‘The 
repression of international crimes by Congolese jurisdictions’ <http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
CAD_TheRepressionofInternationalCrimes_Dec2010_EN.pdf> accessed 25 July 2015.
93 See ICC Website <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situa-
tion%20icc%200104/Pages/situation%20index.aspx> accessed 25 July 2015. 
94 See Elebe (n 91). 
154 Emilia Siwingwa
DRC are not empowered to prosecute international crimes (as those prosecutions 
are reserved for military courts). However, the mobile courts structure has gone 
some way to remedy this for the communities they serve.95 Mobile courts have been 
established in a number of regions (including Bandundu, Katanga, Maniema, North 
Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Kasai Occidental and Equateur) with the support of the 
Government and inter-governmental organizations. In October 2009, the American 
Bar Association/Rule of Law Initiative (ABA/ROLI) helped to establish an itiner-
ant court to hear primarily, but not exclusively, cases of gender-based violence and 
sexual crimes in South Kivu, with jurisdiction to hear civil and criminal matters as 
well as apply international law.96
The courts are domestic mechanisms, operating within the DRC’s existing 
judicial structure. They reach communities that have little access to traditional 
judicial processes. They have the ability to apply international law, and so hold 
those responsible for atrocity crimes to account, and are an illustration of a novel 
approach to positive complementarity.97 According to a 2013 report, 20 traveling 
courts heard 382 cases, with 204 rape convictions, 82 convictions for other crimes 
and 67 acquittals (29 decisions are pending).98
3.3	 Ad	hoc	and	hybrid	tribunals
3.3.1 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Established by the UNSC99 in 1994 as an ad hoc court,100 the mandate of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is to prosecute persons respon-
sible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for geno-
cide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring states be-
tween 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.101 Situated in Arusha, Tanzania, with 
95 Southern Africa Litigation Centre Case Study, ‘Complementarity in action: The mobile gender courts’ 
(2013) <http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/1/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Case-Study-




99 Pursuant to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
100 The ICTY held its closing ceremony on 1 December 2015. See ICTR website <http://www.unictr.org/
en/news/ictr-host-closing-events-december-2015> accessed 2 December 2015. 
101 C Garraway, ‘Courts and tribunals’ <http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-z-guide/courts-and-tribunals/#sthash.
DOAbDiGm.dpuf> accessed 25 July 2015: ‘[This] Statute broke new ground in granting international 
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an Appeals Chamber in The Hague, the ICTR is credited with working towards the 
establishment of a credible international criminal justice system, and the produc-
tion of a substantial body of jurisprudence102 on genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes as well as forms of individual and superior responsibility.
The ICTR had jurisdiction to prosecute natural persons103 for genocide and 
crimes against humanity;104 and persons committing or ordering to commit viola-
tions common to those of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.105 The ICTR Statute 
provided	for	individual	criminal	responsibility	irrespective	of	official	capacity.106
Similar to the ICTY, the ICTR Statute provided for concurrent jurisdiction 
and primacy over the national courts to the ICTR to prosecute violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law, and also permitted the ICTR to formally request national 
courts to defer to its competence.107
The ICTR prosecutor could initiate investigations ex-officio or on the basis of 





trating genocide.109 The ICTR indicted 93 persons, 61 of whom were sentenced.110 
The ICTR delivered its last trial judgment on 20 December 2012 and the remaining 
judicial work now rests solely with the Appeals Chamber.111 
jurisdiction	for	the	first	time	over	war	crimes	committed	in	a	non-international	armed	conflict.’
102 See UNICTR website <http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal> accessed 25 July 2015. 
103 See ICTR Statute, art. 5.
104 See ICTR Statute, arts. 2 and 3.
105 See ICTR Statute, art. 4.
106 See ICTR Statute, art. 6.
107 See ICTR Statute, art. 8.
108 See ICTR Statute, art. 17.
109 See UNICTR website <http://www.unictr.org/en/tribunal> accessed 25 July 2015.
110 Ibid. In this regard, Jallow and Bensouda (n 40) indicate that the ICTR has provided for some of the best 
examples of state cooperation in international criminal justice in that arrests of accused perpetrators of 
the Rwandan genocide took place in Cameroon, Kenya, Togo, Mali, Tanzania, Benin, Angola, Congo, 
Burkina Faso South Africa, Zambia, Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal, Uganda, Gabon, Senegal, and Namibia.
111 Ibid.
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3.3.2 Special Court for Sierra Leone and Residual Special Court for Sierra 
Leone
The Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘Special Court’) was established on the 
request of the Government of Sierra Leone to the United Nations for ‘a special 
court’ to address serious crimes against civilians and UN peacekeepers committed 
during the country’s decade-long (1991-2002) civil war.112
The	Special	Court	was	the	world’s	first	‘hybrid’	international	criminal	tribu-
nal, mandated to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in 
the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, 
in committing such crimes, had threatened the implementation of the peace process 
in Sierra Leone.
The Special Court had jurisdiction to prosecute natural persons irrespective of 
official	capacity113 for crimes against humanity;114 violations common to the Gene-
va Conventions of 1949;115 serious violations of international humanitarian law;116 
and criminal violations of provisions of the Sierra Leone Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act (1926) and Malicious Damage Act (1861).117
Similar to the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court had concurrent jurisdiction 
with national courts, and primacy over the national courts to prosecute the statutory 
violations. The Special Court could also formally request national courts to defer to 
the competence of the Special Court. The Special Court prosecutor could investi-
gate crimes with the assistance of the authorities as appropriate.118
The	 Special	 Court	 was	 the	 first	modern	 international	 tribunal	 to	 sit	 in	 the	
country	where	 the	crimes	 too�	place,	 and	 the	first	 to	have	an	effective	outreach	
programme on the ground.119 Ten persons were brought to trial before the Special 
Court, including former President Charles Taylor. In 2013, the Special Court be-
came	the	first	 internationalised	court	 to	complete	 its	mandate	and	 transition	 to	a	
residual mechanism.120
112 See Special Court website <http://www.rscsl.org/> accessed 25 July 2015.
113 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 6.
114 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 2.
115 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 3.
116 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 4.
117 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 5.
118 Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 15.
119 Special Court website (n 112).
120 Ibid.
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The Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone (‘Residual Court’) was established 
pursuant to an agreement signed between the United Nations and the Government 
of Sierra Leone on 11 August 2010. The court is seated in Freetown with operations 
at	an	interim	seat	in	The	Netherlands	and	a	sub-office	in	Freetown	for	witness	and	
victim	protection	and	support.	It	was	ratified	by	Parliament	on	15	December	2011	
and signed into law on 1 February 2012.121
The mandate of the Residual Court is to carry out the functions of the Special 
Court, which must continue after the closure of the Special Court. To that end, 
the Residual Special Court has ongoing and ad hoc functions with a mandate to: 
maintain, preserve and manage its archives, including the archives of the Special 
Court; provide for witness and victim protection and support; respond to requests 
for access to evidence by national prosecution authorities; supervise enforcement 
of sentences; review convictions and acquittals; conduct contempt of court 
proceedings; provide defence counsel and legal aid for the conduct of proceedings 
before the Residual Special Court; and respond to requests from national authorities 
with respect to claims for compensation and prevent double jeopardy.122
3.4	 Permanent	court	–	International	Criminal	Court
Thus far, 22 cases in nine situations123 have been brought before the Court: two 
by	way	UN	Security	Council	referrals;	five	by	way	of	referral	by	governments;	and	
two non-State Parties accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.124 Although the OTP 
is reportedly conducting preliminary examinations in other situations including 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia, Guinea, Iraq, Nigeria, Palestine and Ukraine,125 
all of the active cases hail from Africa.
African states have viewed this as a betrayal following their role in the prom-
ulgation of the Rome Statute after the genocide in Rwanda. Forty-seven African 
countries were present during the drafting, and pushed for adoption of the same. To 
date, African states continue to lead the number of member-representatives with 34 
(out of 55 African) nations as States Parties.126
121 Ibid. 
122 Statute for the Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1).
123 Uganda, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur (Sudan), Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, 
Cote D’Ivoire and Mali.
124 See ICC Website <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situa-
tions%20and%20cases.aspx> accessed 25 July 2015.
125 See ICC website <https://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situa-
tions%20and%20cases.aspx> accessed 4 November 2015. 
126 Of	the	123	States	Parties,	34	are	African	States,	19	are	Asia-Pacific	States,	18	are	from	Eastern	Europe,	
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In addition to earlier-cited threats to withdraw from the ICC, there have been 
other clear examples of non-cooperation. A case in point is the failure by South 
Africa’s Government to execute the ICC arrest warrant for the surrender and arrest 
of Sudanese President, Al Bashir, despite a court order issued by the High Court 
of South Africa barring Al Bashir from departing the country whilst attending the 
2015 AU Summit in Johannesburg.127
On	5	December	2014,	the	ICC	Prosecutor	filed	a	notice	to	withdraw	charges	
against Kenya’s President, Uhuru Kenyatta, stating that ‘the evidence has not 
improved to such an extent that Mr Kenyatta’s alleged criminal responsibility can 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’128 Whilst the notice did not state the reasons 
behind the failure to collect evidence, an open letter129 by the ICC Chief Prosecutor, 
Fatou Bensouda, stated that two key witnesses had withdrawn their testimonies 
in	 2013,	 and	 in	 court	 filings,	 prosecutors	 indicated	 that	 their	 witnesses	 were	
blackmailed, bribed and intimidated into withdrawing, and blamed the Government 
of Kenya for creating a ‘climate of fear.’130
4 Conclusion
The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends towards justice.131
27 are from Latin America and Caribbean States, and 25 are from Western European and other States. 
See ICC website <http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/Pages/the%20states%20par-
ties%20to%20the%20rome%20statute.aspx> accessed 8 August 2015. 
127 See SALC website <http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2015/09/16/news-release-state-de-
nied-leave-to-appeal-bashir-case/> accessed 20 October 2015. 
 In a bid to ensure that South Africa adheres to its domestic and international law commitments, SALC 
brought an urgent application on 13 June 2015, before the High Court, seeking the immediate arrest 
and detention of President Al Bashir. On 14 June 2015, the Court issued an interim order preventing 
President	Al	Bashir	from	leaving	the	country	pending	the	finalization	of	the	matter,	which	was	set	down	
for hearing the following day. The Court reconvened on 15 June 2015 and after hearing submissions 
from all the parties, it ordered that President Omar al Bashir be arrested and detained for subsequent 
transfer to The Hague. After handing down this order, the Court was informed by the state respondents 
that President Al Bashir had already left the Republic in direct contravention of the interim court order 
issued on 14 June 2015. The Court, in its judgment, indicated that the failure to arrest President Al 
Bashir was unconstitutional and therefore invalid. 
128 See ‘Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta’ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/
iccdocs/doc/doc1879204.pdf> accessed 20 October 2015. 
129 See F Bensouda, ‘Why I applied to adjourn Kenyatta case’ KenyaMOJA 2013. 
130 S Allison, ‘Kenyatta escapes the ICC, and shows others how’ (6 February 2014), <http://www.dai-
lymaverick.co.za/article/2014-02-06-analysis-kenyatta-escapes-the-icc-and-shows-others-how-its-do-
ne/#.VmB9ZdJ97Mx> accessed 20 October 2015. 
131 Martin Luther King Jr.
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In many respects, Africa has been proactive in institutionalizing pro-justice 
mechanisms,	which	have	culminated	in	significant	manifestations	of	the	promotion	
and implementation of the rule of law and human rights as well as the condemna-
tion and rejection of impunity.
This chapter has provided key examples of how international criminal justice 
on the continent has yielded: individual criminal responsibility within and beyond 
national borders; reparations for victims; international oversight in national situa-
tions; prosecution at international fora; and interventions by the international com-
munity where a government or local judiciary were unable or unwilling to act. This 
chapter has, however, also provided examples where the politics of the day have 
thwarted	or	significantly	delayed	efforts	to	implement	international	criminal	justice.
To be sure, the circumstances of the day and context within which internation-
al criminal justice interventions have been implemented should be noted. Timeous 
efforts	to	advance	justice	in	the	following	circumstances	have	resulted	in	positive	
results:	post-conflict	situations,	drastic	transitions	in	leadership;	and	significant	in-
terventions or application of pressure from African states through the AU or pres-
sure from the international community.
The issues that are more proximate to practitioners, however, are as follows:
1. Application of universal jurisdiction: The potential created by the notion 
of universal jurisdiction over the prosecution of international crimes is 
self-evident, particularly where the political will to do so is strong. As 
Kamanga has stated, to strengthen complementarity, there is a need to re-
view132 relevant penal codes to empower the prosecution of international 
crimes.133
2. Establishment and strengthening of national mechanisms for investigat-
ing and prosecuting international crimes: In the absence of implement-
ing legislation, the prosecution of international crimes at the national 
level remains elusive. This then speaks to the need to domesticate key in-
ternational criminal law instruments to provide for domestic legislation, 
which addresses international crimes and establishes/strengthens inves-
tigation mechanisms (such as the police), as well as special prosecutors 
(in special courts).
132 As well as implement.
133 C Murungu, ‘The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Constitution of Tanzania’ 
in R Shilamba (ed) Towards domesticating the Rome Statute in Tanzania: A position paper (CHESO 
2012).
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3. Independence of the judiciary: Where there is impunity, bad governance 
is not far behind. The independence of the judiciary is a critical issue of 
concern in many African jurisdictions, which when compromised under-
mines the accountability mechanisms and undercuts complementarity. 
However, when respected, protected and promoted, it may act to safe-
guard international criminal justice.
4. Civil society activism: In apt situations, civil society ought to intervene 
by instituting legal action(s) to compel governments to comply with their 
statutory and treaty obligations,134 and to carry out training and sensitiza-
tion	activities	for	the	benefit	of	other	practitioners	and	lay	communities.
134 Du Plessis (n 79).
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